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Abstract 
In 2005, the Home Secretary commissioned a new review of the law of murder, with a 
view to "resolving many of the recognised problems. "1 These centred on the breadth 
of conduct, and the implications for the 'mandatory life' sentence, both as punishment 
in law, and as a social label in marking out the gravest offenders against society. 
It is against these difficulties that the partial defence of provocation has struggled to 
reliably reflect the reduced culpability of those who kill when provoked to a loss of 
self-control, particularly concerning situations of domestic violence. The 
controversial House of Lords decision in Smith led to a separate review of the partial 
defences. 
This thesis first considers the definition and scope of problems facing murder and 
their reform, in establishing the wider framework within which provocation must 
operate. 
It then examines problems facing present provocation, assessing the different options 
for reform, and introducing the experiences of other states. The previous reform 
dialogue suffered from an absence of common values, and so the different reform 
options for provocation are assessed through the application of specific criteria, 
enabling more objective and authoritative conclusions. 
These conclusions are then reassessed in light of the recommendations made 
regarding the reform of murder. 
1 Law Commission press release, 20th December 2005. 
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Introduction 
The law of murder in this country, and in particular the area of the law concerning 
provocation, has. been a focus of legal controversy for well over sixty years. 
In that time three Acts of Parliament (the Homicide Act, 1957, and the Abolition of 
the Death Penalty Act, 1965 and the Criminal Justice Act, 2003), three reviews (the 
Advisory Council on the Penal System, 1978, the Criminal Law Revision Committee, 
1980, and the House of Lords Select Committee on Murder and Life Imprisonment, 
1988-89), two Privy Council and several House of Lords' rulings, and a host of case 
law decisions and commentaries, have failed to produce a sufficiently workable law 
of murder, or of provocation in murder. 
As these words are written, the Law Commission has been commissioned by the 
Government to undertake a major review of the law of murder. 
Why is this? It is not as if the quality of discussion during or since the drafting of the 
two Acts, or the subsequent case law, is at all inferior to that in other branches of law; 
rather the contrary; as will become evident in the following pages. Admittedly there 
have been major mistakes in the case law- by general agreement, Smith (Morgan) 1 is 
the most damaging in the area of provocation law - but the real issues, and indeed the 
reasons for Smith and its like, lie elsewhere. 
The fact is that our response to murder, and especially provoked murder, sits at the 
heart of the evolving complex of social, political, practical and humanitarian values 
by which we defme, perceive, and measure ourselves as a successfully civilized and 
advanced society - in testimony of which, at least half-a-dozen other major countries 
are going through the same travails with regard to murder and provocation. It is no 
coincidence that the word 'barbaric' is bandied about so often when discussing 
murder and the law of murder. Likewise the involvement of the Secretary of State in 
sentencing was no accidental by-product of parliamentary bargaining, but the 
reflection by Parliament of a deeply held view in society that this was too important to 
leave to the judges where it impinged on society's self-worth. 
Any resolution of the problems with murder and provocation must also satisfy this 
wider requirement, and one· possible conclusion from the analysis of murder and 
provocation that follows is that the failure to provide a lasting resolution, or even 
proposal, concerning murder and provocation in murder, reflects much less a failure 
to overcome historical defects in the law, than a degree of narrowness in discussion 
and approach that has prevented the finest minds in legal practice and analysis from 
finding an agreed solution. The well-established and effective mechanisms by which 
the practice of law is defined and advanced have proved insufficient here, despite 
sixty years of effort, and we must look to other tools, and wider criteria. 
A thesis of this length can only hint at these extension& of scope, concept and 
.. analytical technique that a fuller treatment would have enablFd, and indeed I have had 
. . : . 
1 (2000) 3 WLR 654 (HL); (2001) 1 AC 146. Hereafter 'Smith'. 
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to omit significant materials from my coverage. Nevertheless, it includes a full 
exposition of the principal issues dogging the law of murder as a whole (since 
provocation can neither be analysed nor resolved without this wider viewpoint); 
important contributions from murder-law review in other countries; a range of 
conceptions of provocation; extensive discussions of the vruious practical approaches 
that enable a workable balance of responsibility between judge and jury; and a 
criteria-based comparative analysis of the principal candidate approaches for a 
successful law of provocation in murder. 
Are we in a position to define and establish a successful law of murder, and 
provocation in murder? I believe so, and the concluding analysis finishes by 
recommending a particular approach to provocation in murder. However the value of 
this thesis should not solely reside in its conclusion, and each chapter has been written 
to be largely self-sufficient, and to provide useful clarifications, insights and 
conclusions regarding its particular area. 
Murder and Provocation 
Murder is the intentional unlawful killing of another person. To commit murder is to 
break the most fundamental of rights, the right to life. For this reason murder is 
considered to be the worst offence against society, and is punished with a mandatory 
life sentence, a uniquely severe punishment. 
Provocation is one of three partial defences to murder, each of which enables a 
successful defendant to receive a manslaughter conviction, and a sentence set at the 
discretion of the sentencing judge, rather than a mandatory life sentence. For a plea 
of provocation to succeed, the defendant must have been provoked, by words said 
and/or things done, causing them to lose self-control, leading to their killing the 
victim; the jury must then decide that a 'reasonable man' would have done the same. 
The partial defences are highly important, their presence necessary in justifying the 
'one-fit' sentence for murder by enabling defendants who don't deserve this 
maximum punishment to be convicted of manslaughter. 
Criticism of provocation has been primarily directed at the 'loss of self-control' 
requirement, which is claimed to be outdated and male-centred, and the objective 
standard, which is claimed to be overly complicated and unrealistic. 
The advent of 'battered woman syndrome,' and greater awareness of the plight of 
battered women in abusive relationships, has brought considerable pressure upon the 
temporal constraints of self-defence and provocation. Due to deficiencies in self-
defence, provocation has tended to be the plea that battered women have raised; this 
has placed immense pressure on the defence, which is fund.a.qlentally ill suited to their 
predicament. 
Smith was an attempt to address this, but its freeing of the jl.fry role and restriction of 
judicial guidance, as well as subjectivisation of the standard of evaluation, has proved 
highly controversial (indeed the latest dedsions indicate that qounter to all precedent 
it has been overturned). 
3 
The Law Commission of England and Wales was commissioned by the Home 
Secretary in October of 2003 to review the partial defences, with particular emphasis 
on their effect in domestic violence. The law remains in an unsatisfactory state. 
Objectives and Content 
The principal objectives of this thesis are to establish 
- clear useful expositions of the state of play in each of the main sub-areas of this 
area of the law 
- a methodology for evaluating proposed legal structures for murder as a whole, and 
provocation in murder 
- evaluations of the main proposed and tried approaches leading to a proposal for an 
effective law of provocation in murder. 
To this end the thesis will first consider murder law as a whole, and the prospects and 
advantages/disadvantages of possible changes (chapters 1&2), before defining, 
positioning and assessing the present and possible future state of provocation within 
murder (chapters 3-10). Chapter 11 summarizes and draws conclusions about the 
state and future of provocation law, and considers these in the light of the conclusions 
of chapter 2 concerning reform of the sysem of homicide. Each chapter summarizes 
and draws conclusions about the particular area or approach it considers. 
In chapter 10, five main options for reform of provocation will be assessed: 
- the possibility of stabilising provocation in its present form as a subjectivised plea 
the possibility of moving back to a plea based in justification with a stronger 
objective standard 
the Law Commission's formulation, combining a plea of provocation based in 
justification with a partial defence of self-defence 
the 'extreme mental or emotional disturbance' formulation, established by tJle 
Model Penal Code in the US, which considers the intensity of the emotion 
experienced by the defendant 
and finally the case for abolishing provocation without replacement 
Individual chapters contain additional introductory material. 
Research for this thesis was completed in early December 2005. Consequently this 
precluded any consideration ofLCCPNo. 177. 
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SECTION A 
The Law of Murder 
6 
7 
Chapter 1: Definition ofMurd~r Law and 
Reform 
1. The Present Law of Murder 
1.1. Definition 
Homicide is: "The death of a human being in circumstances where the death 
can be attributed to the conduct of one or more other human beings. "1 
1.2. Actus Reul 
A homicide must contain certain elements: the victim must be human, the death 
must be through the act or omission of one or more human beings, and it must 
occur within the Queen's Peace.3 Homicide can be either unlawful or lawful: 
unlawful homicide includes crimes such as murder, manslaughter, infanticide 
and causing death by reckless driving. · An example of lawful homicide is 
justified self-defence. 
1.3. Mens Rea4 
The mental element in the crime of murder is 'malice aforethought. ' Prior to 
the Homicide Act 1957, there were 3 types of malice: 'express,' 'implied' and 
'constructive.' Express malice is intent to kill the victim. Implied malice is 
intent to cause the victim grievous bodily harm. Constructive malice was found 
where the defendant caused death while committing a felonious act: the 
intention was to commit the felonious act, but the causing of death (the 
felonious act) had the effect of 'constructing' the crime of murder. This was 
subsequently considered to render murder too broad in ambit, and was abolished 
by the Homicide Act 1957.5 
The mental elements are often referred to as 'intent to kill' and 'intent to cause 
grievous bodily harm' 6. Intent to kill is straight-forward; the defendant causes 
the victim's death with the intention of doing so. The more difficult element is 
1 Sime:>ter and Sullivan, ~Crim~a1 Law -Theory and Doctrine' (200 I), 319. 
2 The behaviou.r element. . . 
3 The meanings of these are not important to this disCussion. 
4 The mental element. . . · · · · 
5 Section l: "Where a person kills another in the course or furtherance of some other offence, the 
killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the same malice aforetfzought (express or implied) 
as is required for a killing to amount to murder when not done in the co~rse or furtherance of some 
other offence." The term 'malice aforethought' is now outdated and misleading, but remains the 
mental state required in section I. 
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'gbh' and 'gbh-intent' will be used for the latter 
8 
intent to cause gbh, which has been interpreted to mean '"really serious" harm.' 7 
After several challenges, the law finally was settled in Cunningham8, the House 
of Lords ruling 3-2 in favour of gbh-intent. Any further change will probably 
have to be made by Parliament. 9 
As established above, the required mental state of the defendant is that of 
'intent.' The intent required is subjective, i.e. that possessed by the defendant at 
the time of their conduct causing death. 10 
Intent to kill or cause gbh is referred to as 'core' or 'primary' intent. Where a 
case involves primary intent, Lord Bridge's 'golden rule' from Moloney11 
applies: "the judge should avoid any elaboration or paraphrase of what is 
meant by intent and leave it to the jury's good sense to decide whether the 
accused acted with the necessary intent. "12 Where there is a lack of compelling 
evidence that the defendant intended to kill or cause gbh, the 'golden rule' does 
not apply. In such cases the jury is to decide on the objective evidence (the 
facts they have regarding the incident, and the defendant's conduct before, 
during, and after). Such a situation requires guidance from the judge, but quite 
what this should constitute has been a matter of considerable debate. Currently 
a' Wool/in' direction is required, as established by Lord Steyn: 
"the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to find the necessary 
intention, unless they feel sure that death or serious injury was a virtual 
certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant's 
actions and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case. "13 
Wool/in is the most recent decision in a difficult case law, in which judges have 
struggled to formulate a coherent doctrine to deal with 'oblique' or 'secondary' 
intent. 14 The rationale behind seeking to include such cases within murder is 
that the defendant, while perhaps not intending to cause death or gbh, was 
inevitably going to do so; and so is morally deserving of the stigma and 
punishment of a murder conviction. The significance of a murder conviction as 
opposed to one of manslaughter is that a convicted murderer receives a 
mandatory life sentence, whereas a defendant convicted of manslaughter has 
their punishment set at the discretion of the court. 
7 
"Bodily harm needs no explanation, and 'grievous' means no more and no less than 'really serious. "' 
Dpp. v Smith (1961) AC 290, 334, per Viscount Kilmuir. 
8 (1982) AC 566 
9 Ibid., 925, per Lord Bridge. 
10 In Smith (Op. Cit., 7) this briefly became an objective standard; a defendant was presumed to have 
intended to cause death or gbh if a reasonable person in their situation would have foreseen death or 
gbh as a probable consequence. In response, a 2-clause bill was prepared by the Law Comn'lission, and 
the second clause was passed, becoming section 8 of the 1967 Criminal Justice Act. Section 8 has no 
real relevance to Smith, but since its creation the courts have consistently treated Smith as overturned, 
most recently in Wool/in ((1999) 1 AC 82). The Priry Council, in Frank/and, ((1987) AC 576) advised 
that Smith was based on a misunderstanding of the common law and should not be followed. The 
standard remains a subjective one of whether the defendant actually po~s.yssed intent to kill or cause 
~bh. 
I (1985) AC 905. 
12 Ibid., 926. 
13 (1999) 1 AC 82, 90. 
14 Hereafter 'secondary' intent. 
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2. Problems with the Definition of Murder, and Reform~ 
2.1. Introduction 
Murder is commonly considered the worst crime possible, and consequently it 
·has always been uniquely severely punished: initially through the death 
sentence, after 1965 15 by the mandatory life sentence. The highly stigmatic 
nature of murder and its unique punishment engenders enormous pressure to 
accurately define its parameters. In this respect, the current law is far from 
settled, and has been the subject of considerable criticism and advised reform, 16 
principally focused on gbh-intent, secondary intent, and mandatory life. 
Resolution of these issues, particularly mandatory life, has been heavily 
impacted by the European Convention of Human Rights. 
2.2. Gbh Intent 
The ambit of murder is very broad; the mental element presently includes both 
intention to kill and intention to cause gbh to the victim. The latter has been the 
subject of intense debate, and a troubled case law. 
2.2.1. The case law. 
In Vickers 17, the defendant argued that 'gbh-intent' was the equivalent of 
constructive malice - the intention to cause gbh, ·and the resultant death, 
'constructing' a murder conviction- and as such should be abolished. The 
Criminal Court of Appeal ruled that the causing of gbh was not a separate 
felony from murder but was the means by which the death was caused; 
·consequently 'gbh-intent' remained. 
In Hyam, 18 Lord Dip lock asserted. that the doctrine of constructive malice 
had stifled development of the law, and that without it the judiciary 
certainly would have abolished gbh-intent for murder. Lord Kilbrandon 
concurred, rejecting this construction of murder. Lords Hailsham and 
Dilhorne, however, disagreed19, and the fifth judge, Lord Cross, 
astonishingly confirmed the murder verdict on the 'assumption' that gbh 
intent was sufficient. This weak resolution enabled a challenge in 
Cunningham, where the House of Lords ruled 3-2 that gbh intent was 
sufficient. This is the current state of the law. 
15 The Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act. 
16 3 Law Reform bodies have reviewed it: Advisory Council on the Penal System (1978), Criminal Law 
Revision Committee (1980), House of Lords Select Committee on M4fder and Mandatory Life 
Imprisonment ( 1988-89). 
17 (1957)2 QB 664. 
18 (1975) AC 55. 
19 reasoning that such a change was best left to Parliament. Viscount Dilhome stated that it would 
make little difference to the law's administration. (Ibid., 86). 
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2.2.2. Problems with Gbh-intent 
- Breach of the prindple of correspondence 
An important principle of law is that there should be correspondence 
between act and mental state for a defendant to be held culpable of a 
particular offence. Gbh-intent constitutes a significant breach of this 
principle. 
In Cunningham, Lord Edmund-Davies, dissenting, said: 
"I find it passing strange that a person can be convicted of murder if 
death results from, say, his intentional breaking of another's arm, an 
action which ... would in most cases be unlikely to kill. "20 
Lord Mustill referred to 'gbh-intent' as a ''fiction "21 : "If one could find 
any logic in the rules I would follow it from one fiction to another, but 
whatever grounds there may once have been have long since 
disappeared. "22 
Lord Windlesham's review of Home Office statistics for 1994-1996 
concerning mandatory life sentences found that the majority of those 
convicted Qf murder only possessed gbh intent.23 This is cause for grave 
concern: if, as the Law Commission stated, "a man should not be 
regarded as a murderer if he does not know that the bodily harm which he 
intends to inflict is likely to kil/,"24 then Lord Steyn's argument in Powell 
and Daniels and· English, 25 takes on great force: gbh-intent, he says, 
"turns murder into a constructive crime, "26 and "results in a majority of 
defendants being classified murderers who are not in truth murderers. "27 
Lord Steyn considered the counter-argument that anyone willing to risk 
the unpredictability of inflicting gbh is deserving of a murder conviction if 
death results. He concluded it to be "outweighed by the practical 
consideration that immediately below murder there is the crime of 
manslaughter for which the court may impose a discretionary life 
sentence or a very long period of imprisonment. "28 
- Inconsistent with broader criminal law 
20 (1982) AC 567, 582. Under the present law this would constitute murder, the lack of correspondence 
between mens rea and actus reus making murder a constructive crime. 
21 A-G's ref. No. 3 of'94 (1998) AC 245,262. 
22 Ibid. 
23 
"Responses to Crime," vol. 3 (1996), 342, n.29. 
24 
'Imputed Criminal Intent (DPP v Smith)' 1967, para. 15( d). 
25 (1999) I AC I, 14-15. 
26 Ibid., 15. 
27 Op. Cit., 25, 10. 
28 Ibid. 
I 
I 
J 
~ 
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· Glanville Williams highlights the discrepancy between the mental element 
for murder and attempted murder: ''It may seem remarkable that a person 
cannot be convicted of attempted murder when he deliberately inflicts 
grievous bodily harm upon another, and yet can be convicted of murder, if 
as aresult ofthe.injury,. the victim dies. "29 Deaths with this kind of mens 
rea generally result in a. manslaughter conviction, argues Williams, unless 
the defendant is engaged in a "villainous enterprise. "30 
_. Unacceptable to Juries 
· Lord Goff, writing extra-judicially, cited a case in which one defendant 
·'glassed' another man, accidentally severing the jugular vein causing the 
victim's death. The defendants were willing to plead guilty to 
manslaughter but the prosecution refused and proceeded on a murder 
charge. Lord Goff in summing-up, told the jury that if they found that the 
defendant intended to kill or cause gbh, they must find him guilty of 
murder. The jury acquitted the defendants of murder, convicting them of 
manslaughter instead. Lord.Goff concluded "it was plain to me, and must 
. have been plain to. the jury, that the assailant did indeed intend to cause 
the victim really serious bodily harm; yet they could not bring themselves 
to call him a murderer. "31 Where an informed jury find themselves 
unable to uphold the law, gbh-intent is further called-into question . 
. The case also highlights.the wide prosecutorial discretion that this mental 
·element entails: . "So the rule in Cunningham is. merely a rule that a 
person may be convicted of murder if he both falls within the rule and is 
·unlucky in the choice of prosecutor, judge and jury. " 32 · 
2.2.3. Resolving the problems: the need for a change in the law 
Prevailing opinion is that gbh-intent must be changed. 
As Ashworth states; "If we are to continue to have two offences of 
homicide, murder and manslaughter, the aim should be to define murder 
so as to capture those killings which dre generally the most heinous. "33 
The MCCOC reports that many law reform bodies have condemned the 
current formulation ofmurder.34 
Lord Edmund-Davies, in Cunningham, considered the arguments to be 
"of the greatest public consequence,. but concluded that "Resolution of 
29 Williams (1983), 251. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Goff, "The Mental Element In Murder" (1988) LQR 30, 49. 
32 Op. Cit., 25. 
33 
"Reforming the Law of Murder" (1990) Crim. LR 75, 78. 
34 Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing Comf11ittee of Attomeys'General, 
'Discussion paper, Draft Criminal Code: Fatal Offences Against tpe person' (MCCOC/SCAG, 
Canberra, 1998), 51. Hereafter 'MCCOC.' 
12 
that conflict cannot, in my judgement· be a matter for your Lordships' 
House alone.· It is a· task for none otherthan Par.liainent. "35 . 
In Wool/in, Lord Steyn stated that ''unless the House of Lords or 
Parliament have occasion to revisit this point, the sufficiency of an intent 
to cause serious harm is· the basic assumption upon which any analysis 
must proceed "36 
The Cunningham decision was strongly influenced by a recognition that 
the power to overrule must be sparingly used, especially in this context. 
. To · overturn the common law would mean that some, including the 
defendant in Vickers/1 were wrongly hanged. Such is the magnitude of 
this decision:, it was left for Parliament to decide. 
2.2.4. Options for Reform of Gbh-Intent 
The appropriate reform is a matter of considerable debate, and there are a 
number of different possibilities; each of· which · is assessed here, 
incorporating as appropriate the experiences of other States. 38 
- Abolition of gbh-intent 
Various law reform bodies worldwide have recommended the abolition of 
gbh-intent, including the Victoria LRC -of Australia,39 the Law 
Commission of England and Wales,40 and the Canadian LRC.41 The 
problems raised in 2.2.2 can be restated as arguments for-abolition: 
- Murder is such a serious offence that the mental element should 
correspondingly involve unlawful killing. The Law Commission 
stated '·'unless there· are strong reasons which justify a contrary course, 
it is generally desirable that legal terms should correspond with their 
popular meaning. '~2 
- There is a significant difference in moral culpability between someone 
who intends to cause death and someone who intends to cause gbh but 
· neither intends nor' foresees death. 
'Gbh' is an uncertain standard, leading ··to· some confusion and 
contention regarding its definition and scope. 43 
35 Op. Cit., 8, 582, per Lord Edmund-Davies 
36 Op. Cit., 13, 90. per Lord Steyn. 
37 (1957) 2 QB 664. 
38 Options for broadening murder are considered at 2.4. 
39 
'Homicide' (Report No. 40, 1990-1991), para.s 122-131. 
40 Op. Cit., 24, para.s 15,17. 
41 
'Recodifying Criminal Law' (Report 31, 1987), 57-58. 
42 Op. Cit., 40, 15(a). 
43 The LRC of Victoria cited hypothetical scenarios demonstarting the difficulty of distinguishing a 
plea deserving of murder from manslaughter: stifling a victim's cries by using a pillow to suffocate 
them to the point of unconsciousness; shooting them with a gun in the arm, leg or foot; punching them 
with the intention of causing unconsciousness. Each of these scenariqs assumes that the defendant 
intended only to do the action described (Op. Cit., 40). 
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- Manslaughter is perfectly adequate to deal· with those who cause death 
with gbh-intent, due to the discretionary life sentence. 
Despite this there remain strong reasons for its retention and reform: 
- Abolition encourages murderers to claim gbh-intent, and so avoid a 
murder conviction. 
- There m many instances in which willingness to inflict extreme harm 
· or cruelty without intending to kill,· or sheer indifference as to the risk 
• · · of death, ·is· sufficiently morally· grave · a:s to wartant conviction under 
· · < the severest heading of UnlaWful killing, a.nd the severest punishment. 
- The ·doctrine ·of· 'cominon • kriowledge' states that a defendant 
intentionally inflicting gbh understands the "inherent vulnerability of 
the human body"44 artd·therefore the ri'sk of resultant death. 
. . .-· 
. . . . ' . 
There are several possible approaches to the reform of 'gbh-intent': 
~ · Redefinition of gbh · 
... according to the effect on the body 
This approach seeks to narrow gbh to hairn with a serious effect upon the 
body, and so to exclude objectively trivial harm. 
Glanville Williams proposed the following definition: 
''An injury is serious if it -
(a) causes distress, and also 
(b) involves loss of a bodily member or organ, or permanent bodily injury 
or· permanent functional ' impairment, or serious and permanent 
disfigurement; or severe and prolonged pain, or serious impairment of 
mental health, or prolonged . unconsciousness; and an effect is 
permanent whether or not it is remediable by surgery. ,,4s 
lieland~s Non Fatal Offences AgainSt the Person Act, 1997, similarly 
defines serious hartn as . . . 
· "injury which creates a ·substantial risk of death or which causes serious 
disfigurement or substantia/loss of imPairment of the mobility of the body 
as a whole or of the function oi any particuiar. bodily member or 
orgim.: "46 · · · · ·' : · • · · · · · 
. These . definitions . both create . ·ample . scope for arbitrary decisions: the 
infliction of serious injury to a fmgef or toe (in. Williams' formulation also 
·callsing distress), could constitUte gbh. · ' · • · · 
The CLRC reported . " ... we spent some time considering the possible 
definitions but finally conCluded thai ·no satisfaciory.dejinition ,t;ould be 
44 Irish LRC 'Homicide- the mental element in murder' (LRC-CP 17·2001), 67. 
45 
"Force, Injury, and Serious Injury" (1990) Vol. 140 New LJ 1227, 1229: · 
46 Section 1(1). 
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drawn .up: some broken noses might amount to serious injury, others not. 
Many cases involve a multiplicity of injuries none of which alone might 
constitute a serious irifury but which together might amount to it. ,,41 The 
gravity of an injury often will depend on "the particular context and 
circumstances, including, for instance, the availability or otherwise of 
timely medical assistance.'.48 
An alternative is to read the definition inclusively, leaving the jury some 
freedom in determitring whether _the severity. warrants a murder 
conviction. However, this wcmld permit thejury unacceptable latitude to 
apply the mental element according to personal values. 
... ac.~ording to the risk of death 
Another approach is to define gbh according to the risk of death it creates . 
. . 
The Queensland and Western Australian criminal codes define it as 
"bodily injury of such a nature as to endangerorbe likely to endanger 
life, or cause, or be likely to cause, permanent injury to health.'.49 The 
mental element ~quires "that the. offender. intended to do an act or to 
cause physical or mental injury which was of such a nature as actually to 
endanger, or objectively viewed be likely to endanger life, or cause, or be 
objectively likely to cause permanent injury to health. "5 
The Indian Penal Code states culpable homicide to be murder where it is 
done "with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the 
bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of 
nature to cause death." 51 The "ordinary course of nature" is held to mean 
"in the usual course if left alone.n52 This approach has the advantage of 
restricting the scope of 'gbh' and so minimising "the constructive nature 
of the liability by excluding injuries such as broken arm, which, although 
serious, do not normally result in death."53 . . · 
However, where a defendant inflicts a fatal injury which would not have 
caused death in the 'ordinary course of nature', they· would evade a 
murder convict.ion - even where they. knew the probability of death 
resulting in the particular circumstances. By contrast, a cut to a 
haemophiliac might . be "sufficient in · the. ordinary co1,1rse. of nature to 
cause death" despite being apparently and objectively trivial . 
. The definitional appro~h benefits by narrowing the scope of conduct 
which.can constitute gbh., However, the nee4 to reliably reflect the moral 
culpability of each offender cannot be a~hieved through a uniquely 
47 14th Report, 'Offences against the Person' Cmnd 7844 (1980), 154. 
·· 
48 Op. Cit., 44, 5.20(2). · · · 
49 Op. Cit., 34, 41. 
5° Kenny Charlie v The Queen (1999) HCA 23, per Callinan J. 
51 Section 300(3). · · 
52 Chana Padhan (1979) 47 Cut LT 575. 
53 Op. Cit., 44, 5.19(1). 
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objective definition of gbh, as the examples above show; rendering such 
an approach insufficient. 
- Intention to inflict gbh with an awareness of the risk of causing 
death 
There is a very strong case that the mental element in murder should 
involve subjective knowledge of the risk of causing death. The two 
principal levels of subjective knowledge are considered below. 
... awareness of a probability ofcausing death 
- The plea 
The Indian Penal Code requires that the defendant cause death "(b) with 
the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or (c) 
With the knowledge that he is likely by· such act to cause death ... "54 
Similarly, the legal reform bodies of Victoria and Southern Australia 
recommend limiting 'gbh-intent' to situations in which the defendant 
knows there is a "Substantial risk of causing death "55 or a "high 
likelihood that his actions will cause death. "56 
- Problems with this formulation 
The Crown Prosecution Service criticised the need to prove that the 
defendant knew their actions to be 'likely' to cause death, as asking too 
much of the prosecution. 57 The Irish LRC said "Whether serious injury is 
'likely ' to cause death depends on all the surrounding circumstances 
including the accessibility or otherwise of medical aid. Specialist 
material evidence mf{ be required to assist the jury, further complicating 
court proceedings."5 Indeed defendants could claim that they did not 
know their actions were likely to result in death, merely that they might. 
... awareness of the possibility of causing death 
- The Plea 
In Powell and Daniels and English,59 Lord Steyil recommended that a 
"killing should be classified as murder if there is an intention to kill or to 
cause really serious bodily harm coupled with an awareness of the risk of 
death. "60 The CLRC . strongly endorsed this 61 , constructing the mental 
element as "an unlawful act intended to cau_se serious injury and known 
54 Section 299. 
55 Victoria, Working Paper, N.o.8 (1984), 21. 
56 South Australia, 4th Report, 8. 
57 Op. Cit., 40, paras 59~60. 
58 Op. Cit., 44, 4.092, 2. 
59 (1999) 1 AC 1, 15.· 
60 Ibid. 
61 Op. Cit., 4 7, para. 31. 
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to that accused to involve a risk of causing death. "62 The House of Lords 
Select Committee favoured a similar formulation: "intending to cause 
serious personal harm and being aware that he may cause death,"63 
arguing that "while the law continues to have two categories of homicide, 
unforeseen but unlawful killings are properly left to the law of 
manslaughter. "64 The Irish LRC pointed out that "these 
provisions ... satisfY the principle of correspondence [unlike] ... the present 
rule which allows a conviction for murder in cases where death was 
neither foreseen nor intended."65 
- Problems with this formulation 
The Irish LRC highlighted the lack of "indication to the jury as to what 
degree of possibility is required," allowing conviction on "remote or 
slight possibilities."~6 This is an important criticism, although where a 
defendant willingly inflicts gbh and is aware of the risk of causing death, 
their culpability is significantly elevated, however slight the risk might be. 
On the issue of 'awareness', the Irish LRC commented: "A defendant 
who acts in a temper 'without thinking', or who fails to advert to the 
consequences out of sheer indifference to them, or who claims he was so 
preoccupied in what he was doing that he gave no thought to a'p.; 
particular result of his actions, would escape liability on this approach." 7 
More importantly, the Crown Prosecution Service anticipates significant 
difficulties regarding proof.68 Any formulation needs to be practically 
workable, and were this provision to result in defendants unacceptably 
evading a murder conviction due to difficulties of proof, this would be a 
major drawback. 
However, the number of international law reform bodies which have 
recommended this reform 69 suggests a consensus that this formulation is 
workable. If the requirement of subjective knowledge of the risk of death 
would result in a significant reduction in murder convictions, this might 
not be due to undesirable practical difficulties, but rather a desirable 
narrowing of the moral culpability of those charged with murder. 
62 Ibid., 17-31. 
63 Draft Criminal Code, clause 54(1), (HL Paper-1, 1988-89), vol I, para. 71). 
64 HL Select Committee, 'Report of the Select Commttee on Murder arid Life Imprisonment' (HL 
Paper 78-1, 1989), 68. 
65 Op. Cit., 44, 4.091. 
66 Ibid., 4.093. 
67 Ibid., 4.100. See 63. 
68 Op. Cit., 24, para. 59. 
69 Eg. Canadian LRC, 'Recodifying Criminal Law' (Report 31, 1987), 57-58; Victoria LRC, 
'Homicide' (Report No. 40, 1990-1991), para.s 122-131; NC Crimes Conslfltative Committee, 'Crimes 
Bill 1989: Report of the Crimes Consultative Committee' (April, 1991 ); f-IL Select Committee, (Op. 
Cit., 65), para. 195; LC England and Wales, 'A Criminal Code for England1and Wales' (Law Corn. No. 
177, vol. 1, 1989), para. 54(b) ... etc. 
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2.2.5. Conclusion to Gbh-intent Reform 
Reform of gbh-intent has been the subject of extensive and intensive 
debate. The Home Office's recent commissioning of the Law 
Commission to undertake a review of murder is welcoine, although after 
three· previous major reviews without enactment one's enthusiasm is 
· somewhat guarded. 
Abolition of gbh-intent is in many ways a desirable simplification, leaving 
such killings to be dealt with under manslaughter with its discretionary 
life sentence. This would improve the correspondence between action and 
mental state which at present is worryingly disparate. However, abolition 
would enable many defendants to evade a murder conviction through 
claiming to have intended gbh but not death. This clearly is undesirable, 
and arguably unnecessary when under the present 2-tier structure of 
homicide, unlawful killings of a sufficiently proximate culpability may 
justifiably be punished under the same offence. Accordingly, abolition is 
not recommended here. 
Likewise, redefining gbh is not a suitable reform option. It would lead to 
arbitrary distinctions on the basis of the technical definitions, making no 
reference to the defendant's state of knowledge regarding the risk of 
death .. This formulation fails to limit the scope of 'gbh' sufficiently 
enough to counteract the absence of a subjective requirement concerning 
the risk of death. The Irish LRC doesn't see this as a problem, on the 
basis that an offender willing to inflict 'serious injury' "must be taken to 
know that he is risking life in view of the inherent yulnerability of the 
human body and mind Such a defendant -therefore possesses sufficient 
moral culpability to justifY a murder conviction." 70 This is a dangerous 
line to pursue, with worrying echoes of DPP v Smith. 71 
Qualification of gbh-intent through a requirement of foresight of the risk 
of death is a stronger reform option. 72 There are some problems with this 
approach: the Irish LRC identified one such (quoted above); 73 however, a 
defendant who does not think about the fatal consequences of his actions 
is hardly of the same moral culpability as a defendant who is aware of 
their potential fatal effect and who despite this proceeds to inflict gbh. 
Another important concern is that objectively trivial harm, resulting in 
70 
'Homicide: The Mental Element in Murder' (LRC-CP17-2001), 4.097. 
71 Op. Cit., 7. 
72 The House of Lords Select Committee recommended: "intending to cause serious personal harm 
and being aware that he may cause death." (Op. Cit., 65, vol I, par~. 71). The LRC of Victoria 
recommended that 'gbh-intent' be replaced with "intent to inflict a serious injury which the defendant 
knows to be life endangering; or intent to cause serious injury being aware that he or she may kill." 
('Discussion Paper on Homicide' (1991), 6.47). It accepted that "the co"lbiration of the intent to cause 
serious injury with foresight by the defendant of the possibility of death makes the level of clupability 
sufficiently comparable with that of the intentional killer to warrant a conviction of murder." (para. 
115). However, in its subsequent report, the Commission decided that gbh-intent was not appropriate 
for a murder conviction, regardless of the defendant's awareness of risk, and recommended its 
abolition. (Para. 139). 
73 Op. Cit., 44, 4.100. 
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death, may result in a murder conviction where the risk of death, however 
remote, was foreseen by the defendant. However, the line between 
murder and manslaughter must be drawn somewhere, and this seems an 
appropriate place to do so. A theoretically ideal solution would be to 
combine a redefinition of gbh with an awareness of the risk of death 
resulting; however, redefining gbh carries so many problems that it would 
result in a highly complex fomulation. For this reason, intent to cause gbh 
with a subjective awareness of the risk of death resulting is advocated as 
the best way forwards. 
Clearly the law must be reformed. There is considerable sympathy 
towards the majority in Cunningham, who stated that they would not 
hesitate to change the law, and introduce a requirement that the offender 
be aware of the risk of death, Were an appropriate case to come before 
them. This change is too important to be left any longer: the present law 
fundamentally devalues murder, and any justification of the mandatory 
life sentence. An intervention of judicial legislation may be justified. 
2.3. Wool/in: 'Oblique' or 'Secondary' Intention 
Courts have struggled with the inability of 'intention to kill or cause gbh' 
to capture accurately within its definition actions they felt to be morally 
deserving of a murder conviction; especially cases of utter disregard for 
life in the pursuit of other criminal ends. Initially they attempted to define 
· and construct intent to kill from an elevated probability of death; 
subsequently they treated likelihood of death as evidence for the jury in 
determining intent; ultimately, the difficulties in case law resulted in the 
W oollin-direction, defining a separate category of secondary intention; 
but this continues to cause confusion. 
2.3.1. The case law 
In Hyam, Lord Hailsham stated intention to include the "inescapable 
consequences ofthe end as well as the means"; although elsewhere in the 
same judgement he did not consider that ''foresight as such of a high 
degree of probability is at all the same thing as intention. "74 
In Moloney, Lord Bridge went further, stating that there may be cases in 
which events sought neither as ends or means, should be considered to 
have been intended: 
"A man who, at London Airport, boards a plane which he knows to be 
bound for Manchester, clearly intends to tral]el to Manchester, even 
though Manchester is the last place he wants (o ,be and his motive for 
boarding the plane is simply to escape pursuit ... By boarding the 
74 Op. Cit., 18, 77. 
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Manchester plane, the man conclusively demonstrates his intention to go 
there, because it is a moral certainty that that is where he will arrive. "75 
Williams provides an example: a person plants a bomb on a plane in order 
to claim the insurance for the package's destruction. It is not his aim to 
kill the passengers and crew; "but he knows that success in his scheme 
will inevitably involve their deaths as a side-effect. "76 The death of the 
passengers and crew is not a means to the destruction of the package, but 
is nonetheless inextricably linked to the act itself. 
However Lord Bridge did not provide an applicable construction of this 
mental element. · 
Elsewhere in Moloney Lord Bridge stated the accused to be guilty only if 
he foresaw the probability of an outcome as '~little short of 
overwhelming, "77 but neither this, still less his ambiguous term 'natural 
consequence,: clearly established the level of likelihood required to 
construct intent. 78 
The cases following Moloney supported· the view that 'morally certain' 
consequences were merely evidence. from which the jury could 'infer' 
intent, and not evidence of intent per se. Lord Scarman's position in 
Hancock and Shank/and 79 was restated in Nedrick by Lord Lane: "if the 
jury are satisfied that at the material time the defendant recognised that 
death or serious harm would be virtually certain (barring some 
unforeseen intervention) to result from · his voluntary act, then that is a 
fact from which they may find it easier to infer that he intended to kill or 
do serious bodily harm. "8 
However the judges in Wool/in adopted an alternative to regarding 
'oblique' or 'secondary' intention as evidence of the defendant possessing 
intent, treating it instead as constituting a separate category of intention. 
Lord Steyn's leading judgement rejected the notion of 'inference', 
replacing 'infer' by 'find' (below): 
" ... in the rare cases where the direction that it is for the jury to simply 
decide whether the defendant intended to kill or do serious bodily harm is 
not enough, the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to find 
the necessary intention, unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily 
harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a 
result of the defendant's actions and that the defendant appreciated that 
such was the case. "81 
Wool/in has been widely praised by legal writers as establishing a "firm 
line "82 between intention and recklessness. Simester and Sullivan 
75 Op. Cit., 11, 926. 
76 Williams 'Textbook of Criminal Law' (1983), 84. 
77 Op. Cit., 11, 925. 
78 Williams: "Conception is a natural consequence of sexual interco¥rse but it is not necessarily 
~robable. " ("Oblique Intention" (1987) CLJ 417). 
9 (1986) 1 AC 455, 473. 
80 (1986) 1 WLR 1025, 1028. 
81 Op. Cit., 13, 96. 
82 Smith, "Case and Comment R v Woo/lin'' (1998) Crim. LR 890, 891. 
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comment that Wool/in had the effect of "clarifYing the independent status 
of this second category of intention. "83 
2.3.2. Related case law 
The clearest guidance relating to scope rather than certainty of intent 
comes not from murder case law, but from Steane.84 In Steane, the 
defendant made a broadcast for the Nazis, as a means of saving his family 
from a concentration camp. He clearly foresaw assisting the enemy as a 
direct consequence of his broadcast, yet the Court of Criminal Appeal 
acquitted him on the basis that he had made the broadcast with an intent to 
save his family. 
Lord Denning applauded this reasoning on the basis that "it would be very 
hard to convict him of an 'intent to assist the enemy' if it was the last 
thing he desired to do. "85 The judgement in Steane was cited with 
approval bl Lord Bridge, who said he knew of "no clearer exposition of 
the law. "8 The judgement stated "if on the totality of the evidence there 
is room for more than one view as to the intent of the prisoner, the jury 
should be directed that it is for the prosecution to prove the intent to the 
jury's satisfaction, and if, on a review of the whole evidence, they either 
think that the intent did not exist or they are left in doubt as to the intent, 
the prisoner is entitled to be acquitted "87 
2.3.3. Problems with Wool/in 
- The negative expression of the Woollin direction 
The negative thrust of the direction "suggests that, although foresight of 
virtual certainty is necessary before the alternative category of intention 
is satisfied, it may not always be sufficient. "88 In R v Matthews and 
Alleyne,89 this ambiguity clearly manifested itself. The trial judge directed 
the jury to equate foresight of a virtual certainty with intention. In doing 
so, he directed the jury beyond where the law "as it stood at foresent 
permitted him to go ... redrafting the Nedrick/Woollin direction." 0 The 
Court of Appeal ruled that the jury were 'entitled to find' intention, and 
consequently the judge could not direct that they JllUSt find intention, Lord 
Justice Rix concluding that "the law has not yet reached a definition of 
intent in murder in terms of appreciation of a virtual certainty. ,m 
83 Simester and Sullivan 'Criminal Law- Theory and Doctrine' (2001), 123. 
84 (1947) KB, 997. 
85 
'Responsibility before the law' (1961), 27. 
86 (1985) 1 All ER, 1039. 
87 (1947) KB 997, 1004, per Lord Goddard. 
88 Ibid. 
89 (2003) EWCA Crim, 192. 
90 Ashworth, "Commentary on R v Matthews and Alleyne" (2003) Crim. LR 553, 553-554. 
91 Ibid. 
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The Court·stated that, .''once what ·is required is an appreciation of virtual 
certainty of death, and not some lesser foresight . of merely probable 
consequences, there is very little to choose between a rule of evidence and 
one of substantive law. "92 However this remains an · anomaly; it is 
unacceptable that part of the definition of the mens rea for murder should 
be left to the jury's discretion in deciding. whether to apply it or not. 
. - Problems with the scope of intent 
·· .. Williams' insurance-claiming bomber example is not resolved by Wool/in . 
. . His protagonist's action will maim or kill people, but his act was not 
directed against them, as the language.ofthe· law and of Woo/lin asswnes; 
his act, and his 'primary intent' was simply to:destroy a package. If one 
widens the meaning of 'intent' in order to encompass the certain 
consequences of his act, it is then no longer possible to say that, for 
. example, the coach driver who saves many lives by staying in his lane on 
& busy road despite seeing a person on the road ·ahead did not 'intend' to 
. kill that person: the outcome was obvious, inevitable and chosen; but his 
'primary intent' was to save lives. · 
Similarly, there are situations where. a doctor knows that in treating a 
patient,· they are. virtually certain to shorten their life;· for example the 
. administration of strong pain-killers to a terminally-ill patient. It will be 
undesirable to find the doctor morally culpable for shortening the patient's 
life, where they are treating them to the best of their ability. Wool/in does 
not cover this. 
The approach taken in Steane, and cited by Lord Bridge, does not resolve 
this either; .Williams points·out that where 'intent' has been broadened- as 
it surely . would for his insurance-claiming bomber example - it is no 
longer· possible to support a claim that Steane had .no intent to assist the 
enemy: he intended to assist them in order to save his family.93 
. Norrie offers · an alternative . interpretation of Steane to bypass this 
objection: he describes· a • "moral threshold between. the. direct intent 
(saving the family) and· the indirect. intent· (assisting the enemy), "94 
recognised by the. Court of Appeal in. narrowing intention to the former, 
and demands why "intention: can be narrowed in these cases but not 
where necessary, in the law· of murder?"9? ·.-Previously Smith had 
. identified. such. 'narrowing' . as giving ·effect to. a concealed defence of 
necessity · or self-defence; :. citing the example of the ·Herald Free 
Enterprise; (in which a man, immobilised with fear; blocking an escape 
ladder from a sinking ferry,'was thrown from the ladder. to his death by 
the defendant, enabling the safe escape of other passengers).96 
. 921bid. . ' 
93 
'The Mental Element in the Crime of Murder' (1988) 104 LQR 30, Id. 
94 Norrie, "After Woollin" (1999)Crim. LR 532, 538. 
951bid: 
96 
'Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law' (1989), 68·74. 
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Sullivan reiterates William's assertion in relation to Steane that "the 
concept of intent cannot, without distortion, discriminate between the man 
who acts to save his family and the man who acts to earn a pack of 
cigarettes. "91 · . 
It can be argued that the law's acceptance of such defences (of necessity, 
and duress) is very limited, and consequently that in any case of murder 
with a 'morally acceptable' feel of necessity, the narrow definition of 
intent must be opted for. This is possible under the Nedrick/Woollin 
direction which 'entitles' the jury to "find that foresight of virtual 
certainty does not equate with intent, "98 (as reasserted in R v 
Matthews&Alleyne). But this is an unsatisfactory temporary solution to a 
fundamental problem. 
This then is the current dilemma facing the courts: either virtual certainty 
equating with intention cannot be applied across the board as it is too 
morally insensitive and will result in undesirable results; or it can be so-
applied, provided it is under the Wool/in conception, as clarified in 
Matthews and Alleyne, where there remains some moral 'elbow room' for 
the jury (but· not the judge) to 'narrow' intent. This is necessary in 
situations such as the medical context, or cases such as the Herald Free 
Enterprise; but Woollin's 'elbow room' is unintended, anomalous, and 
capable of misuse. 
2.3.4. Resolving the problems 
Woollin, confinned in Matthews and Alleyne, can be seen as a major step 
forward in its rejection of 'virtual certainty' as evidence from which to 
'infer' intention, in favour of virtual certainty as a separate category of 
'found' intention. 
However, the Nedrick!Woo/lin ·direction is anomalous, and raises issues 
that need to be addressed directly in any new law, even if only to say that 
where there is an "indirect intent" as well as a "direct" one, such as in 
Steane, the jury should decide (applying the '"morally acceptable' feel of 
necessity" - see above) which intent should be dominant: the "direct" in 
Steane, in Smith's example, in the coach driver's case, and in the medical 
cases
99
; · the "indirect"· in the insurance-claiming bomber example. 
Similarly any other.· circumstanCes that might justify the jury's 
'entitlement' to find on intent should be· explicitly categorised, allowing 
the anomaly above to be resolved by making the· Wool/in formulation 
substantive. 
97 Sullivan, 'Intention and Complicity: A Reply', 648, citing Williams, 'Criminal Law, The General 
Part' (1983), 41. 
98 Op. Cit., 94, 537. 
99 See Ashworth's suggestion, "The Treatment of Good Intentions" in Simester and Smith, 'Harn1 and 
Culpability' ( 1996) 173, 178. 
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2.3.5. Reform· Options for 'Secondary' Intent 
The primary criticism directed at murder asserts it to be overly broad, and 
consequently devalued. The CLRC asserted the importance that "the 
· definition of murder should, so far as possible, ensure that those convicted 
of murder will be deserving of the stigma. Too wide a law of murder 
· would not only be unjust but would tend to diminish the stigma to which 
we ... attach value."10° For this reason, formulations broadening the scope 
of intention to encompass recklessness will not be considered further here, 
the recent decisions having sought to establish a clear distinction between 
recklessness and intention. 
This assessment will. briefly look at, firstly, the option to abolish 'oblique' 
intent, restricting the mental element for murder to where a defendant's 
purpose is to cause death, and secondly, attempts to resolve difficulties 
with the 'Wool/in' direction. 
- Narrow definition of intention 
There are certain advantages to abolishing secondary intention: primarily 
. the avoidance of awkward construction and counterintuitive expression 
which can result from seeking to extend 'intention.' 
However the drawbacks of this reform are vast and preclude any serious 
follow-through. Invoking the oft-cited example, a person planting a bomb 
on a passenger plane, wanting to claim insurance on his parcel's 
destruction, would not he culpable under murder for the resultant deaths 
because his purpose was not to cause death; "It is only a philosopher who 
would consider that there would be any divergence between the accused's 
knowledge of the ultimate .death of the passengers and crew of that plane, 
and what he meant to do." 101 . 
There is a certain class of consequence to any action, so intrinsically 
bound up in the act itself, that it cannot be divorced with any moral 
legitimacy; indeed to do so may be to encourage defendants to act without 
.fear of the virtually certain consequences of their actions. 
- Attempts at defining secondary intention 
The need to establish a substantive definition is generally accepted, but its 
precise form is a matter of some debate. Various attempts have been 
made at drafting a definition; each is considered in turn below. 
Clause 18(b) of the Draft Criminal Code ( 1989) defines: 
"A person acts intentionally with respect to 
(i) a circumstance when he hopes pr knows that it exists or will exist 
. . . . . 
100 
'Offences Agaisnt the Person' (14th Report Cmnd. 7844 (1980)) para. 19! 
101 Charleton, McDernott, Bolger 'Criminal Law' (1999), 7.93. 
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(ii) a result when he acts either in order ot bring it about or being aware 
that it will occur in the ordinary course of events" 
A number of criticisms of this formulation have been raised: 
- The expression "in the ordinary course of events" lacks clarity, failing to 
establish the foresight required of the defendant. To take the bomb 
example given above: if the bomb has a 50% failure rate, is this included 
under the definition? 
- This formulation fails where a defendant acts expressly to prevent a 
virtually certain outcome from occuring. Lord Goff s hypothetical 
example is apt: a father and his two little girls are trapp~d at the top of a 
burning building, the only means of escape being to jump through the 
window. The father throws his first daughter out, then jumps out with 
the second daughter in his arms. It is virtually certain that the first girl 
will suffer serious injury or die as a result, and under a strict 
construction of secondary intent, were she to die, the father must be held 
to have intended her death. Clearly this is absurd: "The definition leaves 
open the possibility that a person may be held to have intended a result 
that it was his express purpose to avoid."102 
Clause 1 of the Criminal Law Bill (1993) sought to make improvements: 
"A person acts ... intentionally with respect to a result when -
(i) it is his purpose to cause it; or 
(ii) although it is not his purpose to cause it, he knows that it would 
occur in the ordinary course of events, {{;he were to succeed in his 
purpose of causing some other result. "1 3 
The expression 'being aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of 
events' of clause 18(b) is here rendered ' he knows that it would occur in 
the ordinary course of events,' so as to differentiate intent from 
recklessness. The Law Commission stated that this expression denotes 
the "near-inevitability"104 of a result. 
However, Smith pointed out that this formulation risks being too narrow. 
On the facts of Woollin, the defendant did not have a purpose "of causing 
some other result," but simply sought to vent his anger. For this reason, 
such a case might well evade Clause 1. Smith apd Hogan suggested a 
suitable amendment to be "he knows that it will occur in the ordinary 
course of events, or that it would do so if he were to succeed in his 
purpose of causing some other result."105 However, it is not certain that 
this reformulation would capture the Woollin-scenario; 
102 Smith "A Note on Intention" (1990) Crim. LR 85, 86. 
103 This formulation sought to improve on the Draft Criminal Code's clause 18(b). 
104 
'Legislating the Criminal Code: Offence agains the Person and General Principles' (Law Corn. No. 
218, 1993), 9-10. 
105 
'Criminal Law' (1999), 60. 
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Simester and Sullivan propose this improvement: "although it is not his 
purpose to cause that result, he knows that it would occur in the ordinary 
course of events either if he were to succeed in his purpose of causing 
some other event, or if he were to behave as he purposes."106 
This proposed direction, while effective in capturing the Wool/in-scenario, 
is not easy for a jury to apply. The. following direction is suggested as a 
possible alternative. 
"A person acts ... intentionally with respect to a result when -
(i) he wants it to happen, and behaves so as to make ithappen; or 
(ii) he knows it to be. a virtually certain consequence of .. 
(a) his behaviour in trying to cause the result he wanted; or 
(b) his behaviour in successfully causing the result he wanted; or 
(c) his behaving as he wanted to do." 
It is necessary to consider how the above formulation would fare against 
four examples which have been frequently cited throughout the debate on 
secondary intention: the father throwing his daughter from the top floor of 
a burning building; the person planting a bomb on a plane so as to claim 
insurance on the destruction of the package; the same scenario but where 
the bomb has a 50% failure rate; and a Wool/in-type case in which the 
defendant acts with no clear result in mind. 
The scenario involving the father in the burning building would be 
captured under (a). This is clearly undesirable, and necessitates a specific 
exemption: 
"(iii) If the defendant expressly acts so as to stop a result from happening, 
they cannot be held to have intended it - even where it was virtually 
certain to happen because of their actions. " 
The formulation· would capture both scenarios where the package is 
placed in the plane.· Where the bomb is virtually certain to explode, the 
offender is caught under (ii)(a); where there is a 50% failure rate, the 
offender is caught under (ii)(b). It is recognised that (a) could be 
subsumed within (b), but for the sake of a simple direction, it is kept 
separate. A jury finding a defendant guilty under (a) has no need to deal 
with the slightly more complex (b). . 
The Wool/in-type case would be caught under the third heading. This is a 
difficult case in which the defendant has no particular end result in mind, 
but nevertheless acts in such a manner as to be virtually certain to cause 
death or gbh; however framing virtual certainty by reference to the actions 
of the defendant would enable Wool/in-type cases to be caught under 
secondary intention. 
The result of the coach driver example (mentioned in 2.3.3 ii) is unclear 
under this definition. The defendant's express purpose is not to avoid 
106 (2001), 121. 
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killing the man in the road, but to save the live~ of his passengers. The 
law of necessity would need to be addressed wi~ a view to capturing 
altruistic actions which intend to save certain lives, but in doing to must 
cause the loss of others. 
2.3.6. Conclusion to Reform of 'Secondary' intent 
The arguments for abolition are flawed. It is articifical to demand 
absolute correspondence between act and mental state, and to do so would 
lead to further undermining of murder, encouraging defendants to act 
without consideration of the fatal consequences of their actions. 
Instead, the following plea is proposed as a workabie formulation: 
"A person acts ... intentionally with respect to a result when -
(i) he or she wants it to happen, and acts so as to make it happen; or 
(ii) he or she knows it to be a virtually certain consequence of .. 
(a) their actions in trying to cause the result they wanted; or 
(b) their actions in successfully causing the result they wanted; or 
(c) their doing the actions they wanted to do." 
(iii) If the defendant expressly acts so as to stop a result from 
happening, they cannot be held to have intended it - even where it 
was virtually certain to happen because of their actions. " 
Additionally, a specific exemption would be needed for situations where 
for example doctors, treating terminally-ill patients to the best of their 
abilities, administer increasing doses of painkillers, in the knowledge that 
this is virtually certain to shorten the patient's life. It is unacceptable that 
they be convicted of murder, and an exemption is needed. Although many 
may take exception to a fmding of the requisite intention for murder being 
made in such a case, prior to the defendant's being excused, this is 
difficult to avoid, and is contended to be outweighed by the benefits of a 
substantive defmition. 107 . 
There would also be the need for very clear guidance as to when the issue 
of oblique intent is to be considered: i.e. only where there is insufficient 
evidence on the facts to settle the question of primary intent. There is 
critical need to maintain a cleat distinction between primary and 
secondary intention, to prevent undermining of the mental element in 
murder.· 
2.4. Broadening Murder 
There has been considerable argument for widening the scope of murder to 
include unlawful killings which, although not included within the present 
definition of murder, are of a moral culpability so grave that they should be. 
107 The precise drafting of the specific clause is beyond the scope of this t~esis. 
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Ash worth stated: "It may be argued ... that there are some reckless killings 
which ought to be classified as murder, since they show such a high disregard 
for human life as to be socially and morally equivalent to many intentional 
killings. "108 There is strong feeling that, for example, terrorists who give a 
warning regarding a bomb they have planted, thus evading intention for murder 
(due to the absence of a virtual certainty that their actions will cause death or 
gbh), should be convicted of murder for any resultant death. This is an area 
fraught with difficulties. As Ashworth stated: "it is difficult to identify with 
precision the characteristics of those cases. "1 09 
The options considered here are: widening murder so as to incorporate 
defendants who act with the foresight of a probability of death or gbh resulting; 
adopting the MPC provision of 'reckless killings manifesting an extreme 
indifference to the value of human life'; and the Scottish approach of 'wicked 
recklessness.' 110 
2.4.1. Foresight of Probability of Death or Gbh 
In some states, a likelihood of causing death or gbh is sufficient for a 
murder conviction. 
-The Plea 
In Australia, reckless murder is committed when "D does an act, 
foreseeing, when he or she commits the act, that it will probably cause 
death or grievous bodily harm to a person, although D does not intend 
that either event should happen. D may be indifferent as to whether the 
specified harm occurs, or D may even wish that it should not occur. "111 
In Boughey v the Queen, the High Court of Australia held. 'probable' to 
mean "a substantial- a real and not remote- chance. "112 
- Problems with this formulation 
The Irish. LRC considers that this may be crude in its operation: "The 
degree of foreseeable risk required ... may well depend on the justifiability 
of the risk-taking in question. Thus, the required degree of risk may be 
minimal where there is little or no social premise for the risk-taking in 
108 Op. Cit. 33, 79. 
109 Ibid. 
110 The approach of specifically listing those types of killing whjch augment culpability and 
consequently the category of conviction, is not considered. The 1957 Homicide Act retained capital 
punishment for those killings deemed "particularly susceptible to deterrence," but, as Shute 
comments, "this messy compromise quickly proved unstable." ("P)lllishing Murderers: Release 
Procedures and the 'Tariff,' 1953-2004" (2004) Crim. LR 160, 162). Shute cites Lord (Chief Justice) 
Parker, describing the distinction between 'capital' and 'non-capital' murqer as a "hopeless muddle." 
(See "Lord Parker on the Death Penalty" (1962) Crim. LR 583). 
111 Gillies, 'Criminal Law' (1997), 630. 
112 (1986) 161 CLR 10. 
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question; by contrast, it may be much higher tyhere the defendant's 
conduct possesses some moral justification or sociql virtue. "113 
In the often-cited example of a terrorist who has planted a bomb, but 
given a warning, can the risk be said to be greater than 50%? The need to 
determine the precise mathematical risk involved quickly becomes 
arbitrary. Does this approach reliably capture those reckless killers 
deserving of a murder conviction? The answer is no. 
In the American case of Commonwealth v Malone 114, the defendant pulled 
the trigger of his gun three times, knowing there to be a bullet in one of 
the five chambers, and on the third occasion the gun fired, killing the 
victim. A 60% chance that the gun would frre was sufficient for a murder 
conviction. Had the defendant pulled the trigger only once, or even twice, 
the chances of causing death would have been only 20% or 40%, and the 
defendant would only have been guilty of manslaughter. Michaels states; 
" ... it is impossible to see why the design of the gun or the slightly earlier 
death of Malone 's companion should change the outcome of the case. In 
terms of moral culpability, there is no reason for punishing the discharge 
on the third pull any differently from the discharge on the first. "115 
In People v Causey, 116 the defendant killed the victim, striking him on the 
head with a jar of pennies. He was convicted of murder despite there 
being no discussion as to the chances of the fatal blood clot developing; 
"It is difficult to see how the defendant, or the jury, could have calculated 
such a risk accurately. "117 
- Conclusion 
This formulation fails to accurately track the moral culpability of the 
defendant. The requirement of a risk greater than 50% is arbitrary and 
quite unsatisfactory. 
2.4.2. Reckless Killings manifesting an Extreme Indifference to the 
Value of Human Life 
Under section 202.2(b) of the Model Penal Code, criminal homicide 
constitutes murder when "it is committed recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life. " The 
reasoning behind this provision is that it "reflects the judgement that there 
is a kind of reckless homicide that cannot fairly be distinguished in 
grading terms from homicides committed purposely or knowingly. "118 
113 ILRC Consultation Paper, 'Homicide: The Plea of Provocation' (LRC CP27-2003), 4.016. 
114 (1946) (Pennsylvania) 354 Pa. 180,47 A2d 445. 
115 
'Defining Unintended Murder' (1985) 85 Col LR (No. 4) 786, 798. 
116 (1978) (Illinois) 66 Ill App. 3d 12, 383 NE 2d 234. 
117 Op. Cit., 44, 4.023. 
118 American Law Institute, 'Model Penal Code and Commentaries' (1980) rart II, 21. 
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-The Plea 
The Code defines recklessness as the conscious disregard of a substantial 
and unjustifiable risk that the defendant's actions will cause death. The 
risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and 
purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, his 
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct 
required. 119 The requirement of recklessness is expressed as follows: 
" ... the Code calls for the further judgement whether the actor's conscious 
disregard of the risk, under the circumstances, manifests extreme 
indifference to the value of human life. The significance of purpose or 
knowledge as a standard of culpability is that, cases of provocation or 
other mitigation apart, purposeful knowing homicide demonstrates 
precisely such indifference to the value of human life. "120 The standard 
set is subjective, and cannot include risk-taking by the defendant where 
they do not realise the danger of their act. 
- Criticisms of the plea 
Criticisms focus on the subjective nature of this formulation, and the 
accompanying risk of inconsistency. The Irish LRC highlights the risk of 
"inconsistent jury verdicts, or possibly verdicts based on irrelevant or 
discriminatory factors such as the defendant's background, allegiance or 
other activities. "121 
Y eo strongly condemned the formulation as introducing ... an 
unacceptable degree of uncertainty over the outcome of a case. One jury 
might consider that the lack of social utility of an accused's conduct was 
so great as to warrant a murder conviction even though the foreseeable 
risk of causing death was only a possibility. Another jury deliberating on 
exactly the same facts might decide against a murder conviction on the 
ground that a higher degree of foreseeable risk was required. "122 
The House of Lords' Select Committee on Murder and Mandatory Life 
Imprisonment concluded of this formulation, tqat the law of murder is 
already regarded by many as ·too broad, and that there is a need for 
. . d. furth . 123 precisiOn regar mg any er expansiOn. 
The Irish LRC, in its consultation paper on Homicide, also recognised 
these criticisms, but reasoned that "some degref! of imprecision may be 
inevitable as the concept of justifiabi/ity is necessarily value laden. "124 
While this is to an extent inevitable in any jlp)' system, there remain 
degrees of risk or uncertainty, and this provision may go too far. 
119 1bid., (Official Draft and Revised Comments)' Part I, 202(2)(c ). 
120 Op. Cit., 118, 21-22. 
121 Op. Cit., 113, 4.036. 
122 
'Fault in Homicide' (1997) 0-83. 
123 Op. Cit., 64, para. 73. 
124 Op. Cit., 113, 4.043. 
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It is striking that although 42 out of 51 US states 125 have some version of 
'depraved heart' murder (the common law forerunner to the MPC 
'extreme indifference' provision), only 14 codify a formula of 'extreme 
indifference' similar to the MPC's definition: it is clear that some 
discomfort is felt with the subjectivity of this provision, and consequently, 
where adopted it is significantly tempered. ' 
- Conclusion 
This plea is insufficiently precise for the purposes of broadening murder, 
the subjective nature of the plea resulting in a lack of certainty concerning 
its application. Murder is already criticised as overly broad and devalued 
because of the breadth of 'gbh-intent'; to further expand the scope of 
murder would place even greater pressl.ire upon the indeterminate 
sentence and partial defences. 
2.4.3. Wicked Recklessness 
-The Plea 
Lord Goff has recommended the adoption of the Scots 'wicked 
recklessness' provision, 126 which includes within its definition of murder, 
killings which demonstrate "such wicked recklessness as to imply a 
disposition depraved enough to be regardless of the consequences. "127 
The 'wicked' conduct must be "recklessness so gross that it indicates a 
state of mind which is as wicked and depraved as the state of mind of a 
deliberate killer. "128 Lord Sutherland defined the action required as 
demonstrating "that you don't really care whe(h~r the person you are 
attacking lives or dies. "129 It seems that the defendant must have intended 
some rersonal injury, 130 but need not have appreciated the risk of causing 
death. 31 
Certain factors are deemed relevant in determining whether the defendant 
has been wickedly reckless: these include the use of a weapon, 132 intention 
to commit an assault with particular referepce to the nature and 
circumstances being "all-important. "133 
125 50 states and the District of Columbia. 
126 Op. Cit., 31, 58. 
127 Cawthorne v HM Advocate (1968)JC 32, 193. Macdonald, 'Criminal Law' (1978), 38. 
128 Sheriff Gordon, 'Criminal Law' ( 1978), 23-17. 
129 HM Advocate v Hartley (1989) SLT 135, 136. 
130 Op. Cit., 128, para. 23-15, quoting Viscount Hailsham LC in Hyam (qp. Cit., 18, 77-78). 
131 HM Advocate v Hartley (1989) SLT 135; HM Advocate v McGuiness (1937) JC.37; HM Advocate v 
Frazer ( 1920) JC 60. 
132 The Scottish Law Commission, 'Attempted Homicide' (Consultative Memorandum No. 61, 1984) 
3.5. 
133 The Law Commission cited Alison stating the intention to inflict an ipjtuy must be "of such a kind 
as indicates an utter recklessness as to the life of the sufferer, whether he live or die." (Aiison, 
'Principles ofthe Criminal Law of Scotland' (1989), 1). 
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This formulation has the advantage of enabling a murder conviction for 
those reckless killers possessing the same culpability as an intentional 
killer. It" also ensures that terrorists who plant a bomb but give a warning, 
are convicted of murder· where the bomb explodes causing death. 
- ·Problems with the plea 
.~. The expression 'wicked' is emotive and imprecise~ · 
The House of Lords Select Committee reasoned: ~~ 'Wicked' is not a term 
used in English criminal law and has no precise meaning. It is true that 
the jury is often called upon to make a moral judgement (as when it is 
called on to decide whether certain conduct should be characterised as 
'dishonest J but it is not generally part of its function· to decide whether 
the defendant's behaviour was so :wicked.' that it should amount to the 
crime charged "134 Lord Goff contended that such behaviour could "be 
epitomised as indifference, "135 but this criticism remains· a forceful one. 
Williams asserted this lack of precision to render· the rule "sufficiently 
abstruse to admit. of being applied or not afflied. according to the 
. condemnations or sympathies of the moment. " 1 Lord Lane stated that 
such. a provision "would· be a bonanza for the criminal Bar. It would 
never go short of fees.for years to come. "137 . Indeed such a provision 
seems fraught with difficulties of accuracy in definition and application . 
... The test is objective in nature, ignoring the actual mental state 
of the defendant 
There is no requirement that the,. defendant recognised a ·risk of death 
resulting from his actions; the conduct must constitute "recklessness so 
gross ·that it indicates a state of mind: which is as wicked arid depraved as 
· the state df mind of a deliberate killer. "138 There js no reference to the 
actual state of mind of the defendant;, the leadmg case of Cawthorne v HM 
Advocate requiring ."such wicked recklessness as to img/Y ·a disposition 
.depraved enough to be regardless of the consequences. " .9 · 
This feature has been heavily criticised; Williams states that "acceptance 
of [this] proposal will/and us back in the morass from which we thought 
. we had:wearily escaped "140 ·He.cites DPP· vSmith,141 in which the 
·mental element in mtirder. briefly ·became an objective one, attracting 
134 Op .. Cit., 64, 74. 
mOp. Cit., 31, 54. 
136 Williams, "The Mens Rea for Murder: Leave It Alone" (1989) LQR 387, 397. 
137 HL. Deb. Vol. 512, Col. 480. 
138 Op. Cit., 41. 
139 Op. Cit., 129 for both, para 38. 
140 Op. Cit., 136, 395. 
141 Op. Cit., 7, 326. Viscount Kilmuir LC: stated the test to be what the "reasonable man would 
contemplate as the probable results of his acts, and, therefore, would intend ... " 
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tremendous criticism. A similar fear must exist concerning this 
formulation. 
In defence of the provision, it must be recognised that Scotland has no 
doctrine of implied malice. Intention to cause serious injury will not of 
itself suffice for a murder conviction, it is a factor from which wicked 
recklessness may be drawn; the defendant must have ·intended personal 
injury sufficiently grave so as to constitute wicked recklessness. The 
ILRC noted that '.'it appears that in this respect the concept of wicked 
recklessness in Scots law serves much the same function as the doctrine of 
implied malice serves in Irish and English laW. ''142 It reasoned that with 
these taken into account, "the concept ofwicked recklessness is a good 
deal less severe, at least in practice, than it might appear at first. "143 
Despite this, it is less than ideal to leave the potential for a very harsh 
operation of the law to judicial interpretation. 
- Conclusion 
It is ultimately concluded that the objective nature of the test, and the term 
'wicked,' constitute sufficiently substantial reasons so as to recommend 
against the adoption of 'wicked recklessness.' The House of Lords' 
Select Committee, in rejecting this partial defence, considered such a 
broadening of murder to fall below the necessary standard of certainty: "It 
is neither satisfactory nor desirable to distort the principle in order to 
deal with the reckless terrorist and other 'wickedly' reckless killers, who 
will. in any event, be liable to imprisonment for life: "144 
2.4.4. Co~clusion to Broadening Murder 
While broadening murder · so as to. capture those · grossly reckless or 
indifferent to the value of human life· is highly desirable, any extension of 
the law beyond intention·and into recklessness is necessarily accompanied 
· by a reduction in its moral reliability. Foresight of a probability is 
rejected for this reason; it cannot reliably distinguish between killings 
deserving of murder and those deserving of a manslaughter conviction. 
The 'wicked recklessness' provision and the MPC's 'reckless killings 
manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life,' are more 
viable. Both require the jury to consider whether they found the actions of 
the defendant to constitute such a grave expression of indifference to the 
value of human life as to warrant a conviction for murder, enabling a 
broader consideration of the overall moral culpability of the defendant. 
142 Op. Cit., 44, 4.061. 
143 Ibid., 4.062. 
144 Op. Cit., 64, 76. 
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However, both formulations have serious drawbacks. Wicked 
recklessness lacks clarity and precision. The term 'wicked' has been 
accused of being overly emotive, and imprecise. This, alongside the 
objective nature of the test, risks a very harsh standard being applied, 
subject to the sympathies of a particular jury. For this reason, it is 
recommended that this provision not be enacted. 
The MPC provision's flexibility, permitting the jury to take into account 
the broad balance of the circumstances in assessing the defendant's 
-culpability, while constituting its primary strength is also its principal 
weakness. The jury's freedom to determine - according to its own 
standards -whether a killing manifests 'extreme indifference to the value 
ofhuman life' could lead to unpalatable decisions. 
Law reform bodies in England and Wales have repeatedly expressed great 
reluctance to expand the scope of murder, and have consistently rejected 
proposals to extend it. The tension between a d~sire to incorporate all 
those deserving of mandatory life, and to maintain the same degree of 
exclusivity and declaratory stigma which follows a murder conviction, 
remains unresolved. 
Ultimately, one must conclude that the potential cost in devaluing murder 
outweighs the moral benefits of increased scope, benefits further reduced 
when reckless killers with a high moral culpability can already be given a 
discretionary life sentence under manslaughter. The range of behaviour 
covered by murder is over-broad, and this woblem would only be 
aggravated by such a reform. 
34 
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Chapter 2: The Punishment Regiqte for Murder 
and its Reform· 
1. The present sentencing regime for murder 
Every convicted murderer receives a mandatory life senteq.ce. 1 This involves a 
minimum term which must be served by the prisoner, afl:er which the prisoner's 
release is determined through the parole process. 
1.1. Minimum term 
The minimum term must be served to satisfy the requirements of 'retribution 
and deterrence.' Pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act, 2003, the minimum term 
is determined "as the court considers appropriate. "2 The sentencing judge is to 
"have regard to "3 the general principles set out in Schedule 21, in setting the 
'appropriate' minimum sentence. 
Schedule 21 establishes three starting points for determining the minimum 
sentence: 'Whole Life', '30 Years', and '15 Years.' The 'Whole Life' starting 
point is for murders of "exceptionally high" seriousness; examples include the 
murder of two or more persons, planning or premeditation, abduction of the 
victim, or sadistic conduct. The '30 Years' starting point is for murders of a 
"particularly high" degree of seriousness; examples include the murder of a 
police or prison officer in the course of his duty, or the use of a firearm or 
explosive. For all other cases of murder committed by those over 18, the 
starting point is ' 15 Years.' 
Paragraphs 8 and 9 of Schedule 21 state that "having chosen the starting point, 
the court should take into account any aggravating or mitigating factors." 
Paragraph 9 reads: "Detailed consideration of aggravating or mitigating factors 
may result in a minimum term of any length (whatever the starting point) or in 
the making of a whole life order. " 
Aggravating and ln.itigating factors are set out non-exhaustively in paragraphs 
10 and '11. Aggravating factors include: 
(a) a significant degree of planning and premeditation, 
(b) the fact that the victim was particularly vulnerable because of age or 
disability, 
(c) mental or physical suffering inflicted on the victim before death, 
(d) the abuse of a position of trust, 
1 The 1965 Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act. 
2 Section 269 (3). 
3 Ibid., (5). 
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(e) the use of duress or threats against another person to facilitate the 
commission of the offence, 
(f) the fact that the victim was providing a public service or performing a public 
duty, and 
(g) concealment, destruction or dismemberment of the body. " 
Mitigating factors include: 
, 
(a) an intention to cause serious bodily harm rather than to kill, 
(b) lack of premeditation, 
(c) the fact that the offender suffered from a mental disorder or mental disability 
which (although not falling within section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 (c. 
11)), lowered his degree of culpability, 
(d) the fact that the offender was provoked (for example, by prolonged stress) in 
a way not amounting to a defence of provocation, 
(e) the fact that the offender acted to any extent in self-defence 
(f) a belief by the offender that the murder was an act of mercy, and 
(g) the age of the offender. " 
In 2004, the Court of Appeal dealt with four appeals by convicted murderers, 
whose minimum terms had been fixed "in accordance with the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003, s.269. "4 Lord Woolf CJ stated that the judgFment was intended to 
provide general assistance to the courts in applying those· provisions. 
The extent to which a judge is bound by the 'starting points' of Schedule 21 was 
assessed by the court: "It was important to note that the judge complied with the 
section if he had 'regard' to the principles set out in Sch. 21. As long as he bore 
them in mind, he was not bound to follow them. If he did not follow the 
principles, he should explain why ... "5 
This, the Court held, made it clear that: 
" ... despite th~ provision of starting points, the judge had a discretion to 
determine a term of any length as being appropriate because of the particular 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances that existed in that case. 6 This 
discretion must be exercised lawfully, and this required the judge to have 
regard to the guidance set out in the Schedule, though he was free not to follow 
the guidance if in his opinion this would not result in an appropriate term for 
the reasons he identified. '' 7 
The minimum term set by the judge is subject to appeal from the prisoner, or an 
Attorney-General's reference. 
4 Thomas, "Case and Comment- R v Sullivan" (2004) Crim: LR 853. 
5 Ibid., 855. 
6 Paragraph 8 reads: "Having chosen a starting point, the court should take into account any 
aggravating or mitigating factors, to the extent that it has not allowed for them in its choice of starting 
point." : 
7 Op. Cit., 856. 
8 
"The Criminal Justice Act 2003: Custodial Sentences" (2003) Crim. LR 702, 703. 
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1.2. Parole Process 
After the minimum term's expiry, the prisoner is entitled to have his case 
referred to the Parole Board, which "may direct his releqse if it is satisfied that 
the protection of the public does not require that he should continue to be 
detained. "9 If it directs his release, the Secretary of State is no longer able to 
detain him. Once released on licence, the usual rules ~oncerning revocation of 
licence apply. 
2. Problems with Mandatory Life 
Mandatory Life: Origins, Intentions, and Practical Outcomes 
9 1bid. 
2.1. The roots of mandatory life · 
The mandatory life · sentence has provoked, and continues to provoke, 
considerable controversy. Since it came into being in the 1965 Murder 
(Abolition of Death Penalty) Act/0 there have been 3 major reviews of the 
current law of murder, and frequent calls for reform, particularly of mandatory 
life. As Simester and Sullivan stated, "it would be a bold prediction to say this 
process is at an end. "11 Internationally, the mandatory life sentence has been 
the subject of a significant number of reviews from law reform bodies. 12 
It is important to recognise that the present form of murder has its origins in a 
"parliamentary compromise, "13 between those desiring the death penalty's 
abolition and those desiring that murder should remain uniquely severely 
punished. 14 It would seem accordingly that the present form of the offence of 
murder was not arrived at expressly, and may for this reason be compromised; 
this also undermines attempts to interpret the law by reference to the 
Parliamentary discussion. 
2.2. Problems 
Mandatory life has been an ongoing battleground between the executive and the 
judiciary. The executive's desire to control murder has struggled against the 
10 This temporary resolution was made permanent through the affirmative resolution of both houses of 
Parliament 4 years later. 
1l Simester and Sullivan 'Criminal Law- Theory and Doctrine' (2001), 369. 
12 NZ CLRC 'Report on Culpable Homicide' (1976); Advisory C~mncil on the Penal System 
'Sentences of Imprisonment: ·A Review of Maximum Penalties (HMSQ, L<lndon, 1978); LRC of 
Canada 'Homicide' (WP33 Ottawa, 1984) ... etc. 
13 Ashworth "Reforming the Law of Murder" (1990) Crim. LR 75, 77. 
14 
" .•• little consideration was given to what would replace capital punisflment; the main focus was on 
the need for it to be abolished " 
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judiciary which, understandably, has seen the administration of the mandatory 
life sentence as a judicial function. The Home Secretary's powers have been 
gradually eroded through a recognition of the need for greater transparency in 
the administration of the mandatory life sentence, and through a number of 
important decisions in the European courts. 15 Furthermore, the 2003 Criminal 
Justice Act, section 269, has firmly established judicial control of the setting of 
minimum terms, the release of a prisoner to be determined solely according to 
the parole board's decision. 
There have been a staggering number of changes to tqis process, which all too 
often have appeared to be reactions against legal challenges to the executive's 
overbearing control, rather than the result of reform driven by an underlying 
rationale. 
This lack of coherence has engendered 3 major reviews of the law of murder in 
the last 30 years: the Criminal Law Revision Committee, 16 the Advisory 
Council on the Penal System, 17 and the House of Lords Select Committee. 18' 19 
All three considered whether murder should be punished by mandatory life, and 
reached different conclusions despite considering very similar evidence. The 
major areas they considered were the indeterminate nature of mandatory life, its 
value in protecting the public, the justifiability of the indeterminate term in the 
context ofthe breadth of murder, and the stigmatic effect ofthe murder label. 
2.2.1. Protecting the public 
The CLRC considered the indeterminacy of mandatory life an asset in 
safeguarding the public against the release of ~ prisoner still posing a 
threat, while enabling the early release of a prisoner no longer posing a 
threat. 
The Advisory Council disagreed, contending that the judge's discretion to 
impose a life sentence was adequate protection: "[We} cannot believe that 
the problems of predicting future behaviour at the time of conviction are 
inherently more difficult in a murder case than in any other case where 
there is a measure of instability, or that judges are any less able to make 
predictions or to assess degrees of culpability in murder cases than in any 
th ,zo o ers ... 
15 In R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ((2002) UKHL 46; (2003) l Cr App 
R 32), the Home Secretary's powers in setting how long adult prisoners convicted of murder should 
serve for the purposes ofpunishment (under s.29 Crime (Sentences) Act 1997) were held incompatible 
with the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6(1), which establishes the right to a fair trial 
by an independent judicial body. 
16 14th Report, 'Offences against the Person' Cmnd 7844 (1980). 
17 
'Sentences oflmprisonment: a Revision of Maximum Penalties' (HMSO, London 1978). 
18 
'Report of the Select Committee on Murder and Life Imprisonment' ~es~ion 1988a89, HL Paper 78, 
3 Volumes. 
19 Hereafter referred to as: the 'CLRC', the 'Advisory Council' and the ·~elrct Committee'. 
20 Op. Cit., 17, para.s 235a244. 
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This stance was strengthened by the New Zealand CLRC,21 which 
recommended that any prisoner serving a determinate sentence of two or 
more years for homicide, would be 'liable to recall upon release,' thus 
eliminating the fear of the Home Secretary being powerless to prevent the 
release of a prisoner still posing a threat to the public. 
The Select Committee reported that "many murderers are not generally 
dangerous," citing "Dr Thomas who pointed out that, during a ten-year 
period when 6, 000 persons convicted of homicide (including 
manslaughter) were at large, only six persons previously convicted of 
murder committed a second murder - and several of these were committed 
in prison. "22 They are certainly no more dangerous than those imprisoned 
for manslaughter upon the grounds of diminished responsibility, which in 
Thomas's view makes a "complete nonsense, "23 of the argument that 
mandatory life better protects the public. Cross makes the point that, "At 
the expiration of fixed term sentences there is the possibility that a 
prisoner known to be potentially dangerous will have to be released, but 
this does not deter us from having fixed term sentences. "24 Thomas 
asserts that as long as murder excludes those killers who suffer from a 
reduced mental capacity and those who fail to kill through no fault of their 
own, the present law "cannot be defonded on the ground that it effectively 
selects the homicidally dangerous person. "25 
2.2.2. It encompasses a huge range of conduct 
A major criticism of mandatory life is that it encompasses an enormous 
range of culpability. The Advisory Council stated "Although murder has 
been traditionally and distinctively considered the most serious crime, it is 
not a homogenous offence but a crime of considerable variety."26 The 
Select Committee contended this to devalue mandatory life, reducing 
"what should be the awe-inspiring nature of the life sentence. Because 
many murderers receive unnecessary life sentences, the average time 
served is reduced, giving credence to the common belief that 'life' means 
nine years. "27 Where a murder conviction does not reliably mark out the 
worst offenders against society, mandatory life is devalued and confidence 
is lost in its punitive significance. 
In the light of the 2003 Criminal justice Act, this criticism gains far 
greater force. The minimum term is now determined entirely at the 
discretion of the sentencing judge, which will inevitably result m 
sentences of a matter of months in cases such as 'mercy killings.' 
21 
'Report on Culpable Homicide' (1976). . 
22 Op. Cit., 18, para. 111B(i). Influential evidence was given by Thomas: Report Vol. 11, 40-58. 
23 Thomas "Sentencing Implications" (1980) Crim. LR 565, 566. . 
24 Cross, "Penal Reform In 1965: A Mass Of Unexplained and Unfoundt)d Assumptions" (1966) Crim. 
LR 184, 188. 
25 Op. Cit., 23, 566. 
26 Op. Cit., 17, para. 244. 
27 Op. Cit., 18, para. ll4B. 
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2.2.3. Lack of a clear rationale 
Lord Windlesham, writing following the introduction of the 'tariff period' 
(the present day 'minimum term') stated "The paradox now posed by life 
imprisonment is that it is neither a sentence of life nor a genuinely 
indeterminate term. The importation of a stated tariff period means there 
is in effect a minimum fixed sentence contained within the indeterminate 
sentence. "28 This criticism is especially apt in the. light of the 2003 Act, 
which leaves the mandatory life sentence in a state of considerable 
confusion. 
2.3. The need for reform 
Mandatory life is caught between different pressures; the longer it remains 
unreformed, the greater the disillusionment. The 2003 Act, in giving the 
judiciary complete freedom to determine the minimum term, has significantly 
improved matters. However, the huge scope of murder only serves to devalue 
the mandatory life sentence when judges might set minimum terms of a matter 
of months for a 'mercy killing.' 
The 2003 Act represents an attempt at patching up the present law, when what is 
required is a full review. At the end ofits Final Report on 'Partial Defences to 
Murder' the Law Commission stated "our first recommendation is that the Law 
Commission be asked to conduct a review of the law of murder; "29 it is time for 
the law of murder, and indeed more broadly homicide, to be brought into a state 
of collective coherence. In view of the many failures to resolve the current 
law's problems, proper resolution awaits a new law. 
3. Reform of the structure of Homicide 
There are three main options for replacing the present system of homicide: a limited 
discretionary sentencing regime for murder, the unification of murder and 
manslaughter into a single offence of 'unlawful offence,' an4 the 'degrees of murder' 
approach. 
3.1. The abolition of mandatory life, to be Feplaced by a limited 
sentencing discretion 
The mandatory life sentence is at the root of the ten~ion between murder and 
manslaughter, placing considerable pressure on the definition of murder and the 
partial defences, because of its indeterminate severity. One possible solution, is 
to replace it with a limited sentencing discretion. Und~r this approach, there 
28 Lord Windlesham, "Life Sentences: The Paradox oflndeterminacy" (1989) Crim. LR 244,255. 
29 
'Final Report' (2004) No. 173, 1.12. 
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would remain a presumption that a -convicted· murderer ·will receive a 
duscretionary · life sentence~ subject . to an assessment of mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances .. 
3.1.1. Arguments in favour of a total sentencing discretion 
- It enables a fairer reflection ·of the culpability of any individual 
offender 
Murder comprises a vast range of culpability, which mandatory life 
cannot reflect. A discretionary sentencing regime would enable precise 
sentencing and accurate reflection of the moral culpability of the 
individual offender. 
- Partial defences create a "fairly arbitrary patchwor/C'30 which fails to 
reliably reflect moral culpability 
The difference ·between a murder conviction, with its mandatory life 
sentence, and a manslaughter conviction, with its discretionary sentencing 
regime, is huge. This puts pressure on the partial defences, which have 
struggled to cope. It is unrealistic to expect legal mechanisms to reflect 
the many permutations of aggravating and mitigating factors, and 
.. provocation has reflected this tension. 
- Discretionary sentencing does not mean shorter prison-time 
A primary criticism has been that.discretionary sentencing results in more 
lenient sentences, but this assertion is not borne out by the statistics. The 
Law Reform Commission of Victoria reviewed all the cases of murder 
between 1986 (when the mandatory life sentence was abolished) and 
,1991 .-. · It found ~that .the average prison time. under the new system was 
longer than under mandatory life. Similarly, -in New .. South Wales, the 
time spent in prison under the discretionary sentencing regime was greater 
than under the previous .system of death sentences commuted to life 
imprisonment. 31 · · · · 
3.1.2. Criticisms of a discretionary sentencing regime 
- The loss of a declaratory and· stigma tie 'murder' label 
The declaratory value of murder would be significantly diminished. 
Ashworth makes the important point that "If the mandatory sentence were 
abolished and the range of available sentences were the same for murder 
30 LC of NZ 'Some Criminal Offences, with Particular Reference to battered Defendants' Report 73k, 
May 2001, Wellington, para. 145. 
31 LRC of Victoria, 'Homicide' R 40 (Melbourne, 1991), para. 218; Freiberg&Biles 'The Meaning of 
Life: A Study of Life Sentences in Australia' (AIC, Canberra 1975), 5~-54; Judicial Commission of 
NSW, 'Sentenced Homicides in New South Wales' 1990-1993 (Sydney 1995), 87. 
32 Ibid., 78. 
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and manslaughter, would there be any reason for keeping the legal 
distinction between the two ojfences?"32 The precise impact of such a 
reform is difficult to gauge. See 3 .1.3 for a fuller discussion. 
- Protection of the public 
There is a frequently-expressed concern that a total sentencing discretion 
will· mean judges are forced to give a determinate sentence to unlawful 
killers of a lower moral culpability who nonethelesS pose a threat to the 
public. Thomas, however, contends that the exclusion of defendants who 
successfully plead diminished responsibility ''makes a complete nonsense 
of this argument." Furthermore, "the mandatory sentence does nqt apply 
to those who inflict serious violence with an intent which will result in a 
conviction for murder if death results, but who fail to kill through a 
combination of accidental circumstances which affect neither their 
. dangerousness nor their culpability. "33 
Under a limited discretionary sentencing regime the presumption would 
be of 'life,' so the danger to the public could be factored-in to any 
• 34 
sentence gtven . 
. - Complicated sentencing ranges 
There has been some concern that· this. would lead to judges assigning 
differing sentences to cases of similar culpability. Ash worth suggests that 
- through guideline judgements from the Lord Chief Justice, judges could 
be directed as to the number of years they should set for different types of 
murder. Having warned that· a sentencing discretion might be "a voyage 
into the unknown, with sentences of .SO, 60 ·and 75 years being 
mentioned,"35 he concludes it "broadly to be we/comed."36 · 
- In fight of the 2003 Criminal. Justice Act a dis~retionary sentencing 
regime is unnecessary 
Judicial control of the setting of the minimum term effectively means that 
mandatory life operates as a discretionary sentencing regime. 
While this argument has some force, it is unacceptable to retain 
mandatory life . when the term is so at odds with the reality of its 
administration. Better, surely, to abolish the indeterminate sentence, and 
to enable accurate sentencing and fair labelling to reflect the enormous 
range of culpability within murder. 
3.1.3. What about public opinion? 
33 Op. Cit., 23, 566. 
34 
.Release would be on licence, subject to the usual remission. 
35 Op. Cit., 13, 84. . · . 
36 1bid, 83. 
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The fundamental reason stated against the abolition of mandatory life is 
that the public desire it to be uniquely punished. This belief has generally 
been based upon very broad opinion surveys, 37 and is considered in 
greater depth below. 
- 1998 Survey of Public Opinion concerning homicide law 
Mitchell has carried.out extensive research in this area, and his findings 
are significant. In 1998, in collaboration with Social and Community 
Planning Research, he undertook a qualitative survey of public opinion, 
"testing the law's assumption that it has public support for the way in 
which it deals with homicides. "38 · · 
The 822 participants were chosen to be demographically representative of 
English and Welsh populations. . Each participant . ranked 8 homicide 
scenarios according to seriousness, with reasons, indicating their 
perceptions of the crime and the appropriate sentence after certain 
variations were introduced. 
This research revealed that the ''personal culpability oj the defendant was 
a key factor in the public's evaluation of homicides. "3 Factors especially 
influential were premeditation, planning, victim vulnerability, justified 
self-preservation, and the extent of the defendant's fault.40 Regarding 
categorisation of the offences, no respondents used the term 'murderer' to 
describe the battered spouse or self-defence scenarios; 15% considered 
these to be· 'killings,' while 15% described the self-defence scenario as 
manslaughter, and 21% as 'self-preservation. ' 41 
In a follow-up survey, 33 of the original participants commented on, and 
explained, their observations regarding the gravity of the different 
scenarios, and the effect of aggravating factors. Mitchell concluded: 
" ... the follow up survey provided encouraging evidence that, given the 
opportunity to consider the matter, the public present neither knee-jerk 
nor especially punitive views about the way in which the criminal justice 
system should deal with homicide ... There is little doubt that they share the 
view that distinctions in gravity should be made according to the 
offender's personal culpability. ''42 
37 
"Whilst there has been a good deal of res~arch in England on popular views a~ross a broad range of 
crimes, there has been comparatively little work specifically concerned with homicide." (Op. Cit., 29, 
Appendix C, 180). 
38 
"Public Perceptions of Homicide and Criminal Justice" {1998) British Journal of Criminology, 453, 
456. 
39 Law Commission, 'Partial Defences to Murder' (2003) (LCCP173), 2.18 
40 Op. Cit., 38, 467-468. 
41 Ibid., 466. 
42 
"There were real signs of attempts to give proportionate and discriminatory responses, of efforts to 
focus not solely on the loss of life but to take account of the circumstances generally, including the 
personal culpability of the killer. " (Mitchell, "Further Evidence ofthe Relationship between Legal and 
Public Opinion on the Law of Homicide" (2000) CLR 814, 825-26). 
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- Mltchell's research into public perception of culpability for the 
various unlawful killings falling within murder. 
In the light of Mitchell's findings the Law Commission, as part of its 
report on 'Partial Defences to Murder,' commissioned Mitchell to conduct 
research into "public opinion on homicides in which defendants would be 
likely to raise a defence based on provocation, diminished responsibility 
or the use of excessive force in self-defence. "43 The selected &pproach 
was "a short series of interviews ... undertaken with a group of individuals 
drawn from various parts of the country who might be expected to reflect 
a wide cross-section of backgrounds and personal circumstances ... The 
Law Commission was also keen to elicit the views of the next-of-kin of 
those who had been killed, and a small sub-group of these secondary 
victims were included in the survey. "44 
Professor Mitchell conducted 62 interviews.45 Each interviewee 
commented on a series of scenarios; "the objectives were to determine 
whether the scenario was regarded as one of the more or less serious 
homicides, and to identifY the factors which affected this assessment. "46 
Approximately ten were put to each interviewee, with variations then 
added, ranging from the 'contract killer scenario,' to the 'mercy killer 
scenario.' 
The results were striking; 
"Of the 62 respondents, 39 (62.5%) said they did not favour a mandatory 
penalty for what are regarded as the most serious criminal homicides. Of 
course, the views as to what should constitute the most serious criminal 
homicides vary - the comments received in this survey broadly confirmed 
the results of the 1995 national survey which highlighted factors such as 
premeditation, torturing victims before death, and killing child victims -
but the majority of respondents felt that even within this category of the 
most serious homicides there will inevitably be sufficient variations in 
gravity and heinousness that the judge ought to be able to reflect the more 
precise degree of seriousness in the sentence imposed. "47 
The Law Commission cited the tremendous variation in perceived 
culpability across the different scenarios put to the respondents, from the 
contract killer,48 for which 790/o would have given a life sentence, to the 
mercy killer,49 for which almost 60% would not have prosecuted at all, 
and 77% would either have not prosecuted, gtranted a non-custodial 
disposal, or given less than a 2 year sentence. Even if the very particular 
situation of the mercy killing is set aside, only 33% recommended 
43 Op. Cit., 29, Appendix C, l. 
44 Ibid., 2. 
45 47 with the main sample, 15 with secondary victims. 
46 Op. Cit., 43, 4. 
47 Ibid., 68. 
48 Scenario E. 
49 Scenario I. 
45 
mandatory life in the scenario of a father who hunted-down and killed his 
daughter's rapist. 
The Commission stated; 
"The notion that all murders, as the law is presently framed, represent 
instances of a uniquely heinous offence for which a uniquely severe 
penalty is justified does not reflect the views of a cross section of the 
public when asked to reflect on particular cases. "50 
The limited sample size qualifies the survey's a~thority, but, with the 
demographic weighting,51 this constitutes a significant fmding. The Law 
Commission concluded; "Although the number questioned was small, 
their responses when asked to consider a range of scenarios covering a 
wide range of cases which could give rise to murder convictions tend to 
point against there being a popular mandate for the present mandatory 
sentence. "52 
- Conclusion 
Mitchell's results, if they accurately reflect the general public's opinion, 
have potentially huge consequences for the justification of the mandatory 
life sentence. Mitchell's informed approach suggests that the primary 
concern of the public is that sentencing should reflect the culpability of 
the offender. 
A move to a limited sentencing discretion would take some preparation to 
establish a range of sentences for the different levels of moral culpability. 
The ambit of murder would also need to be addressed, but the power of 
the judge to set a sentence specifically tailored to the moral culpability of 
the individual defendant would render the difficulties·of definition much 
more acceptable than at present. 
For some, the reduction in the stigmatic effect of a murder conviction 
remains a major obstacle to abolition of mandatory life. However, it is 
difficult to justifY this indeterminate sentence where it does not 
exclusively mark-out the worst offenders against society. Under the 
discretionary approach, a presumption of discretionary 'life' for murderers 
would retain some of the stigma of the indeterminate sentence. 
The House of Lords Select Committee recommended a judicial 
discretionary sentenCing power, proposing that life imprisonment should 
be reserved for "particularly outrageous murders, "53 and defendants who 
50 Op. Cit., 29, 2.35. 
51 Reflecting a "wide cross-section of backgrounds and personal circums(ances," Ibid., Appendix F, 2. 
52 Ibid., 2.32. 
53 Op. Cit., 18, para. 117. 
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fulfil Hodgson's54 general criteria for a discretionary life sentence: 
mentally disturbed, unstable of character and unpredictable in risk. 55 
A number of other bodies have also recommended the abolition of 
mandatory life and retention of murder and manslaughter: the Committee 
on Mentally Abnormal Offenders56, the Advisory Council, the Prison 
Reform Trust, 1995,57 and JUSTICE, 1996.58 · 
3.2. A Single Unified Offence: Merging Murder and Manslaughter 
By far the most radical proposed reform is the uniting of murder and 
manslaughter into a single offence of 'Unlawful Homicide.' This would leave 
the sentencing of each unlawful killer entirely up to the sentencing judge. 
3.2.1. Arguments in favour of a single unified offence 
- Simplification of a complicated area of law 
Lord Kilbrandon in Hyam59 endorsed this as a "radical simplification of a 
complex body of law. "60 Wells concluded of provocation and diminished 
responsibility, that "Both defences are artificial devices to overcome the 
hurdle of the mandatory penalty, "61 recomending 'unlawful homicide' as 
a desirable simplification. There is a strong appeal to this reform; the 
difficulties with the murder/manslaughter distinction are considerable, and 
in 40 years since the Abolition of Death Penalty Act, 1965, a satisfactory 
balance between the two has yet to be struck. 
- Greater accuracy in sentencing 
Wells, stated that "If the question were left to be taken into account in 
sentencing, each case could be dealt with individually, reflecting this 
range (of moral culpability) more accurately. "62 Cross, writing in 1966, 
stated, "Now that capital punishment has gone, would it not be better to 
leave the judges to do the best they can to reflect in their sentences the 
54 (1967) 52 Cr. App. R 113. 
55 Under their proposed refonnulation, the judge would - in open court - specify the reasons for a life 
sentence, and the tenn necessary for retribution and deterrence. This 'Penal Sanction' would be open 
to appeal from both sides, but free from Home Office intervention. At the 'Penal Sanction's' expiry, 
the prisoner's release would be considered by a tribunal, composed of a high court judge, a consultant 
psychiatrist and a chief probation officer. The prisoner would have the right to see all relevant 
documents, to appear before the tribunal, and to have legal representation. 
56 
'Final Report' (1975) Cmnd. 6244, 1975, para.s 42-63. 
57 
"Report of the Committee on the Penalty for Homicide" (Lane Committee) Prison Refonn Trust, 
1995. 
58 
"Sentenced for Life: Refonn of the Law and Procedure for those Sen1enced to Life Imprisonment" 
JUSTICE, 1996. 
59 (1975) AC 55, 98. 
60 Simester and Sullivan 'Criminal Law- Theory and Doctrine' (2001), 36Q. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Wells, "The Death Penalty for Provocation?" (1978) Crim. LR 668, 671. 
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difficult and disputable moral distinctions involved in the different kinds 
of unlawful homicide?"63 The judicial freedom to sentence ·specifically 
according to the culpability of each unlawful killer, is a major advantage. 
- Since the abolition of the death penalty, tJtere is little reason to 
maintain the distinction. 
Cross, writing about the 1965 penal refotrn, contended it to be "at least 
arguable that a great opportunity of fusing the two offences has been 
missed. ·~ 64 · He cited this question from Lord Parker: "Is it not the true 
position today that there is only one offence, the offince of homicide, 
which varies infinitely in degree from the lowest manslaughter up to 
murder in the course of organised crime in a war against society?",65 
concluding that this has "yet to be convincingly answered. "66 Now that 
offenders can be punished just as severely under murder and 
manslaughter, much of the stigma of, and justification for, murder has 
been eradicated. 
- Many prosecutors charge manslaughter 
Clarkson and Keating stated that in "many cases" prosecutors charge 
manslaughter despite a murder conviction being the best fit, concluding 
that this "indicates that prosecutors, at least, are often willing to rely on 
judges exercising their sentencing discretion reasonably."67 Lord 
Denning, writing when capital punishment still existed, stated that "in 
many cases which are in law plainly murder, juries return verdicts of 
manslaughter, because they do not think the death sentence is 
. ,68 
appropnate. 
The true extent of this is unclear, but it raises the grave concern that the 
present law may be seen as unfair and unrealistic, and consequently be 
circumvented. 
- A unified system with the retention of discretionary life, would 
restore value and belief in the 'life sentence.' 
The Advisory Council on the Penal System stated that under a unified 
system, "Life imprisonment would be reserved fqr those cases where both 
the gravity of the offence and the instability of the offender suggested that 
an indeterminate sentence was necessary for the protection of the 
public ... This, in our opinion, would increase, rather than diminish, public 
confidence in the life sentence."69 One must agree that a more careful 
63 Op. Cit., 24, 189. 
64 Ibid., 188. 
65 HL Oeb., Vol. 268, col. 1214. 
66 Op. Cit., 24, 188. 
67 
'Criminal Law: Text and Materials' (1994), 682. 
68 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Cmd.8932 (1953), 27. 
69 Op. Cit., 17, 255. 
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application of the indeterminate sentence would give it greater conceptual 
certainty and moral reliability. 
3.2.2. Criticisms of the proposed Single Unifi~d offence 
- A very broad range of conduct would come under one offence 
Simester and Sullivan point out that it would bring under the heading of a 
single offence "an enormous range of differing conduct with very 
different forms of culpability, already a powerful objection to 
manslaughter. " 70 A practical concern is the potential for variation in 
sentencing across cases of similar culpability. Such a system would only 
be workable through the establishment of sentencirig ranges reflecting the 
gravity of different forms of unlawful killing. Bowever, it should be 
noted that this would be no different to the powers a judge currently has in 
sentencing outside of murder, although the breadth of the unified offence 
would be substantial. 
- Undermining the jury's role 
Under the present law, the jury has a meaningful role in deciding between 
murder and manslaughter; a single unified offence would, "take important 
elements of the decision out of the hands of the Jury. " 71 As pointed out in 
the introduction, society places a high values uppn its direct involvement 
in the assessment and condemntation and of murders. 
There is the further possibility of enabling the j~ to recommend the 
sentence it considers appropriate; although this would necessitate further 
development in drafting a working law. 
3.2.3. Conclusions 
The primary argument against this reform is the loss of the 'murder' label. 
The CLRC concluded that "In modern English usage, the word 
'murderer' expresses the revulsion which ordinary people feel for anyone 
who deliberately kills another human being. "72 One possible solution 
would be to retain the 'murder' label for those given discretionary life: 
this might retain some of the indeterminate sentence~ s declaratory 
significance, with fewer of the current problems. 
A further difficulty of such a reform js the need to establish strong and 
clear sentencing guidance. 
70 Op. Cit., 67, 369. 
71 Elliot and Quinn, 'Criminal Law' (2000). 
72 Op. Cit., 16, 15. 
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The potential merits of the reform are vast. Unlawful killing is one 
offence of many different degrees of moral culpability, and 'Unlawful 
Homicide' is superior in its potential to reliably reflect this range. 
However, this reform is unlikely to be enacted in the foreseeable future, as 
it is too radical for present day society. The mqrder label is ingrained in 
the public's understanding of the criminal justice system: such that the 
abolition of mandatory life is controversial, let alone the eradication of 
murder itself. Before such a reform is possible, the public must fust come 
to a clearer understanding of the considerable breadth of murder and 
homicide. 
3.3. Different degrees of murder 
Another approach is to reflect tht; range of culpability within unlawful killing by 
dividing murder into different categories or 'degrees.' This approach is 
primarily seen in the US, with 42 states adopting this approach for murder, and 
a further 26 doing so for manslaughter. 
The 'degrees'. of murder are typically categorised as follows: First degree: 
generally a calculated act of killing, committed with premeditation, punished by 
life imprisonment or capital punishment. Second degree: · a killing with 
intention but without premeditation, including provoked killings. Some states 
recognise a third degree, which can be known as manslaughter, which in some 
states is then further sub-categorised. A very similar approach is found in 
Canada 
There are number of other factors which dictate the appropriate 'degree' of 
· murder; primarily the mode of causing death: killing with poison, with 
explosives, while in prison or escaping from prison, contract killing, robbery, 
kidnapping or rape, torture, are among the aggravating factors establishing fust 
degree murder. The identity of the victim can elevate the degree found; iri 
Louisiana the killin~ of a police officer or fueman in the course of their duty is 
first degree murder; 3 in Arizona, dangerous crimes perpetrated against children 
are punished more severely.74 The identity of the killer is an important factor in 
some states; in New York it is first degree murder if the offender was confined 
to prison. 75 
3.3.1. Disadvantages 
- Unreliable in reflecting culpability 
A prime example of this is the distinction between first and second degree 
murder, which is often based upon the distinction between 'premeditation' 
73 La. Rev. Stat., s.l4.30( 4). 
74 Second degree murder of an adult faces a presumptive penalty of 15 years, where as for a child it is 
20 years. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., s.B-604.0l(A) .. 
75 NY Penal Law s.l25.27(l)(a)(iii). 
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and 'intent.' This is impossible to apply with any precision and 
reliability. Cardozo puts it thus; 
" ... an intent to kill is always deliberate and premeditated ... There can be 
no intent unless there is a choice, yet by hypothesis, the choice without 
more is enough to justifY the inference that the intent was deliberate and 
premeditated " He criticises this approach as "framed along the lines of a 
defective and unreal psychology. "7 
Clarkson and Keating assert mercy killings to ¥Xpose the limitations of 
this approach, contending that though they are "invariably premeditated 
killings, yet they are invariably regarded as far less blameworthy than 
most other types of killings. "77 They cite, by way of example, Repouille v 
US, 78 in which the jury refused to apply the law concerning the 
premeditated nature of a mercy killing, instead finding second degree 
murder and requesting sentencing leniency. The judge handed down a 
suspended five year sentence, placing the defendant on probation. Hand, 
1., commented that "Although it was inescapably murder in the first 
degree, not only did they bring in a verdict that was flatly in the face of 
the facts and utterly absurd - for manslaughter in the second degree 
presupposes that that the killing was not deliberate - but they coupled 
that with a recommendation which showed that in substance they wished 
to exculpate the offender. Moreover, it is also plain, from the sentence 
which he imposed, that the judge could not have seriously disagreed with 
their recommendations."79 
The aggravating criteria equally fail to express the culpability of the 
offender: the use of poison, for example, does not, in and of itself, assure 
the court of the elevated culpability of an unlawful killer. This approach 
does not permit latitude in assessing culpability, its rigidity rendering it 
unsuitable to reflecting the breadth and variety of the range of individual 
cases. 
- Complicated categories and jury decisions 
The law of homicide in this country is already complicated, with 
considerable tension between murder and manslaughter. This would not 
be improved by having a number of 'degrees' of murder. The Law 
Commission of New Zealand, in 1996, conclllded of the degrees of 
murder approach that it "complicated the law by introducing difficult 
distinctions. "80 
76 
"What Medicine can do for Law" in 'Law and Literature and Other Ess;tys and Addresses' (1930), 
99-100. 
77 Clarkson and Keating, (1994), 677. 
78 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947). 
79 Ibid. 
80 NZ LC, 'Battered Defendants: Victims of Domestic Violence who Offend' Discussion Paper, 
Wellington, 2000, para. 150. 
81 Ibid. 
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It also considered that this approach "significantly changes the role of 
·juries and makes their ·task more· difficult.',s 1 If .the present two-tier 
· structure is beset with difficulties of categorisation, what then happens 
when two or three extra headings of murder are added? · Any potential 
clarification is outweighed by the fundamental rigidity of this structure 
and its demonstrable failure to accurately reflect the culpability of 
unlawful killers. 
3.3.2. Conclusion 
It is very strongly recommended that this formulation not be adopted. It 
fundamentally fails to accurately represent the culpability of the offender; 
· · the basic distinction between premeditated and intended killings is flawed, 
as is the 'listed criteria' approach. Many of them may aggravate an 
unlawful killing, but not in a way which can be reliably generalised to all 
cases. This approach would lead to complicated directions, difficult jury 
decisions, and would· run the risk of juries refusing to apply the law. 
3.4. Conclusion to Homicide Reform 
.The present law of murder is in difficulties .. Mitchell's research·indicates that 
the assumption of strong public support for mandatory .life may be exaggerated; 
·further opinion polling of a larger scale and· greater depth.is needed: With this 
.caveat, there are compelling .arguments· for both the. single unified· offence of 
'unlawful homicide~, and the limited discretionary sentencing regime. · 
A unified offence of 'unlawful .homicide' would bring increased clarity and 
simplicity to the· law .of ·homicide .. Sentencing· ranges .would need to be 
established to ensure collective coherence, but, .where achieved, the potential 
benefits would be .huge. 
However, at this present time, such a reform is too radical. To abolish the 
present two-tier system, along with mandatory life, would change homicide 
beyond recognition; there is a need to reassess the role of homicide in modern 
society before its form can be accurately reformed with any assertion of 
permanence. 
The limited sentencing discretion is a less radical reform option, and entails 
considerable benefits. The primary advantage is hard to overemphasise: the 
ability to deliver sentences specifically tailored to the culpability of the 
individual offender is of fundamental importance; and is crucial in justifying the 
retention of the discretionary life sentence. 
The guidelines for sentencing remain a matter of debate: the New Zealand Law 
Commission, proposing a discretionary regime, argued: 
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"There should be an assumption that a conviction for murder will carry a life 
sentence. However, where strongly mitigating factors exist, relating either to 
the offence or the offender, that would render a lift sentence clearly urifust, the 
judge may give a lesser sentence; In deciding whether to exercise his or her 
discretion, the judge may also take into account· any countervailing 
considerations and any aggravating factors. "82 
The House of Lords Select Committee by contrast recommended that the 'life 
sentence' be reserved for "particularly outrageous murders, "83 and Hodgson84 
defendants. 1 
The primary criticism of this proposal is the loss of the stigmatic nature of the 
indeterminate sentence, through which murder is set apart as the most heinous 
offence against society. The weight ascribed to this by the public is unclear; 
Mitchell's research indicates that the public's dominant concern is to accurately 
reflect culpability, especially where there is such a broad range of conduct under 
a single offence, and this provision would enable those cases which constitute 
murder and yet are of a low moral culpability, such as a mercy killing, to be 
proportionately punished, This might well actually enhance the validity and the 
stigma of the life sentence, thus meeting the primary criticisms of the proposal 
to abolish mandatory life. 
However; this reform seems unlikely to come about in the near future·due to the 
political objections. As stated in the introduction, niurder is more than just a 
very serious crime, it is something of an emotive lightning-rod for the public's 
perception of the law as a reflection of societal values;· and the abolition of the 
mandatory life sentence would be portrayed as condescending to murderers. 
In consequence, the discussion that follows, concerning provocation, its 
problems and options for reform, will proceed under the assumption that 
mandatory life will remain for the foreseeable future; although Chapter 11 does 
consider the significance of a limited discretionary sentencing regime on refonn 
of provocation. 
82 Law Commission of New Zealand 'Some Criminal Offences, with Particular Reference to Battered 
Defendants' LC Report 73k, May 2001, Wellington, para. 154. 
83 Op. Cit., 53. 
84 Op. Cit., 54. 
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Chapter 3: The Current Law ofProvocation 
1. Definition 
Provocation is a partial defence to murder, which, if successfully pleaded, reduces a 
conviction for murder to one of manslaughter; and accordingly the sentence from one 
of mandatory life to one set at the discretion of the court. 
Section 3 of the Homicide Act, 1957, holds a provocation plea to arise: 
"Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find that the 
person charged was provoked (whether by things done or things said or by both 
together) to lose his self-control, the question whether the provocation was enough to 
make a reasonable man do as he did shall be left to be determined by the jury; and in 
determining that question the jury shall take into account everything both done and 
said according to the effect which, in their opinion, it would have on a reasonable 
man. " 
Section 3 supplements the common law, confirming that. the provocation partial 
defence applies uniquely to murde.r trials, and is a matter of legal extenuation to be 
resolved at the tri(l.l stage. Commonly, section 3 is broken down into two questions, 
subjective and objective. The subjective question asks whether the defendant in fact 
lost his self~control because of provocation, things said or done (or both). This is a 
question to be answered by the trial judge. If answered affirmatively, then the jury 
must objectively consider whether the reasonable man could have been provoked as 
the defendant was, and how the reasonable man would have reacted. 
2. The subjective test 
The subjective test is in effect a qualifying test, asking two questions: 
The first is whether the defendant was provoked by. something said or done. Bro~ne 1 
established that the provocation must be "something unwarranted which is likely to 
make a reasonable person angry or indignant. "2 In Edwards,3 the Privy Council 
stated obiter, that an act could not constitute provocation where it was an expected 
response to an action of the defendant. This dictum was not followed in Johnson, 4 
and in Doughty,5 it was held that a baby's persistent crying could constitute 
provocation. At present, anything can constitute provocation. 
The second question asks whether the provocation led to a }oss of self-control. The 
leading authority is Duffy, in which Devlin J stated: ·"Provocation is some act or 
series of acts done by the dead man to the accused whjch would cause in any 
reasonable person and actually causes in the accused, a sudden and temporary loss of 
I (1973) NI 96. 
2 lbid., 108, per Lowry LCJ. 
3 (1973) I All ER 152 (PC). 
4 (1989) I WLR 740 (CA). 
5 (1986) 83CrAppR319. 
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self-control, rendering the accused so subject to passions as to make him for the 
moment not master of his mind. "6 The defendant must still be in a state of loss of self-
control when they kill. In Cocker/ the defendant's wife was a depressive who 
continually asked him to end her life. When he finally did so, it was held that 
provocation could not be raised where the killing suggested calculated method and 
purpose, rather than a loss of self-control. In Richens,8 the Court found that the 
defendant needed merely to be driven by their anger to kill in a state of loss of self-
control, and that possession of the mens rea for murder was not incompatible with 
this. 
The implied immediacy of a "sudden and temporary loss of self-control" impedes a 
plea of provocation where a significant amount of time has elapsed between the 
provocative incident and the killing; especially where the qefendant' s response is a 
planned one. In Ibrams,9 the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's verdict, 
stressing the significance of the temporal relationship between provocation and 
killing. Although Ibrams technically still has effect, there have been a significant 
number of cases in which judges have allowed the question of provocation to go 
before the jury despite a significant amount of time havinf elapsed between the 
provocative act and the killing. In Thornton 10 and Ahluwalia, 1 two 'battered women' 
cases, the defendants planned their lethal attacks and were arguably not in a state of 
loss of self-control when they perpetrated them. The primary importance of these 
cases was in changing the matter of time elapsed to a guestion of evidential 
significance in considering whether the defendant was in a state of loss of self-control 
while perpetrating the killing. 
3. The objective test 
The objective test, to be considered by the jury, asks whether the 'reasonable man' 
would have been provoked as the defendant was, and would have done as the 
defendant did. 
The pre-1957 Homicide Act cases of Bedder12 and Mancini13 demonstrated a refusal 
on the part of judges to allow any characteristics of the defendant to be attributed to 
the 'reasonable man', for fear of compromising the objective standard. The change in 
the post-act cases, first made in Camp/in, 14 has been to allow a restricted degree of 
attribution of characteristics from the defendant to the 'reasonable man,' through 
making a separation between those characteristics pertainipg to the gravity of the 
provocation upon the defendant, and those pertaining to his level of self-control. 
The basis for this separation between types of characteristics is that in cases where the 
provocation is aimed at a particular characteristic of the defeQdant, the effect cannot 
6 (1949) 1 All ER 932n (CCA). 
7 (1989) Crim. LR 740. 
8 (1993) 4 All ER 877. 
9 (1981) 74 Cr App R 154. 
10 (1992) 1 All ER 306 (CA). 
11 (1992) 4 All ER 859 (CA). 
12 (1954) 2 All ER 801. 
13 (1942) AC 1. 
14 (1978) AC 705. 
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be satisfactorily assessed where the 'reasonable man' does not possess that same 
characteristic. Bedder15 is a perfect example: the defendant was an impotent 
hunchback, mocked for his impotency by the prostitute he had hired, which, he 
claimed, caused him to lose self-control and kill her. For fear of compromising the 
standard of self-control, none of the characteristics of the defendant were permitted 
attribution to the 'reasonable man,' resulting in the jury being required to consider 
whether a.'reasonable man,' who was neither a hunchback nor impotent, could have 
been provoked to a loss ·of self -control when mocked for characteristics he did not 
possess. Such an outcome is clearly objectionable, .yet the concerns of the court in 
seeking· to protect the objectivity of the reasonable man were quite understandable. 
In Camp/in, Lord Diplock defined the reasonable man as possessing the level of self-
control of an ordinary person of the same age and gender as the accused, but also 
possessing those of the defendant's characteristics relevant to the gravity of the 
provocation. Unfortunately Camp/in did · hot · clearly define what constituted 
admissible 'characteristics,' and some confusion ensued. 
In Newell, 16 the Court of Appeal held it to be correct to ignore the defendant's 
intoxication, overdose of drugs, suicide note and grief at his girlfriend's departure, in 
considering whether the reasonable man would have been provoked to a loss of self-
control by the disparaging remarks made by the victim regarding the defendant's 
girlfriend, and the victim's proposition of homosexual intercourse. Strongly 
influenced by the New Zealand case-law, the Court stated that a 'characteristic' 
needed to be something of sufficient permanence and gravity, such that it might make 
D "a different person from the ordinary run of mankind. "17 Under this definition, the 
only possible feature of the defendant which might have been considered a 
'characteristic' was the defendant's underlying condition of alcoholism, but this was 
not the subject of the provocation and so was not considered. 
In Morhall, 18 the House of Lords affirmed Camp/in with regard to the relevance of 
characteristics of the defendant pertaining to the gravity of the provocation, and 
redefined admissible characteristics from Newel/ to include race, sexual orientation, 
physical features or disabilities, where causally related to the provocation: Lord Goff 
gave the example of eczema constituting a characteristic attributable to the 
'reasonable man' "for as long as the condition and D 's sensitivity about it endures. "19 
Lord Goff s acceptance of the history and circumstances of the defendant as 
· potentially relevant, thus undermining any requirement that characteristics need to be 
'sufficiently significant and permanent,' calls the authority of Newell into question. 
The effect of Morhall, in affirming Camp/in, established the 'classic line'. authority 
.with regards to what constitutes a 'characteristic,' and the standard· of self-control 
expected of the reasonable man. 
An important subset of cases affecting the development of provocation law are those 
in which the defendant suffered from a mental condition. ~eparation between the 
15 (1954) 2 All ER 80. 
16 (1980)71 Cr App R 331. 
17 Ibid., 339. 
18 (1996) AC 90. 
19 Simester and Sullivan 'Criminal Law- Theory and Doctrine' (2001), 349. 
60 
While Privy Council decisions are not binding on English domestic courts, they carry 
a considerable authority, and in R v Susan Shickle, 36 the Court of Appeal treated R v 
Holley as overturning Smith: "The effect of this decision has been to tighten the 
second or objective, test for provocation by limiting the characteristics of the 
defendant with which the reasonable man may be clothed. No longer is the test, as 
propounded by Lord Hoffman in Morgan Smith, one of excusab,ility. "37 
In R v Faqir38, the Court of Appeal again treated R v Holley as authoritative, and 
endorse<\ the 'separation approach.' Scott Baker LJ, delivering the judgement of the 
Court of Appeal, stated Lord Hoffman's test of excusabilirY to be an 'unwarranted 
development.' He concluded, "Properly directed the jury should therefore have 
applied a narrow and strict test of a man with ordinary powers of self-control rather 
than the wider test of excusability that was put to them by the judge." In so. ruling, the 
Court of Appeal went against a clear House of Lords precedent. The present law thus 
remains somewhat confused. 
36 (2005) EWCA Crim. 1881. 
37 1bid., para. 65. 
38 (2005) EWCA Crim. 1880 
----------~- ~~---- --~ 
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gravity of the provocation and the defendant's capacity for self-control has created 
particular problems where the defendant suffers from a mental condition to which no 
reference was made by way of the provocation, but which has a bearing on their level 
of self-control: a primary example is the string of 'battered women' cases, which 
placed immense strain upon this distinction. 
There are four principal cases: Ahluwalia, Thornton, Dryden20 and Humphreys.21 
Ahluwalia and Thornton concerned 'battered women' syndrome, Dryden an obsessive 
of eccentric nature, and Humphreys dealt with abnormal immaturity and attention 
seeking tendencies (through wrist-slashing). In each of these cases there was expert 
testimony that the conditions front which the defendants suffered were "beyond the 
range of normal personality disorder and constituted discrete syndromes. "22 
According to Newel/, such characteristics could only be relevant with regards to the 
gravity of the provocation towards the defendant, but the Court of Appeal in 
Ahluwalia and Thornton spoke of 'battered women's syndrome' as a characteristic 
attributable to the 'reasonable man' with regards to the expected standard of self-
control, where it constituted a specific personality syndrome established by medical 
evidence. 
Lord Goff, in Luc Thiet-Thuan,23 criticised this admission of evidence of personality 
syndromes. In Luc Thiet-Thuan, a majority of the Privy Council held that the 
defendant's brain damage, which caused violent impulsive behaviour in response to 
minor provocation, was not to be attributed to the 'reasonable man' in considering the 
expected level of self-control. In so ruling, the Privy Council considered itself to be 
following Camp/in as affirmed in Morhall. 
However in Campbel/,24 the Court of Appeal held that the 'reasonable man' should be 
endowed with the mental state of the defendant in establishing the level of self-
control. In doing so, it re-affirmed the previous Court of Appeal authority which had 
been doubted in Luc Thiet-Thuan. In Smith (Morgan), the Court of Appeal claimed to 
be bound by Campbell, in overturning the trial judge's direction that the jury should 
ignore evidence of the defendant's depression in setting the standard of self-control, 
on the basis that it was too restrictive. The Court of Appeal held their view to be 
consistent with Camp/in, reasoning that Lord Diplock did not draw any distinction 
between those characteristics relevant to the gravity of the provocation and those 
relevant to the level of self-control. 
. The standing of the Privy Council (and hence the rulhig in Luc Thiet-Thuan) is such 
that the Court of. Appeal additionally certified a question of law to the House of 
. Lords, inquiring whether characteristics other than age and gender are attributable to 
the reasonable man under section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, with regards to the 
level of self-control. The House of Lords, in a 3-2 decision,25 stated that mental 
illness could go to the jury as relevant to the standard of self-control, and that, where 
suitable, the judge should make it clear to the jury that an allowance should be made 
20 (1995) 4 All ER 987. 
21 (1995) 4 All ER 1008. 
, 
22 Op. Cit., 19, 350. 
23 (1997) AC 131. 
24 (1997) 1 CRAppR 199(CA). 
25 R v Smith (2000) 3 WLR 654 (HL). 
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for the defendant's reduced capacity for self-control. The minority in the House of 
Lords disagreed very strongly with the majority, to the extent that rather than 
conceding the majority view as constituting the law, they simply asserted that the 
majority were wrong, and that Morha/l is the current law. 
There have been few cases reported since Smith. In Weller,26 the trial judge declined 
to make specific reference to the defendant's unusually possessive and jealous nature 
in summing up to the jury, issuing instead a general direction requiring the jury to 
consider all the circumstances, making "allowances for human nature and the power 
of emotions, "27 and concluding with the need for the jury to "decide what society 
expects of a man like this defendant in his position. "28 The conviction was upheld. In 
the Court of Appeal, Mantell LJ described Smith (Morgan), as signifying taking 'all 
matters' into consideration, meaning that the judge should not tell the jury to ignore 
any aspect, but may give some guidance regarding the weight to be given to certain 
aspects, provided it .is clearly established that the question is one for the jury to 
answer. The Smith (Morgan) approach was commended, and it was stated that it is 
not necessary to determine a 'characteristic' concerning the objective element, 
because "it is all a matter for the jury. "29 
In Paria v The State, 30 the defendant appealed the first instance decision on the basis 
that the trial judge ought to have instructed the jury to take into account the appellate's 
depression. The Privy Council held that whether the test applied was that of Luc 
Thiet-Thuan, or Smith (Morgan), the appellant's provocation plea must fail for two 
reasons: firstly, the appellant's entirely normal reaction to his father's cancer did not 
constitute mental illness and thus was not a 'characteristic'; secondly, even if it was a 
characteristic, it would have constituted "sheer speculation" for the jury to have 
taken it into account with regards to either the subjective or objective test. 
By contrast, in R v Holle/1, Lord Nicholls, giving the leading judgement, stated that 
"evidence that the defendant was suffering from chronic alcoholism was not a matter 
to be taken into account by the jury when considering whether in their opinion, 
having regard to the actual provocation and their view of its gravity, a person having 
ordinary powers of self-control would have done what the defendant did."32 The 
Privy Council held that the majority in Smith were "incorrect to apply a more flexible 
standard to the issue of self-control."33 "Under the statute the sufficiency of the 
provocation ("whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as 
[the defendant] did'') is to be judged by one standard, not a standard which varies 
from defendant to defendant ... The statute does not leave each jury free to set 
whatever standard they consider appropriate in the circumstances by which to judge 
whether the defendant's conduct is "excusable "."34 Lorq Nicholls concluded by 
stating that the "majority view expressed in the M organ Smith case is erroneous. "35 
26 (2003) EWCA 815. 
27 
"Case and Comment R v Weller" (2003) Crim. LR 724. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., para. 17. 
30 (2003) UKPC 36. 
31 (2005) UKPC 23. 
32 Ibid., para. 37. 
33 Ibid., 23. 
34 Ibid., para. 22. 
35 Ibid. 
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Chapter 4: The problems· facing provocation, 
and the impact of Smith 
1. Introduction 
The problems facing provocation are quite considerable. The decision in Smith1 has 
fundamentally altered the partial defence, greatly contributing to its condemnation. 
The strength of feeling against this decision has been considerable, and has pushed the 
state of provocation to the forefront of criminal justice refomi. The alterations the 
· Smith-majority purported to make are far-reaching, yet how they will practically be 
enacted is unclear from the judgement; in particular; how the .subjectivised evaluative 
standard, (inextricably linked to thejury's increased freedom) is to be controlled. The 
question remains: does Smith actually ameliorate the problems it attempted to address, 
without damaging the operation of the law in other regards? 
The intention of the Smith majority in· so ruling must be Ui:lderstood in the context of 
the overall development of provocation; particularly the pressures which came upon 
the objective standard in the provocation CaSes of the early 1990s;. and conceptual 
problems concerning the' broader lawofhomicide .. · · 
This chapter considers five principal criticisms of provocation, ·and the impact of 
Smith in seeking to address them: 
• Firstly, the objective standard, expressed thiough the 'reasonable man,' led to 
a difficult case law and significant confusion ·and disagreement over the best 
way of establishing a workable and representative objective standard. 
• Secondly, the requiremynt of a loss of self-control is both overly inclusive 
concerning violent males, and . is overly exclusive, particuhu'ly concerning 
victims of domestic violence who kill their abusers. 
• Thirdly, provocation's basis in action in anger has come under close scrutiny, 
particularly when the type of anger it recognises is more masculine in nature. 
Such privileging of a particular emotion, arid indeed a particular expression of 
this emotion, has caused, and continues to cause controversy. 
• Fourthly, the nature of provocation is such that the victim's conduct and 
character often become the subject of attack from the defendant. 
• Finally, the conceptual basis of provocation is unclear. It has elements of 
justification and excuse, recent developments having significantly emphasised 
its excusatory nature. The effect of this shift in emphasis is analysed with 
reference to the sustainability of provocation as presently formulated. 
2. Principal Cri(icisms of Provocation · ·. 
. ' ' . . . . . 
2.'1. Objective standard .. 'Reasonable man' 
I (2000) 3 WLR 654 (HL). 
62 
2.1.1. Problems pre.Smith 
- The 'separation approach' 
The 'separation approach,' established in Camp/in, enabled the character 
and circumstances of the defendant to be recognised, while maintaining an 
objective standard qualified only by reference to the defendant's age and 
gender. 
It came under tremendous pressure due to a number of factors: a lack of 
clarity in what constituted a 'characteristic' for the purposes of attribution 
to the reasonable man; greater awareness of domestic violence and the 
role provocation had to play, through the 'syndrome cases' of the 1990s; 
and a gradual acceptance of mental deficiencies as being relevant to the 
'reasonable man.' All these significantly influenced the role of the 
objective standard in regulating the scope of provocation . 
... Initial confusion concerning what constitutes a 'characteristic' 
Imprecision in Lord Diplock's direction iri Camp/in resulted in judicial 
confusion concerning what constituted a 'characteristic' for the purposes 
of attribution to the reasonable man. In the subsequent case of Newell/ 
the Court of Appeal relied heavily upon the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
case of McGregor, in which North J stated: "The characteristic must be 
something definite and of sufficient permanence to make the offender a 
different person from the ordinary run of mankind," enough to constitute 
''part of the individual's character or personality. ,.3 · 
This approach detracted from the purpose of the separation of 
characteristics, which was to preserve the objective standard of self-
control while assessing the gravity of the provocation through reference to 
those relevant characteristics of the defendant. It was only firmly rejected 
in 1996, in Morhall/ in which Lord Goff gave the example of eczema as 
capable of constituting a characteristic where it had been referred to in the 
provocation.5 
In the intervening time, the 'syndrome' cases reached the Court of 
Appeal.· 
... Syndrome Cases . 
The 'syndrome' cases were those in which the defendant was afflicted 
with a medically attested syndrome, which was the subject of provocation 
and also had a bearing on the defendant's level of self-control. Common 
to the cases of Ahluwalia, Dryden, Humphreys and Thornton, was expert 
testimony that these. conditions were beyond .those of normal personality 
'. ' . 
2 (1980) 71 Cr App R 331. 
3 (1962) NZLR 1069, 1081. 
4 McGregor was disapproved in McCarthy ((1992) 2 NZLR 550), New Zealand AC. 
5 (1996) AC 90, 99. 
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variation: all were sufficiently permanent in the Newel! sense, but all of 
went beyond Newel!, impacting upon the defendant's capacity of self-
control. 
The recognition of 'syndrome evidence' clearly entailed conceptual 
difficulties for the basis of provocation as a defence for the 'ordinary 
person.' One possibility would have been to extend provocation to 
include 'life experience' syndromes i.e. those that can occur in 'ordinary 
persons' subjected to extreme pressure or trauma. In Australia, 'battered 
woman syndrome' was recognised as something that can befall "women of 
reasonable firmness who should find themselves in a domestic situation 
such as that .in which the appellants were. "6 Such an approach permits a 
concession to 'life experience' syndromes, while maintaining the 
conceptual .integrity of provocation. However, the Court of Appeal 
decisions in England and Wales went decisively further. 
'Syndrome cases' provide particular difficulty for the separation 
approach. An apt example is the case of Humphreys: the defendant 
suffered from a personality syndrome affecting her capacity for self-
control. She had been involved in drugs and prostitution, and at the age of 
17 lived with a 33 year old man with whom she had a volatile 
relationship; he was jealous and possessive and beat her on numerous 
occasions. On the night that -she killed him, she had cut her wrists from 
fear that upon his return he would beat her, and force her to engage in 
sexual intercourse with himself and possibly others. Upon his return, he 
taunted her, saying that she had not made a very good job of slashing her 
wrists. She stabbed and killed him. Directing the jury to consider the 
defendant's ·immaturity and wrist-slashing tendencies in assessing the 
· gravity of the provocation, but to ignore them in assessing the standard of 
self-control, appears contrived, and very far from the -reality of such a 
case. 
Following a strong dissent from Lord Steyn in Luc Thiet-Thuan/ in which 
he criticised the 'separation approach,' the Court of Appeal, in Parker8 
and Campbell/ clearly established the acceptance of syndrome evidence, 
going beyond any 'life experience' limitation. The effect of Smith 
(particularly the House of Lords decision) has been to further extend the 
acceptance of 'syndrome evidence' in provocation. 
2.1.2. · Problems due to Smith10 
6 Runjanjic and Kontinnen, ('1991) 53 A Crim R 362,368, per King CJ. 
7 [1997] AC 131. 
8 Parker (1997) Crim. LR 760. 
9 Campbe/l {1997) Crim. LR 227. 
10 In Smith, the defendant and deceased were friends and fellow alcoholics. During the course of an 
evening of heavy drinking, an argument arose and the defendant fatally stabbed the deceased. The 
defendant pleaded provocation, claiming that medical evidence of the depressive illness from which he 
was suffering at the time of the killing should be attributed to the reasonable man regarding the 
expected level of self-control. The trial judge directed the jury that the qeff!ndant's mental impairment 
was only relevant to the gravity of the provocation, and the defendant was convicted of murder. The 
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The majority in Smith sought to respond to the pressures which had come 
to bear upon provocation; particularly accusations that provocation was 
unjustly narrow in its scope, and the objective standard was overly-
complicated. 
- The effect of Smith 
The major effect of Smith was the subjectivisation of the objective 
standard and the freeing of the jury's role. The majority established a 
'community standards' evaluative test, by which all materially relevant 
characteristics are to be attributed to the reasonable man concerning the 
standard of self-control. This - a reasonable man imbued with all the 
relevant characteristics of the defendant in assessing his self-control -
represents a major subjectivisation of the evaluative standard. 
The central thrust of Lord Hoffmann's leading judgement was that the 
'reasonable man' standard was intended, under section 3 of the 1957 
Homicide Act, to be less stringent than the previous. case law. Under 
section 3, the jury are required to consider "everything both done and said 
according to the effect which, in their opinion, it would have on a 
reasonable man." The majority interpreted section 3 as freeing the jury to 
reach its own decision in assessing the defendant's actions. Lord 
Hoffmann stated that a judge could "no longer tell them [the jury} that 
they were obliged as a matter of law to exclude factors personal to the 
prisoner' from their consideration, "11 and that the jury could "determine 
not merely whether the behaviour of the accused complied with some 
legal standard but could determine for themselves what the standard in 
the particular case. should be. "12 Effectively the judge's direction 
becomes, after Smith, at best a guide rather than a rule. 
However, Lord Hoffmann did recognise that "If there is no limit to the 
characteristics which can be taken into account, the fact that the accused 
lost self-control will show that he is aperson liable in such circumstances 
to lose his self-control. The objective element will have disappeared 
completely. "13 
defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeal substituted a manslaughter verdict, on the basis that the 
trial judge had misdirected the jury in excluding the evidence of the defendant's depression regarding 
the standard of self-control. The Court also allowed leave to appeal to the House ofLords, certifYing a 
question (under section 33(2) Criminal Appeal Act 1968): "Are characteristics other than age and sex, 
attributable to the reasonable man, for the purpose of section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, relevant not 
only to the gravity of the provocation to him but also to the standard of self-control to be expected?" 
(Op. Cit., 1, 656). The House of Lords, by a 3-2 majority (Lords Hobhouse and Millett dissented, 
refusing to concede the majority view, contending it to be wrong, and Morhall to be the current law), 
endorsed the Court of Appeal decision. In response to the certified question, it ruled that the 
characteristics ofthe defendant could be recognised as relevant to the stanch}rd of self-control. 
11 Ibid. . 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 674. 
14 Ibid.· 
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He added that the 'community standards of blameworthiness' approach 
"did not mean he [the judge J was required to leave the jury at large 
without any assistance in the exercise of their normative role. He could 
tell the jury that the doctrine of provocation included the principle of 
objectivity and that they should have regard to that principle in deciding 
whether the act in question was sufficiently provocative to be acceptable 
as a partial excuse. "14 
The majority's ruling has huge consequences in allowing the jury to 
determine which characteristics of the defendant to attribute to the 
reasonable man, and to establish its own standard for the purposes of 
assessing the defendant's self-control. Thus, unless the jury formulate for 
themselves an explicit "reasonable man" for the purposes of the case they 
are considering, the objective standard is largely subsumed into an 
undifferentiated jury assessment. The judge's previous formal role in 
establishing the objective standard is eliminated. 
- Did Smith effectively address pre-existing problems? 
The Smith-majority primarily sought to address two criticisms of 
provocation. Firstly that the 'separation approach' was unrealistic and 
overly complicated. Secondly, that is resulted in unfair decisions . 
... Did Smith make the law more realistic and clearer? 
In his leading judgement in Smith, Lord Hoffmann argued that the 
separation approach is too difficult for juries, citing Thomas J., in R v 
Rongonui15, who described the "glazed look in the jurors' eyes" as he 
instructed them to ignore those characteristics relevant to the gravity of 
the provocation, in considering the standard of self-control. 16 
However, precisely how the Smith majority's 'community standards' 
evaluative test is to be applied by the jury, is not much clearer. It is 
likewise hard to discern from Lord Hoffmann's direction how a judge is to 
direct a jury. While the majority did assert that a judge can no longer 
instruct a jury to exclude certain characteristics of the defendant, Lord 
Hoffmann also stated that: "A person who flies into a murderous rage 
when he is crossed, thwarted or disappointed in the vicissitudes of lift 
should not be able to rely upon his antisocial propensity as even a partial 
excuse for killing. "17 
Citing the Australian case of Stingel, in which the defendant, a jealous ex-
boyfriend, stalked his former girlfriend and kille4 the man he observed her 
engaging in sexual intercourse with, Hoffmann stated that "Male 
possessiveness and jealousy should not today be an acceptable reason for 
loss of self-control leading to homicide, whether fnflicted upon the woman 
15 (Unreported) 13 April2000. 
16 Op. Cit., I, 672. 
17 Smith (Morgan), (200I) I AC I46, 169. 
18 Ibid., 169. 
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herself or her new lover." He continued, "So, it is suggested, a direction 
that characteristics such as jealousy and obsession should be ignored in 
relation to the objective element is the best way to ensure that people like 
Stingel cannot rely upon the defence. "18 
But this seemingly contradicts his view that it is "not consistent with 
section 3"19 for a judge to direct the jury to ignore any of the 
'characteristics' of the defendant. Professor Ormerod brings out the 
underlying point here: "By making reference to Stingel, his lordship 
acknowledges that with some issues the jury's moral rigour is not to be 
trusted "20 
In dramatically enlarging the degree of freedom that the jury is to have 
under section 3, Lord Hoffinann struggled to establish a morally rigorous 
objective standard. "His Lordship is prepared to abdicate responsibility 
to the jury for setting moral benchmarks, but only to a point. "21 The 
result; " ... it is just not true that it draws a qualitatively different line 
between the role of the judge and that of the jury. All are similar attempts 
to have the judge specify the relevant standard sufficiently to allow the 
jury to know which standard it is that they are expected to specify still 
further. "22 
Professor Ormerod emphasised this dichotomy with reference to the 
'community standards' formulation in Smith: "In terms of principle and 
practice it is not obviously easier to identify this cut-off point than to 
distinguish which characteristics pertain only to the gravity of the 
provocation. "23 
... Has Smith made the law more just? 
A central plank of the majority's argument in Smith was that the standard 
of self-control should be taken as "a principle and not a rigid rule," which 
"may sometimes have to yield to a more important principle, which is to 
do justice in the individual case. "24 
However, the majority's assertion that the 'community standards of 
blameworthiness' element would enable a fairer standard of self-control, 
specifically tailored to the particular defendant, is riot borne out by the 
majority judgement, or the case law since Smith. 
19 Op. Cit., 1, 669. 
20 Law Commission Consultation Paper (2003) (LCCPI73), 4.83. 
21 Ibid., 4.83, Professor Omerod. 
22 Gardner and Mackelm, "Compassion without Respect? Nine Fallaci~s fn R v Smith" (2001) Crim. 
LR, 632. 
23 Op. Cit., 20, 4.83. i.e. the 'separation approach.' 
24 Op. Cit., I, per Lord Hoffmann, 678. 
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The primary concern is that in subjectivising its standard of evaluation, 
provocation is vulnerable to jury prejudice. The subsequent case of R v 
Weller, 25 permits an informative (and worrying) insight regarding the new 
standard; "'Matters relating to the de fondant, the kind of man he is and 
his mental state ' are to be considered- including, in this case, his 'unduly 
possessive and jealous' nature - when the jury come to apply the test in 
section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957, which need not be phrased in terms of 
'the reasonable man' but could, as in this case, be phrased as 'what 
society expects of a man like this defendant in his position '. "26 The vague 
'what society expects' standard has the potential of endorsing the 
expression of unacceptable societal prejudices. 
The objective standard in provocation has the fundamental value of 
regulating the scope of the defence. Its primary purpose is in determining 
whether the reactions of the defendant were really due to that which 
provoked him, some internal deficiency, or simple criminal intent.27 
Simester and Sullivan recognize a further value of the objective standard: 
"At common law, the reasonable person standard in provocation was not 
only a standard for estimating fault but also a judicial controlling device 
to prevent what were seen as undeserving pleas from being placed before 
a jury. "28 
But, under this new standard, control and reliability of provocation has 
been severely compromised. How is a judge to direct the jury that certain 
characteristics are not to be recognised in considering the objective 
standard, while also leaving the jury free to determine for themselves what 
the objective standard will be? "One may wonder how the two moves are 
to be reconciled. If the reasonableness standard of section 3 cannot be 
specified by the judge without trespassing on the jury's statutory province, 
how can we be confident that the effect of the statute will be to distance 
the reasonableness standard from the (allegedly too restrictive) common 
law version of it?"29 In other words, there is no reason to suppose that the 
changes in Smith will reduce the frequency of outcomes such as Bedder, 
and indeed in a different social climate they might increase; . 
Gardner and Mackelm criticised Smith as "inviting an evaluative free-for-
all, "30 and Ashworth states that the ''evaluative free for all is largely 
· borne out by Weller. "3.1 The loss of judicial control gives rise to the 
legitimate fear that "Leaving the question to the jury's subjectivism may 
25 (2003) EWCA 815. 
26 Ashworth, "R v Weller, Case and Comment" (2003) Crim. LR 724, 725,. 
27 Ash worth states: "The defence of provocation implies that the loss of self-control was caused by the 
provocation: if the provocation was objectively slight, this suggests that the substantial cause of the 
loss of control was not the provocation but rather some weakness (or wickedness) in the accused's 
character, and the case then becomes one of murder or mental abnormality - not provocation." ("The 
Doctrine ofProvocation" (1976) CLJ 292, 298). 
28 Simester and Sullivan, 'Criminal Law- Theory and Doctrine' (2001), ~46. 
29 Op. Cit., 22, 631. . 
30 Ibid., 635. 
31 Op. Cit., 26, 726. 
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produce a reasonable man who is racist, sexist, and ethnocentric. "32 Lord 
Hoffmann did anticipate some judicial guidance ''as to the weight to be 
given to some aspects, "33 but this was not clearly established in Weller, 
and remains decidedly unclear. 
2.1.3. Collapse of the distinction between Provocation and 
Diminished Responsibility. 
An indirect but very significant effect of Smith's subjectivisation of the 
objective standard has been to collapse the distinction between 
provocation and diminished responsibility. Now, both partial defences 
can be raised at the same time, and overlap quite considerably. This has 
raised problems regarding their conceptual differences, the justificatory 
element present in provocation but not in diminished responsibility, and 
their differing burdens of proof; and further demonstrates the consequence 
of subjectivising provocation's evaluative standard. 
- Conceptual differences 
Conceptually, provocation and diminished responsibility are intended to 
cover different areas as partial defences to murder. Classically, 
provocation covers those who are "in a broad sense mentally normal, "34 
whereas diminished responsibility covers the defendant "suffering from 
such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or 
retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by 
disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for 
his acts and omissions. "35 While section 3 is not a statutory definition, 
nevertheless on a plain reading of sections 2 and 3 it is clear that there are 
fundamental differences between the two: "Diminished responsibility is 
the excuse for internal dysfunctions that are the prime cause of the 
accused's violence; provocation focuses on things done or said that are 
the prime cause of the violence. "36 Heaton continues: "The provocation 
excuse should be a concession to extraordinary external circumstances 
and not to the extraordinary internal makeup of the accused "37 
Lord Hoffinann claimed that it is wrong to assume "that there is a neat 
dichotomy between the 'ordinary person' contemplated by the law of 
provocation and the 'abnormal person' contemplated by the law of 
diminished responsibility. "38 The minority in Smith, Lords Millet and 
Hobhouse, accepted that there are situations in which the two defences 
will be run at the same time: "diminished responsibility and provocation 
are both recognised as capable of operating separately. But, likewise, 
32 (2001) 23 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 227,236. 
33 Op. Cit., 1, 713. 
34 (1976) CLJ 292, 312. 
35 Section 2, Homicide Act 1957. 
36 Heaton, "Anything Goes" (2001) 10 Nottingham LJ 50, 54. 
37 Ibid., 55. 
38 Op. Cit., 1, 678. 
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they can and very often do operate in conjunction. "39 Lord Hobhouse 
rationalised this as follows; "In English law by the 1957 Act the two 
defences have been kept separate and are the subject of distinct provisions 
- Sections 2 and 3. But the two sections clearly form two parts of a 
legislative scheme for dealing with defondants who should not be treated 
as fully responsible for they death they have caused "40 
Notwithstanding the need to be able to consider these defences in 
conjunction, the effect of Smith is to blur fundamentally differing 
defences, putting the onus on the jury to consider them both in reaching a 
verdict. The following sections examine additional considerations arising 
from this blurring, while the overall issue is considered further in Chapter 
8. 
- Loss of justificatory element 
Gardner and Mackelm raise the point that where provocation is 
successfully pleaded, the defendant's actions are partly justified through 
the objective element; provocation's "quasi-justificatory drift. "41 But 
diminished responsibility has no justificatory element, and . is entirely 
excuse-based. This is a problem where a defendant raises provocation, 
seeking to have their actions considered against the 'reasonable man' 
objective standard, as commonly understood to have been interpreted in 
Camp/in; they seek to be " ... accorded their status as fully-fledged human 
beings i.e. as creatures whose lives are rationally intelligible even when 
they go off the rails, and who can therefore give a rationally intelligible 
account of how they came to do so. "42 Such a defendant will not welcome 
the developments in Smith, but will rather be frustrated at this removal of 
an opportunity to be judged against a truly objective standard. 
Due to its status as a partial defence, a defendant pleading provocation can 
never be completely justified, but nevertheless the justificatory element 
highlights another way in which to subjectivise the objective standard is to 
compromise provocation's nature. 
- Differing burdens of proof 
Under section 3, the defendant has an evidential burden of proof, which, if 
discharged, leaves the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that 
the defendant was not provoked by things done or said, had not lost self-
control at the relevant time, or that no 'reasonable man' could have acted 
as the defendant did. By contrast, under section 2(2), the defendant, on a 
balance of probabilities, must prove that at the time of the killing he was 
suffering from an 'abnormality of mind,' "whether arising from a 
condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent 
39 Op. Cit., 17, 192. . 
40 Ibid. 
41 Gardner ~'lnstrumentalism and Necessity'' (1986) OJLS 431, 433. 
42 Op. Cit., 22, 627. 
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causes or induced by disease or injury," which 'substantially impaired' 
his mental responsibility. 
The approach following Smith, is complicated: "It cannot be easy even for 
the most conscientious and capable jury, to deal with the same evidence 
under different heads, applying different burdens and quantums of 
proof"43 On a procedural level, these defences could not have been 
intended to overlap: "It can hardly have been intended that a defence 
should have been available on the same facts under section three, where 
the onus of proof is orz the crown. '44 Further confusion is likely where 
only one of the two defences is raised and the judge has an obligation to 
give a direction on the alternative defence if he believes on the evidence 
that it is possible. This will raise difficulties for defendants seeking to 
establish themselves as 'rational' under provocation, if a judge is obliged 
to put the diminished responsibility defence to the jury. 
2.2. The requirement of a loss of self-control 
The loss of self-control requirement has been heavily criticised in two respects: 
frrstly, it is overly-inclusive, particularly towards men, permitting them to raise 
provocation even where the moral worth of their actions is negligible; secondly, 
it is overly exclusive, excluding female defendants deserving of mitigation. A 
third criticism, less often expressed but important nevertheless, is that a loss of 
self-control does not, in and of itself, demand mitigation. 
2.2.1. Overly-lnclusive 
The requirement of a loss of self-control, and the favouring of a closer 
temporal proximity between provocative incident and killing, 45 privileges 
a more masculine reaction in anger. "Designation of the existence of a 
'cooling time ', not simply as evidence of cooled passion, but as legally 
precluding the provocation defence, was clearly premised upon a male-
orientated view of behaviour. "46 While this re~uirement has since been 
relegated to an issue of evidential significance/ it continues to privilege 
action in anger typically of a more masculine nature. 
2.2.2. Overly-exclusive 
43 Op. Cit., 28, 353. 
44 
"Commentary on R v Smith" (2000) Criminal LR 1004, 1005. 
45 Devlin J in Duffy, stated the need for a 'sudden cmd temporary lo~s ofself-~ontrol. '(1949) 1 All ER 
932 (CCA). 
46 Nicholson and Sanghvi, ••Battered Women and Provocation: The Irryplications of R v Ahluwalia" 
(1993) Crim. LR 728, 730. 
47 Numerous authorities, including Thornton ((1992) 1 All ER 306 (CA)), "nd Ahluwalia ((1992) 4 All 
ER 859 (CA)). 
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The second criticism of the 'loss of self-control' is that it excludes women 
deserving of mitigation. The most common reason for women killing 
their husbands or partners, is in response to violence and domination.48 
Due to differences in physical strength, these killings are usually 
perpetrated when the abusive husband or partner is asleep or similarly 
vulnerable, and as such they do not fit the profile of a person provoked to 
· a sudden and lethal loss of self-control. 
Horder, looking at cases of abused women who successfully plead either 
provocation or diminished responsibility, noted that "a light non-custodial 
sentence is usually given to the battered killer and she walks from a court 
a free woman." This result "offends few peoples' sense of justice. "49 He 
contrasted this with those women unable to plead a loss of self-control 
sufficiently proximate to the event or who aren't mentally abnormal under 
· the requirements of diminished responsibility:· "such women are convicted 
· of murder and hence receive a mandatory 'life sentence,· despite the great 
similarity between their cases and those .mentioned above in which a 
manslaughter verdict has been brought in. "50 Sullivan states, "A murder 
verdict in such a context is ·so troubling because the defendants were 
acting,··understandably, to terminate an intolerable and continuing state 
of affairs. Killing was, or in the defendant's psychological condition was 
perceived to be, the only cause of action which would afford relief"51 
The fundamental problem for the battered woman seeking mitigation for 
homicide is that neither self-defence nor diminished responsibility really 
reflect their particular predicament. The circumstances in which they kill, 
often lack the threat of imminent harm required under self .. defence, and 
there is understandable resistance to the notion that such defendants 
should plead diminished responsibility, which requires them to give up 
any justificatory element to their plea, and plead internal defects; besides, 
many battered women don't fit the requirements of diminished 
responsibility. This leaves provocation, which is not a satisfactory fit 
either, due to the re~uirement of a loss of self-control and the related 
temporal constraints. 5 . 
In Ahluwalia and Humphreys, it was held that a past ·history of abuse 
· could be relevant to a plea of provocation, and that a loss of self-control 
could stem from cumulative . provocation. over a number of years. The 
· requirement of close temporal proximity between provocation and killing 
was relegated to an. evidential· ·concern informing . the enquiry as to 
. whether the defendant had ·lost self-control ·at the material time. This 
development was significant in rendering provocation more sympathetic 
48 Edwards (1990), 1380, reports this as 75% in the US. There is no reason tp think that the UK figure 
would be much different. 
49 Horder 'Provocation and Responsibility' (1992), 188, no statistic given. 
50 Ibid., 189. 
51 Sullivan, "Anger and Excuse: Reassessing Provocation" (1995) OJLS 421,425. 
52 Women generally are physically weaker, and therefore less likely ·to react immediately to 
provocation. Nicholson and Sanghvi state; "For one thing, they learn that this is likely to lead to a 
bigger beating. "(Op. Cit., 46, 730). 
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to the plight of women in an abusive domestic situation, but by itself was 
not nearly sufficient. The change was deceptiv~ in as much as it was a 
minor adjustment to what remains an unsuitable pprtial defence for many 
battered women. 
It had further pernicious consequences, in cotnprmp.ising the effectiveness 
of the loss of self-control requirement to prevent ~illings perpetrated out 
of a premeditated desire for revenge, from gaining standing before the 
law; leading to increased pressure on the objective standard. 
2.2.3. The effect of Smith 
Smith has not altered the loss of self-control standard, but in subjectivising 
the objective standard it has had major consequences for the scope of 
provocation. Following Smith, the criticism of the loss of self-control 
requirement as being overly inclusive is far stronger. 
Under the 'separation approach,' characteristics of the defendant such as 
morbid jealousy, or an obsessive desire to control, were excluded from the 
reasonable man regarding the level of self-control; but, pursuant to Smith, 
they are fully attributable to the reasonable man, where relevant. This 
increases the risk that a defendant might receive mitigation for a killing 
perpetrated in the assertion of male domination or control. The loss of 
self-control requirement is powerless to prevent this, and, it can be argued 
· given the objective element's subjectivisation, now encourages such an 
outcome. Pillsbury summarises this: "Manslaughter verdicts in these 
cases treat more leniently homicide due to loss of self-control, even when 
the killing represents a last-ditch effort to control over another. it permits 
mitigation for what may be a desperate act of patriarchy. "53 
Horder, writing in 1992, stated, "One must now ask whether the doctrine 
of provocation, under the cover of an alleged compassion for human 
infirmity, simply reinforces the conditions in which men are perceived and 
perceive themselves as natural aggressors, and in particular women's 
natural aggressors. Unfortunately the answer to that question is yes. "54 
Horder wrote this prior to the Smith·decision (as affirmed in Weller), but, 
distressingly, the answer to his question is now more clearly affirmative. 
· The Law Commission concluded that provocation now "operates as a 
concession not to human frailty but to the male temperament and, as a 
result, .operates in a discretionary manner. ·Jt serves to perpetuate male 
violence. "55 
2.3. Criticism of the basis iD anger 
53 Pillsbury, (1998), 148-9. 
54 Op. Cit., 48, 192. · · 
55 Op. Cit., 20, 12.21. 
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The basis of provocation as a concession to action in anger has been strongly 
questioned. Beyond the problem of the nature of the anger concerned, is the 
issue regarding whether provocation should offer any concession to anger at all. 
A further consideration is whether anger should be the only emotion given this 
legal standing. 
2.3.1. The narrow conception of 'anger' 
The mitigatory justification for privileging anger is its nature as an 
overriding passion which can dominate a defendant's usual non-violence. 
Loss of self-control is an attempt at expressing this in a recognisable and 
quantifiable form. Sullivan points out the difficulty here: " ... there may, 
on occasion, be grounds for scepticism as to the reality of the loss of self-
control. The man who strangles his unfaithful wife; the man who punches 
his crying baby: would they have acted in similar fashion if infuriated by 
the conduct of a person of superior strength?"56 The concept of anger as 
'boiling the blood'57 is outdated, failing to reflect the breadth oflegitimate 
physiological responses in anger. Brett argues strongly that research 
carried-out concerning physiological responses to provocation 
demonstrates the notion of a 'cooling' off period after the provocation, to 
be mistaken. In some defendants, anger produces a 'positive feedback 
system' causing anger to increase with the passing of time. 58 
A loss of self-control is not a pure denial of the mens rea for murder, and 
so the moral value ofthe defendant's conduct must be assessed. There are 
justifiable concerns that violent action in anger "is all too commonly 
regarded as natural or understandable -:-perhaps even appropriate. "59 
2.3.2. Should provocation offer a concession to anger at all? 
The elevated status of anger within provocation continues to cause 
significant controversy, and provocation is viewed by many as "a defence 
which contains an unappealing message condoning anger over 
restraint. "60 Some critics argue that anger is a discreditable emotion, 
which the law partly condones by granting a concession to those acting in 
anger. Morse argues that even in the face of stroqg provocation, it is not 
that hard to refrain from killing;61 which Pillsbucy echoes: "most persons 
have little trouble refraining from killing even when greatly aggravated, 
suggesting that even provoked killings deserve significant punishment. "62 
Horder stated that provocation's justification "depends on an acceptance 
56 Op. Cit., 51, 427. 
57 Op. Cit., 49, 17&18. 
58 Brett, "The Physiology of Provocation" (1970) Crim. LR 6,34, 637. 
59 Horder (1992), 194. 
60 Wells, "Provocation: The Case for Abolition" in Ashworth and Mit~hell eds 'Rethinking English 
Homicide Law' (2000) 86, 106. 
61 MCCOC, 'Draft Criminal Code: Fatal Offences Against the Person' (1998), 91. 
62 Pillsbury 'Judging Evil' (1998), 146. 
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that it may be morally understandable to perpetrate violence in anger in 
certain circumstances"63 As Simester and Sullivan state, "there is clearly 
something problematic about condoning, even partially, violence used not 
in self-deftnce or under duress but perpetrated in anger. "64 Furthermore, 
the early release of a person prone to lethally violent loss of self-control 
when provoked, is hard to justify with regards to public safety. 
2.3.3. Should anger be the only emotion considered? 
It is extremely difficult to justify provocation's privileging of action in 
anger, especially since the 'loss of self-control' requirement has been 
shown to be overly restrictive. It is no longer possible to justify denying 
other emotions a mitigatory value equal to that of anger; the issue now is 
whether provocation can be made to accommodate a whole range of 
emotions, or whether other mechanisms should sh~e this role. This will 
be considered in Section B. 
2.3.4. The changes in Smith 
Smith, while not directly addressing provocation's basis in a loss of self-
control, has had a significantly detrimental impact upon provocation's 
legitimacy as a partial defence mitigating action in anger. Following 
Smith, the unpredictability of provocation, due to the jury's freedom to 
determine for itself the standard to be applied, has rendered provocation 
morally unreliable. Consequently, provocation qm no longer be relied 
upon to reliably mitigate anger-based action, and risks returning 
unpalatable results. 
2.4. Victim~blame 
2.4.1. Distressing and discriminatory 
A singularly unattractive feature of provocation is that it can promote a 
culture of blaming the victim, which is very distressing for their family 
and friends who must endure unanswered accusations. Furthermore, some 
critics have argued that through this, gender discrimination within 
provocation is exacerbated. Examples cited· include Justice Devlin, in 
DuffY, instructing that "You are not concerned with blame here ~ the 
blame attaching to the dead man. You are not standing in judgement on 
him. He has not been heard in this court. He cannot now ever be heard. 
He has no deftnder here to argue for him. "65 By contrast, in McGrail, 66 
63 Op. Cit., 49, 194-5. 
64 Simester and Sullivan 'Criminal Law- Theory and Doctrine' (2001), 12~. " ... under the present law 
what may be particularly brutal killings are sometimes partially condon~d." (lbid). 
65 Summing up to the jury at the Manchester Assizes; repeated by Lor~ Goddard in the Court of 
Crimin1;1I Appeal. 
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the defendant had kicked his wife to death as sh(! lay drunk; Popplewell J 
stated that she "would have tried the patience of a saint. "67 Two de-
contextualised examples are no basis for generalised assumptions, but 
they do highlight the potential for significantly differing values to be 
applied within provocation. 
2.4.2. The effect of Smith 
The recent shift towards recognising the mental characteristics of the 
defendant with regard to the reasonableness 'of the provocation, has 
reduced the focus on the actions of the victim ')lld theoretically reduced 
the risk of 'victim-blame.' However, the jury's freedom to determine the 
evaluative standard to be applied. is such that it could deem a seemingly 
inconsequential action or attitude of the victim to constitute severe 
provocation, which may result in unpredictable victim blame, determined 
according to the specific sympathies and prejudices of a particular jury. 
2.5. Provocation: conceptually confused and anomalous 
2.5.1. Conceptually confused 
A significant accusation against provocation is that it has drifted from its 
roots .in wrongful action on the part of the victim/8 and now focuses too 
strongly on the defendant's subjective experience. The acceptance of any 
conduct as capable of constituting provocation, the gradual increase in 
those characteristics of the defendant deemed relevant to the standard of 
self-control, and the pressure of needing to mitigate the harshness of self-
defence, have all contributed in eroding the element of justification and 
favouring the element of excuse. 
2.5.2. Anomalous 
Some have deemed provocation 'anomalous' because it operates uniquely 
as a partial defence to murder; the New Zealand Criminal Law Reform 
Committee69 cited this reason in advocating the abolition of provocation: 
"The argument for jury participation in determining levels of culpability 
should logically extend to all crimes and not be confined to murder." 
66 Birmingham Crown Court 31 July 1991, unreported. 
67 Ibid. 
68 In Mawgridge, Lord Holt CJ established four type's of provocation, in addition to the victim's 
striking of the defendant, sufficientto rebut the (then) implied presence of rp.alice. These were I) angry 
words followed by assault, 2) the sight of a friend or relative being beaten, 3) the sight of a citizen 
unlawfully deprived of his libertyj 4) the sight of a man in adultery with the accused's wife. ((1707) 
Kel.ll9, 135-137). 
69 Hereafter referred to as 'NZ LRC.' 
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While this is a legitimate contention where all sentences are determinate, 
most would assert the mandatory life sentence to necessitate partial 
defences. The Law Commission states: "The existence of such a partial 
defence is justifiable in the law of murder, although there is no similar 
partial defence to non..fatal offences of violence, not only because the 
sentence for murder is fixed by but also because of the unique gravity and 
stigma attached to murder. " 70 
The same argument applies to the assertion that ~ defendant seeking to 
plead provocation has the requisite mental element for murder, and should 
be convicted as such. 
2.5.3. The effect of Smith 
The significance of this conceptual shift is that provocation is now 
unstable, and the likelihood of it being able to regain its justificatory 
footing under the present formulation is very slight. The Law 
Commission has condemned it as "hopelessly compromised. " 71 
3. Conclusion: defects in the Smith decision 
The criticisms of provocation are formidable. The loss of self-control requirement, 
with its limitations on the scope of provocation, is increasingly difficult to Justify, 
especially in the light of recent developments in physiological understanding. 2 It is 
rooted in provocation's concession to action in anger, which itself has come under 
considerable pressure. It is difficult to justify a partial defence which mitigates action 
in anger, while excluding other emotions; especially where it privileges male action in 
anger. It is important to note that some of this can be attributed to failures in the 
broader web of defences, both full and partial. 
The objective standard, as expressed through the 'reasonable man', resulted in some 
clumsiness in judicial guidance, and has attracted criticism accordingly. 
The decision in Smith has a number of defects: the subjectivisation of the objective 
standard, contradictions regarding directions or guidance to the jury, a collapsing of 
the distinction between provocation and diminished responsibility (which itself entails 
problems concerning their conceptual differences, the loss of the justificatory element 
and the burden of proof). 
But perhaps the most fundamental, and most potentially pemicjous chdnge, is the way 
in which the lack of precision in the majority's direction has resulted in the objective 
standard being comprorrtised without compensatory clarity regarding .the jury's new 
role. Heatdh asks, " ... hds the innately violent person any more control dver his rages 
than the person made tetnporally pugnacious by depression? WJ?at cri/er/a are to be 
used to distinguish those characteristics that are ruled-out?'' An exathple of the 
70 Op. Cit., 20, para. 9. 
71 Ibid., 12.21. 
72 See Brett, Op. Cit., 58. 
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consequence of the majority's decision is Weller, in which the defendant's 'unduly 
possessive and jealous' nature was deemed relevant to the standard of self-control. 
Lord Hoffmann's intention that "Male possessiveness and jealousy should not today 
be an acceptable reason for loss of self-control leading to homicide, "73 is one which 
must now rely entirely on the jury's notion of the objective standard. 74 
Professor Smith summarised the impact of Smith: "Apparently the question now is: 
'Was the provocation enough to make a man with his substantially impaired powers 
of self-control (i.e. his violent disposition) do as he did?' But the jury will already 
have answered this question by deciding that he was (or may have been) so provoked. 
What a muddle/"75 
Unsurprisingly, there has been a reaction against Smith. In R v Holle/6, the Privy 
Council held that the Smith-majority were wrong, a decision which was treated as 
authoritative by the Court of Appeal in R v Susan Shickle77 apd R v Faqir78. These 
two decisions were significant in going against the clear precedent of the House of 
Lords in Smith, indicating the controversy of the decisiol}. The present state of 
provocation is a law controversial in application, and confust1d in precedent. 
73 Ibid. 
74 This is utterly undesirable. The judiciary is relegated to hoping that a vague objective standard might 
be consistently applied from one jury to the next. 
75 Op. Cit., 44, 1007. 
76 (2005) UKPC 23. 
77 (2005) EWCA Crim. 1881. 
78 (2005) EWCA Crim. 1880 
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Introduction to Reform of Provocation 
It is clear from the previous section that provocation is in a state of considerable 
turmoil; the Law Commission, in 2003, concluded it to be "hopelessly 
compromised."1 Its overly subjectivised state - rendering it insufficiently stable and 
vulnerable to the prejudices of the jury - has led to its general condemnation. In this 
section, the different options for reform will be scrutinised. 
To begin with, the possibility of stabilising provocation in its currently subjectivised 
form (Chapter 5) is considered. The New South Wales Law Reform Commission 
recommended a subjectivised plea, and in Ireland such a formulation currently exists. 
These examples from abroad will be factored into a discussion of the viability of a 
subjectivised plea. 
Then, the viability of a plea based in wrongful action 011 the part of the victim, 
retaining the 'loss of self-control' framework, is considered (Chapter 6). Many have 
asserted that for provocation to restore moral legitimacy it must be returned to its 
roots in wrongful action from the victim. The Irish Law Reform Commission, in 
2003, recommended reform of provocation, with a justificatory emphasis, retaining 
the loss of self-control model, and the 'separation approach.' 
In 2004, the Law Commission proposed new 'principles' for provocation, based in 
killing in response to 'gross provocation', killing in response to 'fear of serious 
violence', and a combination of both. This reformulation is assessed, concerning how 
workable it would be in practice, and whether it would improve the present law 
(Chapter 7). 
The Model Penal Code's partial defence of 'Extreme Mental or Emotional 
Disturbance' is considered, in the light of those US states in which it has been 
adopted, the success with which it has met, and its suitability i:p the present system of 
homicide law in England and Wales (Chapter 8). 
Finally the case for abolition is assessed (Chapter 9). 
1 
'Partial Defences to Murder' (2003) (LCCP173), 12.21. 
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Chapter 5: Subjectivised Provocation Plea 
· 1. Introduction . 
In Smith, the House of L~rds subj~ctivised the evaluative standard, establishing a 
'pri;nciple of objectivity', to which the. jury should have regard in assessing "whether 
the act in question was sufficient provocation. to be .acceptable as a partial excuse." 1 
Imprecision in the evaluative element has led to provocation being dangerously 
widened, apd it is generally ccmsidere~ to be both unstable, and unaccep~ble . 
. Before assessing the wholesale reform. options, it is worth considering, whether 
provocation can be. stabilised· as a subjectivised plea. Crudaliy, the ·standard of 
evaiuation must be est~blished with sufficient precision to give provo~ation the moral 
'rigour it currently lacks. In assessing this option, other common law jurisdictions in 
, which such a subjectivisation has been adopted, or considered, wil' be evaluated. 
2. Subjectivised pleas in other states 
2.1. Ireland 
Irish provocation law followed the pre-Act law of England and Wales, 
enforcing the objective standard through the reasonable man devoid of the 
defendant's characteristics, until 19.78, when the .Court of Criminal Appeal in 
People (DPP) v MacEoin,2 reviewed .the law of provocation. Kenny J 
formulated the new test: · 
"[T]he trialjudge ... should rule on whether there is any evidence of provocation 
which, having regard to the accused's temperament, character and 
circumstances, might have caused him to lose control of himself at the time of 
the wrongful act, and ·whether the provocation bears a reasonable relation to 
th;e qmount of force used by. the accused."3 . . . . . :. . . .· 
While intending to subjectivise provocation through considering· the 
temperament, character and circumstances of the defendant, regarding the 
standard of self-control, the retention of the proportionality requirement caused 
. . . . . . . . . 
1
. R v Smith, (2000) 3 WLR 654, 668. 
2 (1978) IR 27. Delivered only eleven days after Camp/in, MacEoin made no reference to Camp/in or 
the 'separation approach.' Prior to MacEoin, the law still stood as it had in Dr.iffY and Bedder, causing 
Kenny J to declare the objective test "profoundly illogical." (Ibid., 34). In his judgement, Kenny J 
relied heavily upon the minority judgement ofMurphy J in the High Court of Australia case of Mo.ffa v 
The Queen {(1977) 138.C~R 601), the only contemporary common law authority promoting a similar 
subjective standard. 
3 (1978) IR 27, 34. 
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confusion, provoking considerable criticism 4 and strong questioning of the 
Court of Criniinal Appeal's commitment to a subjectivised plea. 5 
In subsequent cases, the proportionality requirement has been treated as a guide 
in evaluating the evidence as a whole, but without definitive resolution. 6 
Several attempts by the Court of Criminal Appeal to clarify MacEoin have 
failed, and in People (DPP) v Kel/y,7 the Court of Criminal Appeal "warned 
against quoting from the judgement in Mac Eo in because of what it regarded as 
its confusing discussion of the law. "8 . . . 
In People (DPP) v Davis,9 the Court of Criminal Appeal recognised the heavy 
criticism of the subjective test, 10 and accepted the need to re-examine 
provocation. It also recognised that policy considerations have changed over 
time, certain factors having become publicly visible since MacEoin, such as 
'road rage' and other socially repugnant types of behaviour, asserting that the 
defence should be "circumscribed or even denied where [allowing it would] 
promote moral outrage. " 11 Furthermore, the court noted that the roots of the 
defence are action in response to acts of considerable provocation. 
Most recently, in People (DPP) v McDonagh, the Court of Criminal Appeal 
(made up of different members from People (DPP) v Davis) stated that the law 
"applies a purely subjective test," but in the case itself there was insufficient 
evidence of provocation, and People (DPP) v Davis was not cited, so that 
McDonagh fails to authoritatively clarify the judicial position. 
The Law Reform Commission of Ireland considered the troubled case law to 
illustrate the "difficulties surrounding the interpretation and application of the 
MacEoin Judgement. "11 It recmnmended that provocation be retained, but in a 
modified form, 13 re·emphasising the justificatory nature of provocation's roots 
and adopting the 'separation approach' established in Camp/in. It commented 
4 In response to Kenny J's declaration that the objective test was ''profoundly illogical," Stannard 
argues that the resultant standard is no less illogical. ("'Making Sense of MacEoin" (1998) 8 ICLJ 20). 
5 
" ... it h(JS been argued that the deliberate inclusion of a proportionality elemeilt casts doubt on the 
depth of the Court of Criminal Appeal's commitment to the wholesale subjectivisation of the 
provocation standard". (Law Commission, "Partial Defences to Murder' (2003) (LCCP173), Appendix 
C, para. 8); echoed by McAuley "Anticipating the Past" (1987) 50 MLR 133, 153-154. 
6 The LRC of Ireland, commented that the " ... precise role of the proportionality component has not 
been convincingly resolved ... it remains unclear as to precisely what the Court in Mac Eo in hoped to 
achieve ... whether its emphasis on proportionality was designed to ensure that some element of 
objectivity would be preferred as part of the test or whether the Court merely included proportionality 
as a guide to the type and quantum of evidence that would support a plea of provocation. " (LRC CP 
27-2003, 4.10). 
7 People (DPP) v Kelly {(2000) 2 IR 1). Other cases where attempts to clarify the law failed were: 
People (DPP) v Mullane (Court of Criminal Appeal ll March 1997, 8), People (DPP) v Noonan 
((1998) 2 IR 439). 
8 Op. Cit., 6, 4.11. 
9 (2001) 1 IR 146. 
10 
" ... given the subjective nature of the test, the charge that it is virtually impossible for the 
prosecution to rebut evidence of provocation once the plea has been raised seems justified " (Op. Cit., 
6, para. 4.37). 
11 Ibid., 159. 
12 Ibid., 4.33. 
13 Ibid., 7 .28~ 7 .41. 
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that where the 'wrongful act' roots of provocation are overlooked, "the plea is 
apt to slip its moorings and lose its bearings. As the Irish experience illustrates, 
the ensuing voyage can be a very disorientating experience. "14 
MacEoin's reference to proportionate force makes the Irish experience a less 
clear test of subjectivisation than it might have been. Nevertheless, it would be 
reasonable to conclude of the experience of Irish provocation law, that a 
working subjectivisation of the objective standard has proven difficult to 
formulate or implement, and that they are currently inclined to abandon the · 
attempt. 
2.2 .. New Zealand 
In New Zealand, the objective standard was constituted as it had been in 
England and Wales, through the 'reasonable man' 15 devoid of any 
characteristics of the defendant. This standard was considered to be overly 
harsh, 16 and in 1961 a new Crimes Act was enacted, section 169 of. which set 
out the law of provocation. Section 169 reads in part: 
"(2) Anything done or said may be provocation if-
In the circwnstances of the case it was sufficient to deprive a person having the 
power of self-control of an ordinary person, but otherwise having the 
characteristics of the offender, of the power of self-control ... " · 
This provision is the crux of the law of provocation in New Zealand; its drafters 
clearly sought to move away from the strict objective approach, 17 but how that 
was intended to work in practice remains unclear. 
In McGregor/ 8 the first decision after the enactment of section 169, North J, 
delivering the judgement of the court, concluded that section's intended 
softening of the objective standard involved taking account of the defendant's 
personal characteristics when· considering the standard of self-control of an 
'ordinary person.' This was heavily criticised, as making the 'ordinary person' a 
replicate of the defendant. 19 
The cases since, have principally interpreted section 169 as intending that the 
defendant's characteristics be taken into account when considering the gravity 
of the provocation, but not when considering the standard of self-control. 20 
14 Ibid., 7.30. 
15 Following the 1961 Crimes Act, this became the 'ordinary person.' 
16 Sir George Finlay, invited by the Government of New Zealand in 1958 to review the new bill, 
recognised it as necessary to remedy the "obvious injustice" of Bedder. (Fiplay, 'Report on the Crimes 
Bill 1957' (1958), 72). 
17 
" •.. the drafters of the new Act did attempt the task of investing a reasonable man with the 
characteristics of the accused ... " (Op. Cit. 5, 128, Law Commission). 
18 (1962) NZLR 1069. 
19 Sir Francis Adams (1971), 1264-1269 .. 
20 R v McCarthy ((1992)2 NZLR 550; (1992) 8 CRNZ 58 (CA)), R v Campbel/.((1997) 1 NZLR.l6; 
(1996) CRNZ 117(CA)), R v Rongonui ((2000) 2 NZLR 385. 
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In R v Makoare,21 the Court of Appeal declined to reconsider the 'separation 
approach' in the light of Smith, reasoning that section 169 is substantially 
different from that established in Smith, and provocation in England and Wales 
operates alongside diminished responsibility, which is not recognised in New 
Zealand. The Court also held the fact that provocation was then under 
consideration by the Law Commission, and that Parliament was due to consider 
the "Degrees of Murder Bill, "22 to be limiting on its decision. It unanimously 
called for statutory reform, and concluded that this process would not be helped 
through further change by the courts. 
In its final report, published in May 2001, the New Zealand Law Commission 
reported that a majority of consultees favoured abolition of provocation, 
although most agreed that while mandatory life remained, provocation should 
be reformed?3 It rejected the subjective test qualified by a 'community 
standards' element, (as proposed in New South Wales), on the basis that the 
'lesser culpability' argument is applicable to all circumstances of intentional 
killing, and would be disproportionately singled-out to accommodate 
provocation24; and concluded in favour of abolishing provocation. 
Despite taking a different approach to Ireland, it would seem that the New 
Zealand experience is again that a working subjectivisation of the objective 
standard has proved difficult to formulate or implement. They also are currently 
inclined to abandon the attempt, although taking a different direction in pursuit 
of a solution.25 
2.3. Australia 
Of the Australian states, New South Wales is considered to be the most 
progressive regarding provocation. The provocation defence was enacted into 
law through the NSW Crimes Act 1900, section 23,26 ·which has operated very 
similarly to Camp/in. It is important to note that the legislative amendments of 
1990 gave the courts a full sentencing discretion. 
Following heavy criticism of the objective test, focusing on the limitations of 
the 'ordinary person' test and the 'separation of characteristics' approach, 27 the 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission reviewed provocation. It 
21 (2001) 1 NZLR 318. 
22 The Bill was later withdrawn. 
23 NZ LC Report 73, 'Some Criminal Defences with Particular Refert<nce to Battered Defendants,' 
(2001), Chapter 5, 107-109. 
24 NSW LC 'Partial Defences to Murder; Provocation and Infanticide' R 83 (Sydney '97) cited in NZ 
LC R 73 para.s 112-113. 
25 The Sentencing Act 2002, abolished mandatory life. 
26 S. 23(2)(b) requires that the "conduct of the deceased was such as could have induced an ordinary 
person in the position of the accused to have so far lost self-control as to have formed an intent to kill, 
or to inflict grievous bodily harm upon, the deceased " 
27 See Moffa, (1977) 138 CLR 601,625-626, per Murphy J. 
In Masciantonio, McHugh J asserted that the inconsistency perpetrated by the distinction could only be 
rectified through abolition of the ordinary person test, which he consid~red beyond judicial mandate. 
((1995) 183 CLR 58, 73). 
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considered a number of possibilities, finally recomm~nding a subjective test, 
taking into account the "circumstances and characteristics" of the defendant in 
combination with a 'community ·standards of blameworthiness' objective 
element.28 
Concerns that this approach leaves the jury undue latitude in determining the 
outcome of a plea of provocation were noted by the LRC, but deemed inherent 
to any jury system, and therefore. acceptable. 29 · 
Unlike Ireland and New Zealand, New South Wales has not yet undergone the 
experience of implementing a working subjectivisation of the objective 
standard. The model that they propose is interesting but untested. 
3. Conclusion 
For a subjectivised evaluative standard to work, it must successfully pass two tests: 
the scope of its application must be just, for example including the victims of 
domestic abuse, and excluding the habitually violent; and the risks inherent in the 
increased role of the jury in determining provocation must be acceptably minimized. 
The New South Wales LRC, in considering its proposed subjectivised formulation, 
concluded the risk of the jury returning a morally deficient decision to be inherent to 
any jury system and therefore acceptable.30 However, the size of the risk is related to 
the latitude the jury is given, and for a major crime, where reduced judicial control is 
accompanied by the jury empowerment to independently apply a generalised test of 
'community standards,' this risk is surely too great. Additional safeguards, or an 
alternative approach, are necessary. 
The issue of scope has been highlighted by the general trend of provocation moving 
away from its roots in justification towards a plea based in excuse, leading to 
increased criticism of the 'loss of self-control' requirement. The New Zealand LRC 
found that this requirement, even where relegated to an issue of evidential concern, 
continues to operate to the exclusion of victims of domestic violence, while 
permitting its perpetrators to avail themselves of provocation. 31 
A provision based on a subjectivised standard has proven so difficult to formulate and 
administer, that the tendency on the part of different jurisdictions to retreat from this 
approach is quite understandable. 
28 
"[IJ he accused, taking into account all of his or her characteristics and circumstances, should be 
excused for having so far lost self-control as to have formed an intent to kill or to inflict grievous 
bodily harm or to have acted with reckless indifference to human life as to warrant the reduction of 
murder to manslaughter." (Proposed section 23(2)(b), Op. Cit., 24, 2.50-2.58, 2.81). 
29 Ibid., 2.83. 
30 Op. Cit., 24, 2.144. 
31 Op. Cit., 23, Chapter 5, 105, citing a number of cases where qrovocation partially excused 
unacceptable conduct: R v Tepu (11 December 1998) unreported, High Court, Wellington Registry, (T 
889-98); McDonald "Provocation, Sexuality and the Actions of 'Thoro11ghly Decent Men"' ((1993) 9 
Women's Studies Journal 126); "Minnitt" The Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 5 August 
1980,34. 
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The requirement of a loss of self-control, although now only evidential, continues to 
shape the scope of provocation. This, combined with the general acceptance of any 
conduct as capable of constituting provocation, has placed considerable pressure upon 
the objective element as the means of regulating the scope of provocation. The 
consequences of Smith (Morgan) and the experiences in Ireland and New Zealand, 
demonstrate the dangers of overly-subjectivising the objective element and one must 
conclude that if provocation is to remain a partial defence qa~ed upon a loss of self-
control, it can only do so with a rigorous objective standard. 
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Chapter 6: Retention of Loss of S~lf-Control, 
with Emphasised Justificatory Standard 
1. Introduction 
Provocation, as it currently operates, is unacceptable. As seen in chapter 5, attempts 
to stabilise it as a subjectivised plea have failed. The Law Commission recently 
reported that: "there was overwhelming agreement among consultees that the law of 
provocation is unsatisfactory and that its defects are beyond cure by judicial 
development of the law. "1 Smith's subjectivisation of the objective standard has 
crucially undermined provocation's moral legitimacy, engendering broad 
condemnation. 
The extent to which these criticispts and calls for reform are 'in response to Smith, or 
are aimed more broadly at provocation, is unclear. There is a danger of recent 
developments tarring all elements of the partial defence; inertia for reform risks 
condemning the entire defence, and to reform without carefully considering 
provocation's conceptual roots may be to eliminate elements of great worth which 
might be retained ·and improved. Consequently, it is necessary to assess the 
possibility of a reformed 'plea adopting the 'Classic line' approach of Camp/in and 
Morhall; which established the 'separation of characteristics' evaluative standard, 
(recently reasserted in R v Holley and The Queen v Shickle). · 
In questioning the possibility of such a formulation, the law as it stood will be 
considered, along with the experiences of· similar models in other common law 
jurisdictions. 
2. 'Classic Line' Provocation and Criticisms 
2.1. Objective Standard 
Under the 'classic line,' the 'separation of characteristics' approach was 
fundamental in permitting recognition of the defendant's character and 
circumstances in assessing the gravity of the provocation, while maintaining an 
independent objective stand~rd of self-control. This standard was crucial in 
regulating provocation's scope, and has been adopted widely in jurisdictions 
where it exists as a partial defence to murder. However, the 'reasonable man' 
standard meant that judges and juries were faced with complicated directions. 
The Australian partial defence of provocation origincited from the English 
'reasonable man' model. In Stingel v The Queen,2 it was established that, 
concerning the standard of self-control, only the age qf the defendant could be 
1 LC, Final Report, (2004) 173, 3.32. 
2 (1990) 171 CLR 312 (HCA). 
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attributed to the ordinary person, and in Masciantonio, it was held that the 
ethnic and cultural background of the accused was not to be attributed. 
However, the concept of an 'ordinary person' provoked ~riticism;3 Murphy 1 in 
Moffa4 deemed it unrepresentative of actual experience, calling for its 
replacement with a purely subjective test of actual loss of self-control;5 this 
proposal has also been made by three Australian law reform bodies. 6 Despite 
this, the Law Commission of England and Wales reported that "the objective 
test has continued to receive strong judicial and legislative support in the 
Australian jurisdictions possessing the defence of provocation. "7 This is 
perhaps indicative of a difference in views between the theoretical advantages 
of a subjectivised test, and the likelihood of their practical workability. 
Significantly, the 'separation approach' has been largely successful in India. In 
the leading case of Nanavati v State8, the Supreme Court modified the 
evaluative standard, imbuing the 'ordinary person' with the defendant's cultural 
and ethnic status. Crucially, however, the homogenity of ethnic groups in India 
enables a more legitimately culturally-weighted approach than is possible in 
more ethnically integrated societies. 
In New Zealand, the interpretation of section 169(2) of tq.e New Zealand Crimes 
Act 1961, has engendered strong disagreement. In McGregor, it was held to 
subjectivise the 'ordinary person,' but in the last fifteen years the separation of 
characteristics approach has been the dominant interpretation.9 The situation 
remains far from settled. 10 
In 2001, the New Zealand Law Commission recommended the abolition of 
provocation; amongst its reasons stating the law to b~ overly complicated for 
both judges and juries. 11 The 2002 Sentencing Act abolished mandatory life, 
although there remains a strong presumption in favour of a life sentence. Since 
the Act's inception, there has been no notable push for the abolition of 
provocation. 
3 Yeo "Power of Self-Control in Provocation and Automatism" (1994) 14 Sydney LR 3, 7. 
4 (1977) 138 CLR 601. 
5 
"It is impossible to construct a model of a reasonable or ordinary South Australian for the purpose of 
assessing emotional jlashpoint, loss of self-control and capacity to kill under particular 
circumstances ... The objective test should be discarded. It has no place in rational criminal 
jurisprudence. " (Ibid., 625-626). 
6 The Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee of South Australia, 4th Report, 'The 
Substantive Criminal Law' (Adelaide, 1977); Law Reform Commis&ioner, Victoria, 12th Report, 
'Provocation and Diminished Responsibility as Defence to Murder' (LRCV, Melbourne, 1982). 
7 Law Commission, Consultation Paper, Part V, Chapter 1, 1.30., NSW LRC, Report 83, 'Partial 
Defences to Murder: Provocation and Infanticide' (Sydney 1997). 
s AIR 1962 se 605. 
9 Most recently in R v Rongonui (2000) 2 NZLR 385. The previous qecisions were R v McCarthy 
(1992) 2 NZLR 550, and R v Campbell (1997) 1 NZLR 16. 
10 In Rongonui, Elias CJ criticised this as "highly artificial," and the distinction as "over-subtle," 
making the "application of the law of provocation complex" and "uneven." ((2000) 2 NZLR 385, 
para.s 111-1 13). 
11 NZLC R 73 (2001), para.s 112-113. 
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While the problems with the 'separation of characteristics' approach are well 
documented, it is noteworthy that the Irish LRC, in 2003, recommended the 
adoption of a formulation with a strong objective standard, tempered through 
the 'separation of characteristics' approach. 12 There are some important 
differences from the. 'classic line'; the objective standard is expressed through 
the 'ordinary person,' 13 the justificatory element is strongly reinstated, and there 
is a requirement of proportionate response to the provocation. This, the 
Commission contends, will "curtail the unduly broad sweep of the current law 
in Ireland. "14 . . 
2.2. Loss of Self-control 
The loss of self-control requirement has been heavily criticised, and condemned 
as beyond judicial rescue. It stems from a time when provocation was 
considered to cause a sudden and temporary 'boiling ofthe blood' 15; however, 
this has now been shown to represent just one of a number of models of 
physiological response to provocation. 16 In light of this, the loss of self-control 
requirement cannot effectively reflect the culpability of defendants receiving 
provocation. 
Problems with the loss of self-control requirement have been greatly 
exacerbated by the emphasising of provocation's basis in excuse, permitting 
trivial conduct to be recognised as provocation, and enabling the legal 
expression of unacceptable values concerning male possession and control of 
women. Such is the strength of feeling against this, that provocation's moral 
legitimacy must be restored to justify its retention: this, it is contended, can only 
be done through the adoption of a rigorous element of justification. This would 
enable the exclusion of undeserving pleas, filtering out those premised upon 
morally repugnant attitudes of racism, homophobia, possession or control; 
enabling the loss of self-control standard to better function as intended, in 
excluding premeditated killings. However, retention of the loss of self-control 
requirement is extremely unlikely owing to its exclusion of defendants more 
deserving of mitigation than many it includes. 
3. Conclusion 
For a plea of provocation to be viable, there is a very great need to restore its moral 
legitimacy. This is best done through a return to a strong justificatory standard, and a 
morally rigorous objective standard. 
12 
'Consultation Paper on Homicide: The Plea of Provocation' (LRC CP 27-2003), 7.36-7.41. 
13 Such is the stigma attached to the 'reasonable man' that this represents a wise reformulation. 
14 Op. Cit, 11, 7.38. 
15 Horder 'Provocation and Responsibility' (1992), Chapter I. 
16 Brett, "The Physiology of Provocation" (1970) Crim. LR 634. The requirement of immediate or 
sudden response to provocation, continues to exist in Ireland and Scotland, but is no longer required in 
India, Australia's Northern Territory, Capital Territory, NSW, South Ausp-alia and Victoria. 
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The separation approach has struggled for a number of reasons: the awkward 
'reasonable man' construction, the pressure of the 'battered women' cases, and the loss 
of self-control requirement. The last of these is very signifi~ant, and indeed is the 
primary problem with the present law of provocation; it is not possible to return to a 
partial defence based in justification while the loss of self-control requirement is 
retained. Sudden anger can no longer be uniquely privileged in this manner. 
The present condemnation of provocation has been both vigqrous and comprehensive. 
Provocation cannot remain as it is presently constructed - it must be significantly 
changed. For this reason, a return to the 'classic line' formuJation, with the emphasis 
of the justificatory standard, is not possible. 
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Chapter 7: Law Commission Formulation of 
. . . . . 
·Provocation 
1. Introduction 
In its final report, the Law Commission proposed a formulation for a new partial 
defence of provocation, 1 "seeking to identifY the principles which should govern any 
legislative reform."2 
The Commission identified the primary problem With provocation as bemg that it 
peimits morally undeserving defendants to raise the· defence~· while also excluding 
those morally deserving. Since Smith,· the plea has become ''far too loose, so that a 
· judge may be obliged to leave the issue to the jury when the conduct and/or the words 
in question are trivial. "3 The requirement of a loss of self-control has also caused 
considerable problems,· and, despite being relegated. to an element of evidential 
concern, it continues to do so "especially in the 'slow-burn' type of case"4 of 
cumulative provocation .. 
In response to this, the Law Commission's proposed forrnuiation makes two 
significant changes from the present defence: 
The first is re-emphasising an element of justification: 
" ... we think that the moral blameworthiness of homicide may be significantly. lessened 
when the defendant acts in response to gross provocation in the sense of words or 
conduct (or a combination) giving the defondant a justified sense of being severely 
wronged. We do not think that the same moral extenuation exists if the defendant's 
respOnse was considered, unless it was brought about by" a continuing state offear."5 
. '· . 
The second is the abolition of the loss of self-control requirement, which the Law 
Commission considered too ambiguous a concept; "it could denote either a failure to 
· exercise self-control or.an inabiliiy to. exercise selj-contro/."6 It concluded that " ... the 
requirem(mt of loss of self-control was a judicl"ally inv~nted concept, lacking 
sharpness or a clear foundation in psychology. It was a valiant but flawed attempt to 
encapsulate ·a key limitation to the' defonce:. that it should not be avaliable to those 
·who kill in consideredrevenge. "7 · · · · · · · · ·. · · · ... 
2. LC Proposed Formulation and Explanations 
The Law Commission's proposed formulation contains two prerequisites: 
1 LC Final Report, (2004) No. 173, 3.60-3.168. 
2 1bid., 3.16. 
3 Ibid., 3.20. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., 3.63. 
6 Ibid., 3.28. 
7 Ibid., 3.30. 
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"We consider that the first prerequisite of a defence of provocation should be that the 
defendant acted in response to (1) gross provocation or (2) fear of serious violence 
towards himself or herself or another;. or (3) a combination of (1) and (2). "8 
The second is "that a person of ordinary temperament, i.e. ordinary tolerance and 
self-restraint, in the circumstances of the defendant might have reacted in the same or 
a similar way. "9 · 
2.1. Two Triggers 
The Commission identified two 'triggers' for the partial defence; gross 
provocation, and fear. Gross provocation it characterised as: ·~ ... words and or 
conduct which caused the defendant to have a justifiable sense of being 
seriously wronged. "10 The jury's assessment of ''justifiable" is not purely 
objective; it must consider the "situation in which the defendant found him or 
herself and take into account all the characteristics of the defendant which they 
consider to be relevant. " 11 This is to be done through a 'standards of a civilised 
society' criterion, excluding attitudes of the defendant running contrary to this. 12 
Of the response to fear, the Commission intended that before the partial defence 
arises, the jury will ftrst (where it has been raised) consider self-defence. 13 
Under the present system; 
"If the defence want to obtain an acquittal, it is unhelpful to present D as 
somebody who lost self-control. Running a defence of provocation based on 
loss of self-control resulting from years of abuse makes it correspondingly 
difficult to present D 's acts as proportionate to the immediate risk. We are told 
that sometimes in such cases a defendant may plead guilty to manslaughter, 
although arguably D 's conduct may have been in lawful self-defence, for fear of 
the risk of conviction of murder with the mandatory sentence. ~' 14 
Under the proposed forniulation it would be possible to run both self-defence 
and provocation, without one undermining the other. 
The Commission stated that ~'The defence should only be available if a person 
of ordinary temperament, i.e. ordinary tolerance and self-restraint, in the 
circumstances of the defendant might have reacted in the same or a similar 
Way. " 15 This is a jury decision, tO be made with reference to all of the 
defendant's characteristics, excluding those relevant only to the defendant's 
self-control, 16 with the exception of age, which the Commission contended was 
8 Ibid., 3.66. 
9 Ibid., 3.67. 
10 Ibid., 3 .68. Th~ causal link between the provocation and the killing must be proven (Ibid., 3.69). 
11 Ibid., 3.70. 
12 
"No fair-minded jury, properly directed, could conclude that it was gross provocation for a person 
of one colour to speak to another person of a different colour. In such a case the proper course would 
therefore be for the judge to withdraw provocation from the jury." (Ibid., 3,71). 
13 Ibid., 3.86. 
14 Ibid., 3.88. By way of example the case of Osborn (Sunday Telegraph 09/05/04, 20) is cited, in 
which the defendant pleaded manslaughter despite his case being closer to that of self-defence, because 
the all-or-nothing nature of self-defence carried a much higher risk of a tnur!-fer conviction. 
15 Op. Cit., 1, 3.109. 
16 
"In other words, we prefer the minority position in Smith. .. " (Ibid). 
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crucial to an assessment of the defendant's capacity for self-control. 17 It 
clarified: 
"The test under our proposal is not whether the defendant's conduct was 
reasonable, but whether it was conduct which a person of ordinary 
temperament might have been driven to commit (not a bigot or a person with an 
unusually short fuse). We believe that a jury would be able to grasp and apply 
h . •_.] . ,!8 t 1s 1uea m a common-sense way. 
2.2. LC Addresses Concerns 
The· Law Cominission noted a "a common concern" raised by academics and 
senior members of the judiciary, concerning "whether conduct in response to 
provocation and conduct in response to fear should be joined in a single 
defence, or whether there should be a separate partial defence for those who 
kill in fear, but who do not attract the full defence that they acted in lawful self 
defence. " 19 
Some consultees claimed the two to be conceptually different:20 a defendant 
successfully pleading provocation, knowingly acted unlawfully but with 
sufficient external excuse or justification to deserve to be partially mitigated, 
whereas a defendant pleading excessive force in self-defence believed 
themselves to be employing necessary force, but in fact employed unlawfully 
excessive force. The Law Commission responded to this, citing from the Royal 
College of Psychiatrists; 
"Physiologically anger and fear are virtually identical, whilst many mental 
states that accompany killing also incorporate physiologically both anger and 
fear. Hence, the abused woman who kills in response even to an immediate 
severe threat will also be driven at least partly by anger at the years of abuse 
meted out to her, and perhaps her children. "21 
The Commission also justified the combination of fear and provocation ''from a 
moral viewpoint," claiming that "there is a common element namely a response 
to unjust conduct (whether in anger, fear or a combination Df the two). "22 
3. Strengths of this formulation 
The breadth of this formulation would enable greater representation of the plight of 
many provoked defendants, particularly battered women, in law. It would also enable 
provocation and self-defence to be pleaded simultaneously, whereas presently they 
detract from each other. There is little doubt that this is more representative of such 
defendants, who experience a situation in its entirety ratl).er than through isolated 
emotions. 
17 Ibid., 3.110. 
18 1bid., 3.127. 
19 Ibid., 3.93. 
20 lbid, 3.94 .. 
21 Ibid., 3.99. 
22 Ibid., 3.10 1. 
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The strong proposed objective standard embues provocation with a greater moral 
reliability, fundamental given its contentious nature and the potential for unpalatable 
results. For this reason, the return to the 'separation approach' - through which an 
independent standard of evaluation is established - is greatly welcome. The 
expression adopted by the Law Commission is clearer and addresses the primary 
concerns regarding the 'reasonable man' of Section 3. 
The return to a basis in justification is also welcomed, and is true to provocation's 
· roots in wrongful action on the part of the victim. The recent trend of recognising any 
action as capable of constituting provocation - for example the mere crying of a baby 
-is clearly troublesome. The mere 'vicissitudes' of life should not enable defendants 
to avail themselves of partial defence based in rational and reasonable response to 
grave external provocation. 
4. Shortcomings of this formulation 
4.1. Breadth of formulation 
The primary concern centres on the breadth of the third ground, which combines 
'gross provocation' and 'fear of serious violence,' potentially encompassing a 
very wide range of conduct. The Royal College of Psychiatrists, cited by the 
Law Commission, stated that "the abused woman who kills in response to even 
an immediate severe threat will also be driven at least partly by anger at the 
years of abuse meted out to her, and perhaps her children. "23 
While this is probably true, it is worryingly possible to foresee a case where the 
borderline 'considered revenge' nature of killing will be clouded by a strong 
moral dilemma; for example, it is hard to imagine a jury returning a murder 
conviction where a sympathetic defendant reacts to years of sustained abuse by 
calculatingly killing their unsympathetic abuser. Perhaps such a case deserves 
mitigation, but to permit such an outcome would uq.dermine the law's clear 
commitment to strongly condemning killings perpetrated out of 'considered 
revenge.' 
In view of this, the Law Commission made it clear "The defence should not be 
available if the defendant acted in considered desire for revenge. "24 It accepted 
that there "may be borderline cases on the facts, but we thi-nk that fhe distinction 
is one which a jury would be able to recognise and apply. "25 This confidence is 
hard to share; how clearly identifiable such cases )VOuld be in practice is 
unclear. 
23 Ibid., 3.99. 
24 Ibid., 3.135. "In our provisional conclusions we used the words "premeditated" but it has been 
suggested to us that "considered" might be a better word" (Ibid., 3.315). 
25 Ibid., 3.135. 
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The Commission also stated the unified partial defence26 to be advantageous in 
simplifying the jury's decision: ''from a practical perspective it is desirable to 
try to keep jury directions as broad as simple as possible. "27 The danger is that 
in over-simplifying, the precision of the partial defences might be replaced by 
morally-driven jury decisions. This risk would need regulation through the 
objective standard, which would need to be carefully managed and applied by 
the courts. 
4.2. Objective standard 
The proposed objective standard has raised some questions: "The defence 
should be available if a person of ordinary temperament, i.e. ordinary tolerance 
and self-restraint, in the circumstances of the defendant might have reacted in 
the same or a similar way. "28 The use of the word 'might' has caused some 
concern, having the potential to be too broad in its application. The 
Commission considered this; "The difficulty is that if a test including the word 
"would" were strictly applied, it would be near to impossible, because even 
under extreme provocation killing is not the probable reaction of a person of 
ordinary temperament. "29 Either form of expression may be overly-inclusive or 
exclusive, and the ability to precisely limit the range of potential outcomes is 
itself limited?0 
The potential risk is mitigated to a degree by the requirement that "A judge 
should not be required to leave the defence of provocation to the jury unless 
there is evidence on which a reasonable jury, properly directed, could conclude 
. that it might apply. "31 · This freedom, "coupled with ·the supervision of the 
appellate courts,'' the Commission claims, ,"will enable the law to set 
boundaries in a reasoned, sensitive. and nuanced way:'m The fact that there 
will be cases that will need· to be decided on the facts was readily accepted by 
the Commission; ''Unless the law is reduced to a formula which removes any 
evaluative function from the judge and jury (which we would not favour) there 
are bound to be borderline cases. "33 . . · · . . 
The worry is that the borderline cases may be decided differently according to 
the considerable scope afforded to the natural preferences and values of 
26 Unifying response to 'gross provocation' and response in 'fear of serious violence.' 
27 Op. Cit., I, 3.100. 
28 Ibid., 3.109. Underline added. 
29 Ibid., 3.128. 
30 The phrase "in a same or similar way" also has a broadening potential. (Ibid., 3.66). 
31 Ibid., 3.141. The Commission, considered the Australian case of Stingel (1990) 171 CLR 312 HCA): 
"Under our approach provocation should not be left to the jury in such a case because we do not see 
how any reasonable jury, properly directed, could conclude there had been a gross provocation or that 
a person of ordinary tolerance and self-restraint might have acted in the same way as the defendant. " 
(Ibid., 3.144). The Commission also cited Doughty, in which the defendllnt claimed the crying of a 
baby to constitute provocation ((1986) 83 Cr App R 319), and Dryden, in which the defendant killed a 
court official enforcing a court order ((1995) 4 All ER 987), as cases that "ought not to be left to the 
jury." (Op. Cit, l; 3.148}. 
32 1bid., 3.142. 
33 lbid., 3.147. 
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individual judges under the third ground, which combines fear of serious 
violence and gross provocation. 
4.3. Exclusion of other emotions 
Another significant criticism is the exclusion of other emotions. Extending 
provocation to include fear of serious violence is a welcome recognition of the 
mitigatory effects of this emotion, but it is significant that this formulation 
excludes others such as despair or grief, to which Mackay and Mitchell add 
compassion or disgust.34 The Law Commission recognised that ''provocation 
may give rise to a range of emotions, e.g. anger, fear, disgust and despair," but 
considered that it was not "necessary to incorporate a list of all such emotions 
in a definition of provocation. "35 Mackay and Mitchell 's assertion that this is 
"effectively sidestepping the issue"36 seems to the point. 
5. Conclusion 
Certain features of this proposed formulation are strongly welcomed: the return to the 
'separation approach,' the reinstatement of judicial control, the reemphasising of the 
justificatory standard, and the expansion of provocation from anger to recognising 
fear of serious violence. Undoubtedly it is an improvement upon the present 
provocation defence, and as Ashworth says,· "! think the proposals represent a fine 
attempt to tread the difficult lines. "37 
However, there are certain concerns which make it difficult to wholeheartedly endorse 
this provision. The third ground for the plea is broad, potentially dangerously so. 
Whether the power of the judge to restrict the availability of the provocation plea 
would consistently remedy this is unclear, and the borderline cases could be very 
difficult to distinguish with any sort of overall consistehcy. The exclusion of other 
characteristics which also reduce culpability is difficult to rationalise, and this 
limitation may serve to encourage vague extensions of tl}e provision so as to 
incorporate deserving cases founded in other emotions. 
34 
"But is this Provocation? Some Thoughts on the Law Commission's Report on Partial Defences to 
Murder" (2005) Crim. LR 44, 49. 
35 Op. Cit., 1, 3.103. 
36 Op. Cit., 34, 2. 
37 Op. Cit., 1, 3.82. 
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Chapter 8: Extreme Mental or Emotional 
Disturbance 
1. Introduction 
Section 210.3(1)(b) of the US Model Penal Code38 (1962) establishes 'Extreme 
Mental and Emotional Disturbance'39 as a partial defence to murder. In a number of 
US states it has replaced provocation. Some interest has been shown in England and 
Wales, particularly from Mackay and Mitchell. In the light of Smith, and the 
increasing proximity between provocation and diminished responsibility, they 
contended a logical step to be to combine both partial defences in a single unified 
partial defence, modelled on section 210.3(1)(b). The Law Commission, in its final 
report, noted that; "a significant number of respondents, including particularly 
representative bodies of the legal profession, women's groups and JUSTICE, thought 
that a test involving extreme emotional disturbance would be preferable to a test 
based on a loss of self-control."40 
Section 210.3(1)(b) reads as follows: 
"[A] homicide which would otherwise be murder [is manslaughter when it} is 
committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which 
there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or 
excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation 
under the circumstances as he believes them to be." 
This differs from provocation in two important ways: Firstly, there are no limitations 
on the jury's power to return a manslaughter verdict; it only needs to be satisfied that 
the defendant acted under the influence of EMED for which there exists reasonable 
explanation. Secondly, the reasonableness of the reason for the defendant's actions is 
determined from the defendant's perspective with the defendant's perceptions. The 
reasonableness of the defendant's actual actions is not assessed at all. 
2. The US Experience 
The controversial nature of EMED is clear from the degree and nature of its 
acceptance into US law. Kadish identified "some thirtyfour jurisdictions that revised 
their criminal codes in the post MPC era," noting that "none adopted the MPC 
proposal whole."41 Five omitted the term 'mental' from 'extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance.' Roughly a dozen made consiqetable changes, mostly 
tempering its subjectivity: Oregon is an apt example: the reasonableness of 
explanation was changed from the "viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation 
under the circumstances as he believes them to be/' to that pf "an ordinary person," 
the circumstances to be considered as he "reasonably" sees them; and New 
· 
38 Hereafter 'MPC.' 
39 Hereafter 'EMED.' 
40 LC, Final Report (2004) No. 173, 3.49. 
41 1bid., Appendix F, 5. 
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Hampshire, requires EMED to have been "caused by extreme provocation." Maine 
and Ohio initially adopted EMED (to varying degrees), but both later replaced it with 
formulations more traditionally associated with provocationY 
These changes indicate discomfort with the wholesal~ adoption of Section 
210.3(l)(b), over "the degree of subjectivity" and "its omission of the explicit 
requirement of a provocative action, both of which served to create a great and 
largely unguided discretion in the jury."43 
Nevertheless, despite reluctance in the US to wholly adopt the MPC formulation, 
EMED has had a significant impact. 
3. UK Advocates Mackay and Mitchell 
3.1. The basis for their plea 
Mackay and Mitchell, the primary proponents of EMED in the UK, have 
endorsed its adoption on the basis that provocation and diminished 
responsibility have the same root in 'disturbance of reason' and so can, and 
should, be unified in a single partial defence. 
They asserted that the Smith-majority was: 
" ... wrong to continue to emphasise the need for "loss of self-control" at the 
expense of disturbance of reasoning. In doing so they seek to maintain a 
distinction between provocation and diminished responsibility that is gradually 
being eroded."44 They continue, "Better then to accept this and to introduce a 
plea that more clearly reflects the fact that both provocation and diminished 
responsibility are concerned with rationality defects.',45 
They advocate the MPC 'EMED' provision, which they renamed EED, subject 
to some alterations: 
"A defendant who would otherwise be guilty of murder is not guilty of murder if 
the jury considers that at the time of the commission of the offence, he was 
under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance and/or suffering from 
unsoundness of mind either or both of which affected his criminal behaviour to 
such a material degree that the offence ought to be reduced to one of 
manslaughter. ,,46 . 
42 Ohlo: requires "serious provocation occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sujficient to incite 
the person into using deadly force ... " (2903.03 (A) 'Voluntary Manslaughter'). The 1982 amendment 
changed the language from "while under the influence of extreme emotional stress" to "while under 
the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage." (H 511 ). Ibiq., 7. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Mackay, looking at manslaughter convictions where bOth provocation a~ diminished responsibility 
were pleaded, folUld that juries are generally not required to specify whjch partial defence formed the 
basis of their decision. There is not the space to look into this more clost)!y (( 1988) Crim. LR 411 ). 
45 
"Provoking Diminished Responsibility: Two pleas Merging Into One" (2p03) Crim. LR 745, 757. 
46 Ibid., 758. 
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3.2. Advantages of this proposal 
3.2.1. EED as emotion-neutral 
EED does not privilege action in sudden anger; a charge levelled at 
provocation's 'loss of self-control' requirement, which favours killers of a 
type more likely to re-offend,47 and disadvantages women whose response 
to provocation is less often immediate anger. Jefferson highlights this: "it 
is strange that provocation is a defence to those who give way to their 
emotions, but no defence to those who kill under duress or who perform a 
mercy killing."48 Mackay and Mitchell state "it is time to move away from 
an outmoded plea based on anger to a defence which more fairly 
recognises the gamut of human emotions."49 
Emotion-neutrality focuses on the intensity of the emotion experienced 
rather than the particular emotion, avoiding the overly-restrictive profile 
of a 'provoked defendant'; this could have very positive consequences for 
the legal representation of battered women. Mackay and Mitchell state 
that they would not be surprised if a jury found EED concerning a mercy 
killing, and accordingly convicted the defendant of manslaughter, 
enabling "the criminal justice system to avoid convicting genuine mercy 
killers of murder without having to artificially stretch the diminished 
responsibility defence - and place an enormous burden on the sympathies 
of forensic psychiatrists. "50 
3.2.2. Jury Freedom 
Mackay and Mitchell assert the increased jury freedom to be 
advantageous, enabling a better reflection of the defendant's culpability. 
Recognition of the common root of provocation and diminished 
responsibility enables the jury to address mitigating factors which 
normally would be artificially separated or even suppressed. 51 
3.2.3. Simplification 
Mackay and Mitchell assert 'disturbance of reasoning' to be the common 
root of both provocation and diminished responsibility: "Both diminished 
responsibility and provocation defendants find themselves in disturbed 
emotional states"52; adding that the gradual acceptance of psychiatric 
47 Defendants reacting with sudden violence upon provocation are surely more likely to repeat such 
behaviour than defendants subjected to years of abuse who finally act to terminate an intolerable 
situation. 
48 
'Criminal Law' (1999), 85. 
49 
"Replacing Provocation: More on a Combined Plea" (2004) Crim. LR 219, 223. 
50 Ibid. This is also referred to in The Butler Report, Cmnd. 6244 (I 975), 19.5. 
51 Op. Cit., 8, 751-752. 
52 Op. Cit., 12, 221. 
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evidence in provocation made it "virtually impossible to disentangle the 
issues of loss of self-control, abnormality of mind and substantial 
impairment of mental responsibility."53 The Law Commission referred to 
EED as advantageous in resolving the current inequality between 
provocation and diminished responsibility. 
4. Arguments against EED 
There remain strong arguments against EED, focusing on its lack of discrimination, 
its attempt to unite differing rationales, the assertion that diminished responsibility is 
an 'equal partner' in EED, and a lack of precision in the jury direction. 
4.1. Too undiscriminating 
The basis of EED in excuse means that no plea can be excluded for a lack of 
moral worth, the focus is entirely on the intensity of the emotion experienced by 
the defendant. This has led to cogent criticism that the "new defence would be 
too undiscriminating." Robinson states: 
"Ad hoc determination means that similar cases are likely to be treated 
differently, that the law will be unpredictable, and that there is created the 
possibility of abuse of discretion by decision-makers, judge or juror ... The 
results may depend more on who the defendant gets as a trial judge or j,ury than 
on whether he deserves an extreme emotional disturbance mitigation." 4 This is 
a primary reason for the reluctance on the part of many US states to adopt all, or 
even any, of section 210.3(1)(b). 55 
Chalmers cited two US decisions in which evidence from the defendant that he 
had regularly violently abused his partner before killing her was deemed to be 
relevant in supporting his plea of EED: "while both defendants were 
convicted ... such decisions might give pause for thought in the context of the 
current reform project."56 Chalmers explains this concern: juries weighing an 
EED plea must " ... consider reducing murder to manslaughter where the victim 
had "provoked" the defendant by merely leaving or seeking to leave, the 
parties' relationship. By contrast, in states which retained a "traditional" 
provocation plea, the issue did not reach the jury in any single one of the cases 
studied by Nourse."57 Kadish notes that in the cases referred to by Nourse the 
juries returned verdicts of murder, but accepts that "remitting issues to the bare 
sympathies of the juries invites the illicit and the prejudiced."58 Gardner and 
Mackelm strongly voiced their misgivings: " ... such a new defence 
would ... require lust, jealousy, and hatred to be given exactly the same legal 
53 Op. Cit., 8, 748-749. 
54 Robinson, "The Modem General Part; Three Illusions" in Shute and Simester, 'Criminal Law 
Theory: Doctrines of the General Part' (2002), 75, 90-91. 
ss Op. Cit. 4, para. 7. 
56 
"Merging provocation and Diminished Repsonsibility: Some Reasons for Scepticism" (2004) Crim. 
LR 198, 210. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Op. Cit., 4, para. 11. 
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credence as fear, despair and anger. It would be ripe for exploitation by rapists 
and racists;"59 · 
Mackay and Mitchell, recogmsmg this danger, qualified their proposed 
formulation; 
" ... to make sure that such traits are excluded a policy provision could be 
inserted into our defence. This might read: 'The temperament of the defendant 
shall not be taken into account by a jury in its determination ofo whether he or 
she was under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance." 0 In the light of 
this, they stated "our combined defence may not be as undiscriminating as 
Gardner and Mackelmfear." However, they then continued " ... But this may be 
no bad thing, as one of the many criticisms levelled at provocation is that it 
assists angry men but at the same time fails to help women who are driven to 
kill as a result of cumulative domestic abuse and violence. "61 
This qualification, which they then qualify by stating "But this may be no bad 
thing" does little to assuage the concerns raised above. The fear remains that in 
seeking deliverance from an overly-restrictive provocation formulation, an 
overly-broad EED formulation would have a similar effect to Smith, in 
compounding pre-existing problems. Any broadening of the law should be 
approached with extreme caution. 
4.2. Different rationales 
The Law Commission raised the argument that provocation and diminished 
responsibility have fundamentally different rationales: "The ·ethical distinction 
is that provocation is a partial excuse for wrongdoing while diminished 
responsibility consists of a partial denial ofresponsibility."62 An excuse seeks 
to ''provide a decent rational explanation for what one did," but a denial of 
responsibility claims that "because at the time one was not a sufficient~ 
rational being ... no rational explanation for what one did is called for." 3 
Chalmers emphasised the distinction: regarding " ... provocation, the defendant 
is considered fully responsible and judged by the standard of a fully responsible 
agent ... but, in respect of his particular actions, full condemnation (in the form 
of a murder conviction) is inappropriate. By contrast, a diminished 
responsibility plea is based on a diametrically opposed contention: that the 
defendant is not (or at least, was not at the time of his actions) a fully 
responsible agent. "64 
Mackay and Mitchell challenged this assumption, stating that the two pleas have 
"more in common with one another than might initially be assumed." They 
continued, "what ought to be required ... is such an extreme level of emotional 
59 
"No Provocation without Responsibility; a Reply to Mackay and Mitchell" (2004) Crim. LR 213, 
215. 
60 Op. Cit., 12,223. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Op. Cit., 3, 12.80. 
63 Op. Cit., 22,213. 
64 Ibid., 204. 
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disturbance at the time of the killing that the accused can no longer be regarded 
as acting rationally ... the states of mind of provoked and diminished 
responsibility defendants are both 'abnormal' in the sense that they are not 
thinking (or acting) as fully rational beings."65 They cited Lord Hoffmann's 
judgement from Smith in support: 
" ... the possibility of overlap seems to me to fall inevitably from consigning the 
whole of the objective element in provocation to the jury. If the jury cannot be 
told that the law requires characteristics which could found a defence of 
diminished responsibility to be ignored in relation to the defence of 
provocation, there is no point in claiming that the defonces are mutually 
exclusive. "66 
In support of a common rationale, Mackay and Mitchell argued that section 
210.3(l)(b) demonstrates that EED and unsoundness of mind can operate 
together in influencing the defendant's behaviour. They cited State v Dumalo, 
contending that section 210.3(1)(b) had been interpreted as "'taking account of 
mental abnormalities that have been recognised in the developing law 7£ 
diminished responsibility' and so in essence merging the two pleas." 7 
However, Chalmers claimed this citation to have been de--contextualised and to 
be "liable to mislead." He cited in full from the judgement: 
"The phrase 'actor's situation,' as used in S.210.3(b) of the MPC, is designedly 
ambiguous and is plainly flexible enough to allow the law to grow in the 
direction of taking account of mental abnormalities that have been recognised 
in the development of the law of diminished responsibility. ,,6& 
4.3. Diminished Responsibility not intended to. be ~equal partner' 
Chalmers asserted that diminished responsibility is not, and was not intended to 
be, an· "equal partner" to provocation in EED: "Indeed, the Hawaiian courts 
have made it clear that, as intended by the Model Code 's drafters, diminished 
responsibility cannot in and of itself amount to EMED sufficient to reduce 
murder to manslaughter. "69 In support, Chalmers cited State v .Manloloyo, in 
which the court stated that "in our ofinion, even a strained construction of the 
provisions of Section 707-702(2/ would not permit 'diminished mental 
capacity' as a defence which would reduce the offence of murder to an offence 
ofmanslaughter."71 · 
4.4. Lack of Precision in jury Direction 
65 Op. Cit., 12, 221. 
66 Smith (2000) 4 All ER 289, 307-308. 
67 Op. Cit. 8., 758. 
68 MPC, accompanying notes, 72. 
69 Op. Cit., 19, 201. 
70 The provision which sets out EMED in Hawaii. 
71 600 P.2d 1139 (Haw.l979), 1040. 
Chalmers continues; "The Hawaii courts have, in fact, insisted that an EMED plea be based on the 
defendant having been exposed to an "unusual and overwhelming stress, "(State v Perez 76 P.2d 379, 
387 (Haw. 1999) which seems remarkably close to a provocative act requirement." (Op. Cit., 19, 201). 
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Mackay and Mitchell's requirement that the emotional disturbance "affected his 
[the defendant's] criminal behaviour to such a material degree that the offence 
ought to be reduced to one of manslaughter," is a worryingly imprecise jury 
direction. Precisely what constitutes 'to a material degree,' and when the 
offence 'ought' to be reduced to manslaughter, is unclear; as exemplified in 
State v Raguseo,72 where the jury asked for the plea of 'extreme emotional 
disturbance' to be re-explained on four occasions. On the first three, they were 
re-instructed according to the precedent of the Supreme Court of Connecticut in 
State v Elliot. 73 On the fourth occasion, the trial judge supplemented the 
standard direction by directing that the jury's assessment of the reasonableness 
of the reason for the defendant's emotional disturbance was to be determined 
according to the 'reasonable person.' This clarification, bringing the law back 
to familiar territory, highlights the breadth of the formulation and the difficulties 
this causes for juries. 
5. Conclusion 
In summary, the basis of the EED is an appealing one. Focusing on the intensity of 
emotion that afflicted the defendant instead of assessing the defendant's response to 
provocation (however trivial) permits an emotion-neutral partial defence. But 
ultimately EED fails to satisfactorily reflect both provocation and diminished 
responsibility; their significantly different foundations cannot easily be reconciled. 
Kadish, an advocate of EED, states that "if diminished responsibility were to be 
retained I would think it better to keep it separate because to combine the defences 
would tend to confuse their very separate underlying rationales. "74 If, as Mackay and 
Mitchell assert, EED is a unification of the two, then its chequered history serves as 
an apt illustration of the inherent difficulties. 
Kadish recognised the fundamental problem concerning the original EMED 
formulation: "It leaves the jury with virtually no guidance except their bare visceral 
response in determining what abnormalities in the actor's situation should count and 
which not, and efforts by trial judges to develop some guidance would probably 
maintain the nightmarish experience [ofSmith] you describe."75 Instead he suggested 
"considering what many states have done, retaining the EED formulation but 
rejecting its highly subjective qualification." In so recommending, Kadish seems to 
feel that EED would be morally reliable, were its subjectivity to be tempered. 
However, even with this change, the breadth of the d~fence, alongside the 
considerable jury power would entail a significant risk of abuse. Chalmers argues that 
the merged plea would "improperly hand over the question of the appropriate 
distinction between murder and manslaughter to the jury without providing 
appropriate guidance (or, perhaps, any guidance) as to how t~e jury should approach 
their task. "7 It is with worrying ease that one can foresee a sympathy-lottery 
scenario, where a jury could claim the requisite 'material qegree' in retroactively 
72 622 A.2d 519 Conn. 1993. 
73 411 A.2d 3. Conn. 1979. 
74 Op. Cit., 4, para. 27. 
75 Ibid., 20. 
76 0p. Cit., 19,211-212. 
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justifying a morally desirable result; for example a battered woman, killing her 
oppressor in cold blood, but receiving a manslaughter verdict. While such a 
defendant is no doubt deserving of much sympathy, the law should be very careful of 
creating conditions in which a jury can mitigate a thinly disguised cold-blooded 
revenge killing. Indeed, the Law Commission, in its final report,. concluded; "We 
would not recommend importing a defence based on EMED. We think it is too vague 
and indiscriminate." 77 
While the partial defence would without doubt benefit some women defendants, this 
would be superficial, failing to address the problem of self-defence and its 
requirements of imminence and proportionality. The recent experience of a 
broadening of provocation should engender extreme caution before introducing 
another broad partial defence. While Mackay and MitcheWs qualification to their 
EED formulation would somewhat restrict the scope of the defence, this would not be 
an adequate safeguard. The possibility of a partial defence governed by jury-decision 
in which their prejudices are permitted weight in decision-making is not acceptable. 
Kadish's further restrictions, through tempering the subjectivity of the standard of 
evaluation, would undoubtedly reduce the risk of unpalatable jury decisions, but quite 
how a jury is to apply a more objective standard in assessing whether intensity of 
emotions affected culpability to a 'material degree' su,:h that a manslaughter 
conviction is preferable, remains to be clearly established by any such advocates of 
EMED. 
It is not possible to strongly endorse this partial defence. Its conceptual foundation is 
unclear, and the absence of a definite standard of evaluatioq renders its adoption too 
uncertain. · 
77 Op. Cit., 3, 3.59. 
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Chapter 9: Abolition of Provocation 
1. Introduction 
In 2003, Solicitor General Harriet Hannan stated that she was "amazed at the number 
of cases where a person received a short sentence for killing someone because they 
used provocation to claim manslaughter. " 1 Indeed, the focus on domestic violence of 
the Law Commission's review into the partial defences, is due to strong concerns that 
provocation allows "men who kill their wives in a burst of anger to receive lenient 
sentences but not b(lttered women who kill violent husbands «fier years of abuse."2 
Various commentators have advocated the abolition of provocation, and under the 
2003 Criminal Justice Act, this option is significantly more viable. Final evaluation 
of this is deferred to the closing chapter; however key elements are discussed here. 
2. Discussion of arguments for and against abolition 
Any argument for the abolition of provocation must not only prove that it is preferable 
to the present law, but that it is also preferable. to any of the reform options. 
The primary argument for abolition, is that provocation is unacceptably gender-
biased. Horder, stated "the doctrine as a whole cannot survive an attack mounted 
from the broader perspective of gender politics. "3 He cited Home Office statistics, of 
a 52.5% success rate for women pleading provocation, as unacceptably low given that 
three-quarters of those women will have suffered domestic violence, and concluded 
that provocation must be abolished. 4 
While this is a strong argument, it is not conlusive. Sullivan asks; "if we are to 
abolish provocation, what is to become of the 52.5 per cent of women who do benefit 
from the defence?"5 Nourse echoes this: "Advocates of abolition face an obvious 
question: If we abolish the defence, what becomes of the woman who, distraught and 
enraged, kills her stalker, her rapist, or her batterer?"6 The Canadian Association of 
1 The Guardian, "Law on provocation in killings 'a mess. "' (October 31 '1 2003, Clare Dyer, Legal 
Correspondent). 
2 Ibid. 
3 Border 'Provocation and Responsibility' (1992), 192. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Sullivan, "Anger and Excuse: Reassessing Provocation" (1995) OJLS 421, 426. Bowe states; 
"Harder's conclusion ... is falling on deaf ears ... commentators ... overlook the fact that his bookrlength 
history of the provocation defence is an extended arguf!1ent for abolition. " ('More Folk Provoke their 
Own Demise' (1997) 19 Sydney LR 336, 363). This assertion is strongly contested; Border's 
conclusion to his work comes as a surprise. Sullivan summarises; "For FrfUch the greater part of the 
book anger is perceived, in appropriate circumstances, as exhibiting virh.fe and leading, on occasion to 
conduct deserving not merely of mitigation but of complete exoneration. " Border himself 
acknowledges this unexpectedness: it is all to be "swept aside in the spa~e of one short concluding 
chapter." (Op. Cit., 5, 421 ). · 
6 Nourse, "Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocatjon Defense" (1997) Yale U 
1331, 1390. 
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Elizabeth Fry Societies,7 which has argued strongly for the abolition of provocation in 
Canada, recognises that where mandatory life remains, the answer to provocation's 
problems lies not in its abolition: " ... some women ... may unjustly be denied access to 
self-defence and ... should be able to rely on provocation to at least reduce the offence 
to manslaughter ... it would be a gross injustice to deny them access to anymitigation 
of sentencing in such circumstances. "8 
As already established, despite its significant failings, provocation does provide 
valuable mitigation. Jefferson concludes "ifmurder is to continue to be regarded as 
the most heinous crime, its gravity marked by a mandatory sentence, provocation 
would remain a useful defence. "9 · · 
Where abolition of provocation has been recommended, it has been contingent upon a 
move to discretionary sentencing for murder.10 The Law Commission reported: "We 
know of no common law system where provocation has been abolished as a defence to 
murder but a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment retained, nor of any law 
reform body which has made such a recommendation, " 11 and concluded that 
"Consul tees were overwhelmingly of the view that it would be wrong to abolish the 
defence of provocation while the mandatory sentence remains, and we share that 
view." 12 
In the light of the 2003 Criminal Justice Act, the present mandatory life sentence is 
now a strange mixture of determinacy and indeterminacy. While there is scope for 
provoked killers to receive sentencing proportionate to their culpability, under fair 
labelling, to receive a sentence of 'mandatory life' is misleading and devalues the 
offence of murder. 
3. Conclusion 
In 2003, Harriet Harman stated "The Law Commission signals that provocation has 
had its day ... murder will now mean murder for these people and they will face the full 
consequence."13 These strong views concerning the role of provocation in domestic 
violence are understandable, but in the broader context of the valuable function 
provocation performs for battered women (and many others), such sweeping 
condemnation is misplaced. The decision in Smith14 raises concerns for provocation's 
moral dependability, but this does not clearly condemn outright the present 
formulation, and certainly does not condemn possible replacements. Where 
mandatory life is to be retained as the punishment for murder, abolition of 
provocation is not plausible as a course of action. While the present mixture of 
7 Canadian organisation representing women and girls in the justice system, hereafter referred to as 
'CAFES.' (http://www .elizabethfry .ea/). 
8 Ibid., 2. 
9 Jefferson 'Criminal Law' (1999), 84. " ... provocation, even with its df!fects, provides a valuable 
instance of reasons for conduct being made relevant to responsibility. " (pp. Cit., 5, 421 ). 
10 New Zealand CLRC, (recommendations embodied in the 'Crimes Bill' 1~89), and the MCCOC. 
11 LC Final Report No. 173 (2004), 3.33. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Op. Cit., 1. 
14 (2000) 3 WLR 654 (HL). 
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indeterminate and determinate sentencing within mandatory life is acknowledged, it 
would be a misrepresentation to convict grossly provoked lflurderers of 'mandatory 
life,' and would only serve to exacerbate the exaggerated s~ope of the offence of 
murder and its unique punishment. 
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Chapter 10: A Criteria-Based Analysis of 
Provocation Reform 
This thesis seeks investigate the different reform options for provocation, within the 
law of murder. 
The discussion concerning provocation has been characterised by an absence of 
agreed standards by which to evaluate the present law and assess the different options 
for reform. From the experience of the 'classic line' cases, the developments of the 
last 15 years, and the primary options for reform, certain ·criteria have ·established 
themselves as of dominant importance to the discussion of provocation reform. These 
criteria are established and then applied to the different reform options, before 
conclusions are drawn with regards to provocation within the present law of murder, 
and pursuant to the homicide reform discussion of chapters l and 2. 
The following criteria are derived from the writings of corrunentators, judges, and 
from the author's own judgement based on decisions, criticiSJTIS and discussions. The 
object is to provide some measurable and practical standards by which the different 
reform options can be considered. 
Each criterion is structured according to the following layout: 
- A brief explanation of the criterion. 
- Where it has been seen in law. 
- How well it worked. 
- Where it has been discussed in this thesis. 
- Any caveats. 
Where the . significance of neglecting the criterion is sufficiently grave, a brief 
paragraph highlighting the effects of its omission will be inserted after the paragraph 
discussing whether the criterion worked. · 
Each of these criteria will be established, and discussed briefly before they are applied 
to each of the reform options. 
1. Evaluative ~riteria established 
1.1. The objective standard must be sufficiently rigorous that it prevents 
subjective assumptions and sympathies from forming the sole basis 
for a decision. 
-Where? 
A very strict objective standard was seen prior to th(f 1957 Homicide Act, 
precluding any reference to the characteristics ofthe defendant. Subsequently, 
under the 'separation approach,' the objective standard 'Yas somewhat tempered 
through the attribution of those characteristics of the defendant relevant to the 
gravity of the provocation, to the reasonable man. 
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-Consequences of omission? . . . . . 
The consequences of neglecting this are clearly exhibited by Weller, in which 
the defendant's possessive and jealous nature was permitted consideration in 
evaluating his actions. 
-Where discussed? 
·This criterion is discussed in chapter 4, 2.1. 
·Caveats? 
The objective standard must be balanced, or else it can operate very harshly, as 
seen in Bedder, and Mancini, .in which the actions of the defendants were 
considered against the standard of a reasonable man devoid of their 
characteristics. 
1.2. If expressed through the 'reasonable man' (or a similar legal 
construct), there must be sufficient definition so as to enable precision 
in the jury's normative role. 
The definition should clearly identify - or enable clt~ar identification of - the 
range of relevant characteristics that can or should apply. 
-Where? 
The nearest the law of provocation in England and Wales has been to achieving 
this balance between objective rigour and subjective recognition of the 
characteristics of the defendant has beeri through the 'separation approach' 
established in Camp/in. · 
• Did it work? 
The 'separation approach' established a strong objective standard, which could 
be relied upon to produce reasonably consistent decisions. 
- Consequences of omission? 
Failure to meet this criterion results in an ill-defmed and unreliable jury 
function. 
- Where discussed? 
This is discussed in chapter 4, 2.1.2 and 2.1.3. 
-Caveats? 1 
The 'separation approach' did produce a seemingly counter-intuitive dilemma, in 
which characteristics of the defendant relevant to both tp.e gravity and the self-
1 Hereafter the headings are discontinued, but the structure remains throughput. 
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.-control, while being recognised. in relation to the former had· to be ignored with 
regards to the latter. A better definition might avoid this dilemina. 
1.3. The objective standard must not be overbearing - it needs to make 
sufficient reference to the defendant so as to be a fair standard, and 
not an overly harsh one. 
Quite what constitutes 'sufficient' reference is a matter of considerable debate. 
It is contended that the 'separation approach' struck a good balance between 
reference to .. the defendant's character, and retention of a clear objective 
standard. . The decision in Smith . · is contended to have . fundamentally 
compromised the objective standard. 
· Section 3 .and the 'separation approach' were significant improvements on the 
previous law in tempering the harsh objective standard. . Smith, subsequently 
overly-subjectivised the objective standard. 
This was discussed in chapter 4, 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and2.1.3; 
The Smith decision subjectivised the evaluative standard, but to the detriment of 
its nioral ·reliability .. The balance between a rigorous objective and defendant-
specific tailoring inust be: very .carefully maintained; Smith demonstrates the 
problem of failing to do so. 
> -1.4.: · Provocation ·must. fairly represent all those who due to provocation 
have a reduced moral culpability, ·: regardless · of. ·the particular 
emotion they experienced; or form part of a considered web of 
defences, full and partial, covering . the range of emotions, which 
reduce culpability. 
Provocation has always been based in response in anger to provocative actions 
or words, and therefore only mitigates action in anger. 
Provocation cannot be said to effectively mitigate action in anger, in the light of 
recent discoveries ·establishing the diversity of legitimate physiological 
responses in anger. The. loss of self-control· requirement has limited the 
recognition of types of anger-based response, and excluded other emotions. It is 
now largely perceived to be illegitimately exclusive. 
This is discussed in chapter 4, at 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 
· A single partial defence ·canrtot be both morally rigorous and sufficiently broad 
so as to cover all emotions deserving. of mitigation. While the 'loss of self-
. control' requirement is undoubtedly unacceptably .restrictive, to require a single 
partial defence to cover a.n·emotioris is unrealistic. 
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1.5. Provocation's conceptual foundation must be clearly stated and 
adhered to. 
Provocation, since its creation, has been a partial defence for the ordinary 
person in extraordinary circumstances, mitigating defendants where they have 
been wronged. Despite recent derogation from this, it is generally accepted to 
be the historical conceptual basis for provocation. 
It is very difficult to analyse the success of particular approaches to provocation 
due to the dearth of specific statistics. Provocation has primarily struggled due 
to the loss of self-control standard, and has never had great stability,. marked by 
the many changes to the partial defence, even over the last 50 years .. 
Without clear conceptual foundation, provocation is unreliable, and prone to 
delivering unpalatable results. Provocation's present identity crisis is in large 
part due to the subjectivisation of the· objective standard, and the derogation of 
the justificatory element. · 
This is discussed in chapter 4, 2.5. 
It may not be possible to establish a clear :foundation. Provocation contains 
elements of justification and excuse, and .there has been considerable discussion 
concerning how these ·should be. balanced, and whether provocation.should be 
changing. 
·1.6. Provocation must be kept clear.of.diminished responsibility to remain 
.conceptually sound and viable. 
Provocation ha$ historically been separate Jrom diminished· responsibility, 
looking to external factors causing a loss of self.;·control. The acceptance of 
mental deficiencies as relevant to the standard of self-control is a comparatively 
recent development. 
Provocatioh functioned far better when kept clear of diminished responsibility 
(compare the conceptual cohesion in Morha/1, with that of Weller). The 
'separation approach' ensured a rational, objective standard, and while this was 
the case, provocation was morally more reliable, despite the loss of self·control 
standard. 
This is discussed in chapter 4, 2.1.3. 
Under the 'classic line,' provocation at times operated very closely to diminished 
responsibility; the proximity of the two pleas must be recognised, while their 
differing rationales retained. Furthermore, provocation's inherent complexity 
must be acknowledged; its combining elements of justification and excuse 
ensure that it will never be:the most simple of pleas. 
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1.7. There must be an explicit requirement of a provocative action or 
incident. 
Traditionally under provocation, the requirement of a provocative action or 
incident is a necessary part of establishing that the defendant's action was in 
response to an external influence. 
This requirement has proven problematic, due to the accompanying temporal 
assumptions of the loss of self-control, which have been strongly criticised and 
proven to represent just one of a number of responses to provocation, and not a 
legitimately exclusive definition. 
This is discussed in chapter 4, 2.2 and 2.3. 
The concept of a provocative action or incident has been challenged on the basis 
that the law should not mitigate action in anger, and criticism has also focused 
on the problem of 'victim-blame.' 
1.8. Provocation must be simple to understand and apply 
It is doubtful that provocation, at any time, has been simple to understand and 
apply. It is contended that under the 'separation approach' the basis for 
provocation was clearer, although the acceptance of any conduct as capable of 
constituting provocation caused confusion, enabling further moves towards an 
excuse-based plea. 
The 'reasonable man' of section 3 has caused complication in the jury's role, 
particularly under the 'separation approach.' Under a clearer formulation, the 
'separation approach' is contended to be superior to the conceptual confusion of 
Smith. 
This is briefly discussed in chapter 4, 2.1.1-2.1.3. 
Provocation, as a partial defence, sits in an awkward position between the right 
to life and the need to recognise the reduced moral culpability of gravely 
provoked killers. Its drafting and function inevitably reflect this tension, and 
therefore it will always entail a degree of complexity. 
1.9. Particular attention needs to be paid to the risk of 'victim blame' 
resulting from any particular formulation. 
There is a danger of a provocation plea unduly focusing on the victim, who 
cannot answer accusations made against them. This can ·be extremely 
distressing for their family and friends. 
It is oot possible to state where this has been seen in law1 It would appear most 
related to the strength of element of justification, whicp focuses on the external 
provocation suffered by the defendant. However, under"- subjectivised plea, the 
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jury's freedom to determine what constitutes provocation may result in their 
deeming the victim's conduct particularly blameworthy, according to grossly 
subjectivised standards. 
This was discussed in chapter 4, at 2.4. 
This problem is somewhat inevitable given the nature of provocation, and 
would best be addressed through careful judicial supervision. 
1.10. The judge must have freedom to direct the plea 
Prior to the Homicide Act 1957, section 3, the judge had considerable power 
over a plea of provocation. Subsequently, under the 'separation approach,' the 
judge was empowered to direct which characteristics of the defendant were to 
be taken into account in assessing how the reasonable man would have reacted. 
The 'separation approach' was a reasonably effective arrangement, enabling 
judicial control of this controversial phea. The majority of the House of Lords in 
Smith clearly thought this overbearing, Lord Hoffmann holding that the judge's 
power to direct the jury should be greatly restricted. 
The importance of the judge's role is discussed in chapter 4, 2.1.2. 
The 1957 Homicide Act was intended in part to address the overbearing judicial 
power to determine when provocation applied. The pre-Act situation was 
undesirable, the absence of clearly defined parameters raising the potential for 
derogation of the jury's role. 
1.11. Judges must not have too much power and be able to influence 
provocation according to their personal values 
Prior to section 3 of the 1957 Homicide Act, judges had extensive power to 
exclude a plea of provocation. Section 3 of the Homicide Act was enacted to 
ensure that where provocation led to a loss of self-control, which in turn led to a 
killing, the plea would go before the jury. 
Section 3 was effective in reducing judicial controL Under the 'separation 
approach,' the judge was empowered to direct the jury in evaluating the actions 
of the defendant according to the objective standard established in Camp/in. 
The majority in Smith strongly felt this power to be exorbitant, and eliminated 
judicial restriction. 
The effect of strictly limiting the judge's power was discussed in Chapter 4, 
2.1.2. 
While it is crucial that the judge is not overly powerful, in recent times the 
pendulum has .swung too far the other way. The judge has a crucial role within 
provocation, which should be to assist the jury in ens~uing that their objective 
. 117 
assessment is carried out correctly. Smith's restriction of the judge's power to 
direct the plea, has been unclear and uncomfortable, betraying the majority's 
misgivings at enlarging the jury's freedom. 
1.12. Jury must have sufficient freedom to carry out its normative 
evaluative role 
Section 3 of the 1957 Homicide Act reduced judicial control over provocation, 
leaving the jury free to consider every case in which provocation had caused the 
defendant to be provoked to loss of self-control leading to killing. Smith further 
freed the jury's role, enabling a jury to "determine for themselves what the 
standard in the particular case should be."2 
Section 3 marked a significant change in the role ofth{f jl,ll'Y, and it is contended 
that the subsequent 'separation approach' established a strong but reasonably 
balanced jury role. However, some felt strongly that the jury's role was overly 
restricted by the judge's power to exclude certait} characteristics from 
attribution to the reasonable man when considering the standard of self-control. 
Smith established greater jury freedom, but at the cost of precise role-definition. 
This has not been discussed in this thesis as the present trend is already towards 
increased jury freedom; rather than restriction. The advent of section 3 is not 
discussed in this thesis; the Smith decision is discussed in chapter 4. 
The freedom the jury has, impacts. on the moral.dependability of provocation. 
Smith, in significantly freeing the jury, is contended to have gone too far, with 
damaging consequences. 
1.13. The jury must not have so much freedom that it is able to define the 
standard it is to apply in its role, without judicial guidance. 
Provocation involves complicated factors that must be balanced in reaching a 
verdict. An absence of clarity in the jury's role will lead to decisions influenced 
by the personal beliefs and prejudices· of the jury. 
The 'classic line' cases involved a strong judicial role. The jury's function was 
precisely stated, and guidance given from the judge. 
The 'classic line' direction was not particularly straightforward due to the 
'separation of characteristics' and the reasonable man. Some complication is 
inevitable, given that provocation is a complicated partial defence, but with 
better drafting, the standard is quite manageable. 
This. was discussed in Chapter 4, 2.1.2-2.1.3 and Chaptrr 8, 4.4. 
2 (2000) 3 WLR 654 (HL), 668. 
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The majority in Smith strongly felt that the 'classic line' was overly restrictive, 
preventing the jury from exercising its function under section 3, Homicide Act 
1957. 
2. Appli~ation of the established criteria to the different reform options for 
provocation. 
2.1. Subjectivised plea of provocation 
2.1.1. The objective standard must be suffici~ntly rigorous so that it 
can be trusted to produce morally reliable results. 
This criterion strikes right at the heart of the subjectivised plea, exposing 
the absence of a strong objective standard, to regulate provocation. The 
Irish experience is an apt illustration of the difficulties inherent in the 
subjectivised plea. 
2.1.2. If the objective standard is expressed through. a 'reasonable 
man,' then he must be sufficiently defined so as to ensure 
clarity and precision in thejury's normative role. 
Subjective formulations ·generally have either a 'community standard of 
blameworthiness' . evaluative element, or a 'reasonable man~ · heavily 
qualified by reference to the characteristics and circumstances of the 
defendant. This leaves a very broad standard for the jury to apply. 
2.1.3. The objective standard must not be so rigorous that it fails to 
recognise relevant characteristics of the defendant, and so 
operate harshly. 
The 'community standard of blameworthiness' test may permit a greater 
chance of a harsh verdict: its latitude enabling a jury to return an 
unreasonably harsh verdict according to their personal prejudices. 
2.1.4. Provocation must be equally representative of all those who, 
due to having received provocation, have a reduced moral 
culpability, regardless of the particular emotion they 
experienced. 
The retention of the loss of self-control requirement continues to favour 
action in anger, typically of a more 'sudden' nature. This clearly is not 
part of a broader scheme of defences covering other emotions that have 
the effect of reducing the moral culpability of a killing, such as fear, or 
despair, and constitutes a significant limitation of thi~ formulation. 
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2.1.5. Provocation's conceptual foundation must be clearly 
established and rigorously adhered to. 
The 'community standard of blameworthiness' element is more excuse· 
based than that traditional provocation plea, enabling the defendant's 
internal state to be taken into account. Provocation, historically, 
considered the effects of external stressors upon an 'ordinary person.' The 
experiences of the subjectivised plea following Smith, and abroad, 
demonstrate the discomfort most states feel in moving to a subjectivised 
formulation. 
2.1.6. Provocation must be kept clear of.diminished responsibility, 
both in theory and in practice. 
The subjective plea permits the jury to consider all characteristics of the 
defendant, where relevant, and this can include characteristics belonging 
also to diminished responsibility. 
2.1.7. There must be an explicit requirement of a provocative action 
or incident. 
The subjectivised formulation retains this element, but the provocation 
can be anything and does not have to be unlawful or even objectively 
grave. 
2.1.8. Provocation must be simple to understand and apply 
The post-Smith experience demonstrates that the subjectivised standard is 
difficult to clearly define and practically apply; this was also seen in the 
Irish experience. The New South Wales formulation is untested, and 
therefore difficult to comment on. 
2.1.9. Particular attention needs to be paid to the risk of 'victim 
blame' resulting from any particular formulation. 
The subjectivised plea focuses more on the defendant's experience, and 
less on the conduct of the victim. However, the subjectivity of the 
enquiry might result in the jury prejudicially deeming a certain action of 
the victim to have been gravely provocative; the extent to which this 
would be circumscribed through the 'community standards' element is 
unclear. 
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2.1.10. The judge must have sufficient freedom so as to be able to 
direct the plea. 
Quite how the 'community standards of blameworthiness' element is to be 
applied is uncertain. If it frees the jury's role, then judicial power must 
correspondingly be restricted. Following Smith, the judge can give some 
guidance concerning which characteristics should be given more weight, 
but the jury is largely free to determine the standard to be applied. 
2.1.11. The judge must not have so much power such that it impinges 
on the jury's role/function. 
This is unlikey given that the move to a subjectivised approach has been 
in part a reaction against the perceived over-bearing judicial powers of the 
'separation approach.' It will depend to a large extent on the precise 
drafting of the plea. 
2.1.12. The jury must have sufficient freedom to carry out its 
normative evaluative role. 
This would be the case. 
2.1.13. The jury must not have so much freedom that it is able to 
define the standard it is to apply or exercise its role without 
guidance from the judge. 
This is a critical concern; if a jury can define for itself the 'community 
standards of blameworthiness' standard, it might well result in some 
unpalatable results. 
2.2. Provocation Reform Criteria applied to the plea of provocation with 
an emphasised justificatory standard. 
2.2.1. The objective standard must be sufficiently rigorous that it 
can be trusted to produce morally reliable results. 
A primary strength of this formulation is that it returns to a provocation 
plea with a strong objective element, clearly establishing the standard by 
which the actions of the defendant are to be judged through the 
'separation approach.' 
2.2.2. If the objective standard is expressed through a 'reasonable 
man,' then he must be sufficiently defmed so as to ensure 
precision and clarity in the jury's normative role. 
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Under this proposed formulation the reasonable man is well defined and 
well established, giving the jury a precisely defmed standard with which 
to work. 
2.2.3. The objective standard must not be so rigorous that it fails to 
recognise relevant characteristics of the defendant, and so 
operate harshly. 
In Smith, the primary criticism of the 'separation approach' was that it 
· unduly restricted the jury's function, permitting only age. and gender to be 
taken into account in assessing the:standard of self-control. · 
However, the restriction is intentional;· protecting the ·jntegrity of the 
objective standard, and provocation's moral reliability.· The 'reasonable 
man' construction has resulted in·a.contrived hypothetical defendant with 
a seeming split personality, but where explained in a clearer manner, the 
standard is contended to be quite workable. 3 
2.2.4. Provocation must be equally representative of all those who, 
due to receiving provocation, . have a reduced moral 
culpability, regardless of the particular · emotion they 
experienced. 
The retention of the 'loss of self-control' requirement effectively limits 
provocation to the emotion of anger, specifically 'sudden anger,' and tends 
to exclude emotions such as despair and fear due to its inherent temporal 
assumptions. This means that defendants who kill out of fear or despair 
. are usually excluded. 
2.2.5. Provocation's conceptual foundation must be clearly 
established and rigorously adhered to. 
A re-emphasised justificatory standard alongside a strong objective 
. standard is much·: closer to . the historical · conceptual . foundation of 
provocation than is the present law •. : . · · · 
2.2.6~ ProvQcation inust be kept clear of diminished responsibility, 
. :both in. theory and in practice. . .. 
'. '·' 
. The return to a strong objective standard; the retention of a requirement of 
a provocative act, and the element of justification, all clearly denote a 
formulation quite distinct from that of diminished responsibility. 
. . ~ .. 
3 See Lord Millett's example direction in Smith, Ibid., 7l5E. 
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2.2. 7. There must be an explicit requirement of a provocative action 
or incident. 
This plea reinstates an element of justification, requmng that the 
defendant have been provoked by illegal or unwarranted conduct deemed 
objectively grave. It is an essential element in this formulation. 
2.2.8. Provocation must be simple to understand and apply 
The primary difficulty with the 'classic line' approach was due to section 
3's 'reasonable man,' and the resultant 'split personality' direction to the 
jury. However, where the 'reasonable man' is clearly and carefully 
explained as a legal mechanism facilitating both a subjective assesment of 
the gravity of the provocation, and an objective evaluative standard of the 
defendant's conduct, it is contended to be an acceptable standard. 
2.2.9. Partieular attention needs to be paid to the risk of 'victim 
blame' resulting from any particular formulation. 
Formulations with a strong justificatory element inevitably focus on the 
conduct of the victim. There is a legitimate concern that this might result 
in 'victim-blame,' and would need careful judicial control. 
2.2.10. The judge must have sufficient freedom to as to be able to 
direct the plea. 
The post-Smith experience has demonstrated the importance of judicial 
empowerment over the provocation plea. Under this formulation, for the 
plea to reach the jury, the judge would need to consider that a reasonable 
jury might find provocation. Upon deciding so, the judge would direct the 
jury as to the standard they are to apply. 
2.2.11. The judge must not have so much power such that it impinges 
on the jury's role/function. . 
The Smith majority alleged the 'separation approach' to fail under this 
criterion. Under this present formulation, the judicial power to exclude a 
plea could result in overbearing judicial control. · However, with a clearly 
established objective standard, and a well-defmed jury role, the judge will 
have considerably less worry in permitting plea to go before the jury. 
2.2.12. The jury must have sufficient freedqm to carry out its 
nonnative evaluative role. 
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Under this formulation, the jury's role would be more narrowly defined 
than it presently is, due to the objective standard defining how they are to 
· assess the conduct of the defendant, and the judge's power to exclude the 
plea. However, in light of Smith, this is contended to be entirely 
· appropriate. 
2.2.13 .. The·jury must not have so much freedom that it is able to 
. define the standard it is to apply or exercise its role without 
guidance from the judge. 
The jury's role would be limited by the objective standard, which would 
be explained by the judge. This should effectively circumscribe the jury's 
power .. 
2.3. The Law Commission's proposed formulation. 
2.3.1. The objective standard must be sufficiently rigorous that it 
can be trusted to produce morally reliable results. 
This proposed formulation reverts to the 'separation approach,' thus 
reasserting a strong objective standard. 
2.3.2. If the objective standard is expressed through a 'reasonable 
man,' then he must be sufficiently defined so as to ensure 
certainty and precision in the jury's normative role. 
Under this formulation, the objective enquiry asks whether a "person of 
ordinary temperament, i.e. ordinary tolerance and self-restraint, in the 
circumstances of the defendant might have reacted in the same or a 
similar way. "4 While a significant improvement on the present standard 
of evaluation, some factors cause concern; particularly the use of the word 
'might,' and the phrase 'same or similar.' The combination of these two 
expressions might result in a jury being given undue latitude in applying 
the objective standard. 
2.3.3. The objective standard must not be so rigorous that it fails to 
recognise relevant characteristics of the defendant, and so 
operate harshly. 
The objective standard is a strong one, the 'separation approach' enabling 
some reference to the defendant's character, whiJe maintaining a separate 
standard of evaluation. The Smith majority'.s assertion of this to be overly 
harsh in application is not shared. 
4 Op. Cit., 2, 3.109. 
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2.3.4. Provocation must be equally representative of all those who, 
due to receiving provocation, have a reduced moral 
culpability, regardless of the particular emotion they 
experienced. 
The Law Commission's proposed formulation represents a strong attempt 
at broadening the scope of provocation, while retaining much of the 
framework of the 'classic line' formulation. In accepting 'fear of serious 
violence' towards the defendant or another as grounds for provocation, the 
Law Commission seeks to, in a single partial defence, combine 
provocation with excessive force in self-defence. While this improved 
representation of defendants is welcomed, the failure to cover emotions 
such as despair, grief, or compassion, is not adequately justified. 
2.3.5. Provocation's conceptual foundation must be clearly 
established and rigorously adhered to. 
The proposed plea is grounded in anger and fear, which the Law 
Commission contends have significant physiological similarities 
rendering them suitable as a two-fold basis for a partial defence. The 
return to a basis in justification does bring provocation significantly closer 
to self-defence, but there remain serious concerns over the scope of this 
formulation. It is not clear why anger and fear are singled-out, over other 
emotions equally deserving of mitigation. 
2.3.6. Provocation must be kept clear of diminished responsibility, 
both in theory and U. practice. 
·This formulation clearly re-establishes the difference between provocation 
and diminished responsibility; provocation as a partial defence for 
'ordinary persons in extraordinary circumstances,' and diminished 
responsibility as a partial defence looking to internal defects of the 
defendant reducing their culpability. 
2.3.7. There must be an explicit requirement of a provocative action 
or incident. 
The Law Commission formulation is based upon 'gross provocation' or 
'fear of serious violence.' The third ground, which recognises a 
combination of both, raises concerns that a case involving mild 
provocation with some fear of violence, where the victim is 
unsympathetic, might result in a 'sympathy lottery' scenario, enabling 
juries to use the third heading to grant undeserving pleas legal standing. 
5 Ibid., 3.141. 
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2.3.8. Provocation must be simple to underst~nd and apply 
The return to a strong objective standard, alongsid~ a re-emphasised basis 
in justification clearly re-establishes provocation's conceptual foundation. 
However, the inclusion of 'fear of serious violj::qce' is confusing in its 
exclusion of other emotions, especially whre combined with 'gross 
provocation' under the third basis of the plea. 
2.3.9. Particular attention needs to be paid to the risk of 'victim 
blame' resulting from any particular formulation. 
The justificatory nature of the 'gross provocation' ground for the plea 
inherently carries a risk of the victim's character being denigrated. The 
difficult balance between rightful blame of the victim, and exaggerated 
assassination of their character is best be left to judicial management. 
2.3.10. The judge must have sufficient freedom so as to be able to 
direct the plea. 
The proposed objective standard asks whether a "person of ordinary 
temperament, i.e. ordinary tolerance and self-restraint, in the 
circumstances of the defendant might have reacted in the same or a 
similar way. " It is assumed that the judge would have an active role in 
explaining its operation to the jury. The Law Commission's formulation 
also gives judicial power to exclude the plea: "A judge should not be 
required to leave the defence of provocation to the jury unless there is 
evidence on which a reasonable jury, properly directed, could conclude 
that it might apply. " 5 
2.3.11. The judge must not have too much power such that it impinges 
on the jury's role/function. 
The jury's role is well defined and significantly limited by the objective 
standard. While there is a danger that the judge's power to exclude a plea 
(where he contends that no reasonable jury would find provocation) could 
result in overbearing judicial control, with a clearly defined objective 
standard, judges should feel confident in letting pleas go before juries. 
2.3.12. The jury ·must have sufficient freedom to carry out its 
normative evaluative role. 
This proposal restricts the jury's role. The judge can only-permit a plea to 
go before the jury · if satisfied that a reasonable jury might find 
provocation, and then the jury's normative role ip limited to assessing the 
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defendant's actions by reference to a 'person of ordinary tolerance and 
self-restraint.' However, given the recent experience of subjectivisation 
of provocation this precise limiting of the jury's role is welcomed. 
2.3.13. The jury must not have so much free4om that it is able to 
define the standard it is to apply/exercise its role without 
guidance from the judge. 
There is a concern that the expression "a person of ordinary temperament, 
i.e. ordinary tolerance and self-restraint, in the circumstances of the 
defendant might have reacted in the same or a similar way" leaves too 
great a scope for the jury. By putting 'might' and 'similar' together, a jury 
could come up with a significantly watered doWn response from the 
'ordinary person,' and so significantly diminish the impact of the objective 
standard. 
2.4. Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance 
2.4.1. The objective standard must be sufficiently rigorous so that it 
can be trusted to produce morally reliable results. 
Section 210.3(1)(b) of the MPC is a highly subjective plea, which doesn't 
assess the defendant's actions, but rather the explanation for their actions 
''from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the 
circumstances as he believes them to be. " 
Mackay and Mitchell's proposal is significantly altered, asking whether 
the defendant was: 
"(a) Under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance and/or 
(b) Suffering from unsoundness of mind 
either or both of which affected his criminal behaviour to such a material 
degree that the offence ought to be reduced to one of manslaughter. " 
However, the standard to be applied remains vague: "To such a material 
degree" is very imprecise, and does little to instil confidence in the moral 
reliability of the plea. 
2.4.2, If the objective standard is expressed through a 'reasonable 
man,' then he must be sufficiently defined so as to ensure 
precision and clarity in the jury's normative role. 
There is no 'reasonable man' under this formulation (although some of the 
US states, when seeking to introduce the EMED plea, have introduced a 
'reasonable man' standard).6 
6 Maine and Ohio. 
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2.4.3. The objective standard must not be so rjgorous that it fails to 
recognise relevant characteristics of the defendant, and so 
operate harshly. 
The objective enquiry is quite weak, although this lack of precision raises 
the possibility of a harsh verdict according to jury prejudices. 
· 2.4.4. Provocation must be equally representative of all those who, 
due to having received provocation, have a reduced moral 
. culpability, regardless . of the parti((ular emotion they 
experienced. 
The major strength of EMED is that it is emotion-neutral. Rather than 
looking for some partial. merit in the emotion experienced by the 
defendant, it looks at the· intensity of their experience and whether this 
affected the defendant's criminal behaviour enough to warrant a reduction 
in class of offence. 
2.4.5. Provocation's conceptual foundation must be clearly 
established and rigorously adhered to. 
The conceptual ground for EMED or EED is clearly in excuse. The 
workability of this is unclear, and evidence from the US states that have 
considered or sought to enact section 210.3 (l)(b) is that its basis in 
excuse is difficult to accept; in the vast majority of cases its subjectivity 
has been tempered, in some cases to the extent of introducing an objective 
standard. 7 There clearly is considerable unease about the subjectivity of 
this plea, and the resultant plea is somewhat confused. 
2.4.6. Provocation must be kept clear of diminished responsibility, 
both in theory and in practice. 
Mackay and Mitchell consider a single united plea of EED to be the 
conceptually logical outcome of the recent developments in provocation 
law. However, there is a clear conceptual difference between 
provocation, which considers the external effects of circumstances on the 
defendant who is broadly ordinary, and diminished responsibility, in 
which the criminal liability of the defendant may be reduced due to 
internal conditions. Mackay and Mitchell assert both to have the same 
common root in disturbance of reasoning; this i~ strongly contended to be 
incorrect. (See Chapter 8, 4.2 and 4.3 for the disptission). · 
7 For example Oregon. 
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2.4. 7. There must be an explicit requirement of a provocative action 
or incident. 
There is no such requirement for EMED. The focus is entirely on the 
defendant's experience of emotion, rather than on external provocation. 
2.4.8. Provocation must be simple to underst~nf] and apply 
The EMED formulation is fraught with difficulties. The standard is so 
significantly subjectivised that it is in very real danger of being applied 
with unacceptable latitude by the jury. The case of State v Raguseo, (see 
· chapter 8 at 4.4) is perhaps indicative of the confusion and discomfort 
inherent in this plea. 
2.4.9. Particular attention needs to be paid to the risk of 'victim 
blame' resulting from any particular formulation. 
There is no danger of that here - the moral blameworthiness of the 
defendant has no discernible value concerning this formulation. The 
focus is entirely on the intensity of the emotion experience by the 
defendant. 
2.4.10. The judge must have sufficient freedom so as to be able to 
direct the plea. 
A significant feature of this formulation is that the judge has little power 
and must permit the jury to consider everything in assessing the plea. The 
judge does have a role where called upon by the jury to explain its 
function, but otherwise has no power over the scope of the plea. 
2.4.11. The judge must not have too much power such that it impinges 
on the jury's role or function. 
There seems little risk of that under this formulation. 
2.4.12. The jury must have sufficient free~om to carry out its 
normative evaluative role. 
The jury has huge freedom here, and there is no danger of it being 
deprived of this, unless it is reduced through j,Udicial interpretation, as 
happened in the US.9 . . 
8 622 A.2d 519 Conn. 1993. 
9 For example Ohio. 
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2.4.13. The jury must not have so much fr~dom that it is able to 
define the ·standard it is to apply or exercise its role without 
guidance from the judge. 
This is a grave concern. Under the MPC formulation, the jury has very 
wide-ranging power to determine the outcome of the plea, with reference 
only to the reasonableness of the defendant's explapation or excuse. Even 
under Mackay and Mitchell's reformulation, the latitude afforded to the 
jury remains considerable. 
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Chapter 11: Conclusion·to Provocation Reform 
The adoption of criteria-based approach has· enabled a clearer comparison of the 
ditierent provocation reform optiqns. The fi~t part of Jhis Ghapter draws provisional 
conclusions from this concerning reform o.f provocation. . 
However, the impact , of the .law . of. murder upon provo~ation. is of the greatest 
significance. . Accordingiy lbe .second part . of this chapt~r takes· a fmal view of 
.. prOV()~atjqn reforin jn th~.light of the mUrder law refOimS advised in .c!llipters .} and 2: 
. in particular, the novv viable option to a~olish provo.e;ation .. ·, ·. . . . . . 
3 .. CQn~lusions fr~m ·the Applicati~~.Ot Provo.cation Cnteda 
. . . ' . . . . . 
3.1. Problem of the excusatory pl~s 
Those. pleas of a more excuse-based: nature struggled against the criteria 
established and applied above. . The subjectivised plea is unreliable, and its 
retention of the widely condemned 'loss of self-conirol' require~ent is now 
unjustifiable. For this reason, the subjectivised plea is considered the weakest 
of the reform options available. 
The plea of EMED (or EED) also struggles because of the absence of an 
objective standard. Nourse highlights the dangers of such emotion-centred 
mitigation: . . . . 
"The problem comes when we focus on cases in which the emotion is based on 
less compelling reasons - when women kill their departing husbands or men kill 
their complaining wives. Under conventional liberal theory, if extreme emotion 
is shown, these cases should be handled no di.fftrently from cases where victims 
kill the rapists and stalkers and batterers. The quantity or intensity of the 
· emotio~ provid~s the exCU$e, not (he reason for the emotion. "1 
This encap~ulates the. inadequacy of EMED; the potential for unacceptable 
results pr~cludes its adoption. . . . . . 
3~2 .. .The justifi'catory form~~ations: sup~~or, 'but stil~ proble~atic. 
. . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The formulations . based in ju~tiflcaiion . are emin~~tl~. mo~e feasible; a 
requirement that the pr()voc~tive. ~lement be. illegal o~ unw:arranted would go 
some way to exchiding tin worthy pleas.·· · · · 
Regarding the formulation discusse~.)n C~ter 6, .the .r~tentiop of the 'loss of 
self~control' model is highly problematic. The Law Coinmission stated that it 
"was a judicially invented concept, lacking sharpness or a clear foundation in 
1 Nourse "Passion's Progress: Modern La~Refonn and the Provocation Defense" (1997) 106 Yale LJ 
1331, 1389-92. 
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psychology. It was a vali{lnt but flawed attempt to encapsulate a key limitation 
to the defonce - that it should not be available to those who kill in considered 
revenge. "2 The loss of 'self-control' requirement served a purpose, but is now 
antiquated and must be abolished. 
The Law Commission's proposed formulation is a stronger candidate for 
replacing the current partial defence. The proposed objective standard, 
returning to the 'separation of characteristics' approach, is welcome. Their 
formulation: "that a person of ordinary temperament, i.e. ordinary tolerance 
and self-restraint, in ihe circumstances ofthe defondant might have reacted in 
the same or a similar way, "3 is a8 clear as any evaluative standard could be in 
what remains a complicated partial defence. 
The primary concern regarding this proposal is its breadth. The third ground, 
combining gross provocation arid fear · of ·serious · violence, is potentially 
extremely broad. It is feared that with the emphasis on the wrongdoing of the 
victim, a jury might use this latitude to return a decision based on a dislike of 
the victim, rather than a consideration of the defendant's culpability. While this 
is tempered by the judicial power to exclude a plea where the judge contends 
that a reasonable jury could not find provocation, the third heading remains 
open to overbearing influence according to personal values. Furthermore, the 
exclusion of other emotions is not clearly explained or justified by the law 
commission. 
3.3. Suggested formulation 
A suggested formulation is offered, prior to a discussion of its' strengths and 
weaknesses. 
3.3.1.· Justificatory element 
This proposed· plea is based in wrongful action by the victim. The jury 
would consider whether the defendant was provoked by ''words and/or 
actions" to a ''justifiable sense of being seriously wronged."4 The gravity 
of the provocation would be assessed ·''from· the point ·of view of an 
ordinary person in the circumstances of the defendant, taking into account 
those characteristics of the defendant where relevant." . Any of the 
' 'defendant's beliefs which are contrary 'to ·tight and desirable societal 
values would be excluded from the jury's consideration by the judge. 
The loss·ofself-control requirement is. abOlished;. 
3.3.2. Standard of evaluation 
2 Final Report (2004) No. 173, 3.26, 3.28, 3.30. 
3 Ibid., 3.67. 
4 Ibid., 3 .68. 
5 Ibid. 
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The defendant's actions would be considered ag(!.inst an 'ordinary person' 
standard. The Law Commission's proposed standard enquires whether a 
"person of ordinary temperament, i.e. ordinary tolerance and self-
restraint, in the circumstances of the defendant might have reacted in the 
same or a similar way."5 The expression 'or similar' would be removed 
in favour of slightly narrowing the breadth of the enquiry. This is an 
important change: a standard containing both 'might' and 'or similar' 
indicates of a lack of evaluative rigour. 6 Requiring the jury to determine 
that a "person of ordinary temperament, i.e. ordinary tolerance and self-
restraint, in the circumstances of the defendant might have reacted in the 
same way" is contended to be a better approach; one which establishes an 
independent objective standard, clear and workable, for the jury to apply. 
3.3.3. Judicial powers 
The judge would be given control of the plea as follows: "The judge must 
consider that a reasonable jury might make a finding of provocation, 
before they can permit the plea of provocation to go before the jury." 
This is deemed necessary in light of the complex and controversial nature 
of provocation. 
The abolition of the loss of self-control standard would necessitate a 
specific provision stating that "where the judge considers that the 
defendant acted not in response to grave provocation, but out of revenge, 
the plea is to be excluded." 
3.3.4. Direction 
It is suggested that the following would make a suitable opening guidance 
from the judge in setting the context of a plea of provocation. 
"We each have a duty as citizens to abide by the law. The taking of life is 
the gravest offence possible against another humqn being, and breaches 
the most fundamental of rights - the right to life. For this reason, it is 
only in exceptional circumstances that the law considers such a person to 
have been provoked so gravely that they deserve to be convicted of 
manslaughter instead of murder." 
3.3.5. Discussion of this formulation 
- Narrow scope 
This formulation doesn't address the breadth of ~motions beyond anger 
which are capable of reducing culpability, and fpr this reason may be 
accused of unjustifiably privileging anger. This i~ accepted, but justified 
6 See Chapter 7, 4.2. 
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for the following reasons: Firstly, where a partial defence encompasses a 
broad range of emotions, it can lead to a 'lowest common denominator' 
standard of evaluation, leaving too great a scope for decisions to be driven 
by particular jury sympathies. Secondly, this thesis is limited to a 
consideration of provocation, and as such the other partial defences are 
beyond its scope. For example, a partial defence based upon self-defence 
is contended to be a strong plea, and one which would enable a better 
reflection and legal representation of the circumstances facing many 
battered women. Furthermore, this would relieve some of the pressure 
which has come to bear upon provocation due to the absence of an 
alternative plea better reflecting the plight of battered women. 
Unfortunately a fuller discussion of this plea was not possible within the 
scale and terms of reference of this work. 
- Restriction of the role of the jury 
The role of the jury is clearly circumscribed, and may be claimed to be 
unduly restrictive. However this is strongly contended to be appropriate 
given the recent history of provocation. Such is the controversial nature 
of the plea, and its impact upon the value of murder, that it cannot be 
rendered morally unreliable for the sake of greater jury freedom; a strong 
objective standard, precisely establishing the jury's evaluative role, is 
needed. The judicial power to exclude a plea might be a cause for 
concern, especially with the pre-Act case law in mind; however, under 
this formulation the objective standard and the jury's role are sufficiently 
clearly established that a judge should have few qualms in permitting a 
plea to go before a jury. 
- Return to the 'separation approach' 
The return to a plea based in the 'separation approach' is contended to be 
workable where clearly formulated. Under the 'classic line' the difficulty 
of this approach was due to the 'reasonable man' of section 3, and his 
seeming 'split-personality' with which the jury had to contend. However, 
as reformulated, the standard is contended .to be much clearer, and more 
workable. 
3.4. Conclusion 
This plea is contended to be the strongest reform option of those considered. 
Reinstating a strong objective standard, with a return to the basis in justification, 
is the means to reinstating provocation's moral legitimacy, while the limited 
scope of the formulation is deemed necessary in establishing a moral reliability 
to the provocation plea. 
Certain qualifications must be made to the endorsement of this formulation. As 
a single partial defence it will never be able to reflect tp.e different permutations 
of culpability across all the circumstances in which people are provoked to kill. 
The under-representation of the plight of those wqo are driven to kill by 
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emotions other than anger, needs to be specifically addressed through the 
reform, or through creation of specific legal mechanisms; seeking to broaden 
provocation and in so doing to address the breadth of conduct deserving of 
mitigation risks, repeating the "superficially liberal ruling"7 of Smith. 
Provocation must be reformed, and reformed with conceptual integrity - and the 
broader considerations of murder law handled within their own terms. 
4. Reform of Provocation in the light of the discussion c~ncerning reform of the 
laws of murder 
4.1. Introduction 
A crucial effect of any reform to the law of murder is the opportunity it provides 
for reform of provocation. More specific effects are considered here. 
In chapter 2, the abolition of mandatory life in favour of a limited sentencing 
discretion was established as the preferred reform option for murder. This 
would significantly impact provocation reform, eliminating provocation's 
primary function of mitigating the mandatory life sentence, and would render 
the option to abolish provocation a viable one. 
However, the move to a discretionary sentencing regime is radical, and is 
unlikely to happen in the near future. In this case, provocation retains its role, 
and the proposals in 1.3 need to be carried through. 
With this in mind, the following discussion briefly considers the impact of the 
changes recommended in chapters 1 and 2 on the provocation reform options 
already considered, before examining their effect on the option to abolish 
provocation. 
4.2. Effects of murder law changes on the proposed Provocation reforms 
4.2.1. Reform of gbh-intent 
Any narrowing of gbh-intent will reduce the number of gbh-intent murder 
defendants, and correspondingly the number improperly pleading 
provocation as a defence: this should make provpcation clearer and more 
reliable in general operation, under the proposed reform, and reinforces its 
superiority to more subjective alternatives. 
4.2.2. Reform of secondary intent 
7 
"Compassion without Respect? Nine fallacies in R v Smith" (2001) Criip. LR 623, 625. 
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The possible changes in secondary intent are unlikely to impact any of the 
provocation reform options 
4.2.3. Broadening of murder law 
Broadening of the ambit of murder to encompass "wicked recklessness" or 
"extreme indifference to life" are both likely to generate increased 
numbers of improper pleas of provocation: the strict nature of the 
proposed provocation formulation is advantageous in circumstances 
where juries may find the range of considerations greatly increased. 
4.3. Arguments for the Abolition of Provocation 
4.3.1. Provocation favours action in anger 
The scope of provocation exposes an absence of coherent development of 
the criminal defences. Provocation, as presently defined, mitigates action 
in anger, more specifically 'sudden anger;' this is difficult to understand 
when defendants just as deserving of mitigation are convicted of murder 
because they reacted out of fear or despair instead. Likewise coercion, in 
most common law jurisdictions, is no answer to murder; "yet a defendant 
who kills in the face of a threat to his or her own or a loved one 's life 
seems no less deserving of a manslaughter verdict than the provoked 
killer. "8 Even the Law Commission's proposed formulation only 
broadens provocation to include fear of serious violence, failing to 
represent other equally mitigating emotions. 
4.3.2. Provoked killings are intentional 
A provoked killer formulates the intention to kill or cause gbh, and acts 
with this intent; provocation is not a denial of mens rea. This is of huge 
importance. As the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee stated: 
"[P]eople who lose self-control are not perceived as being in the same 
category as people who act automatically or without intention. The 
person who acts in circumstances of extreme passion does act with 
conscious volition [and] such people do intend their actions and results 
thereof"9 The New Zealand LRC extends this argument: "The notion of 
an intentional killing being reduced to manslaughter, which most lay 
people think of as non-intentional killing, confuses people, in particular 
those close to the victim. " 10 ' 
8 
.ILRC 'Consultation Paper on Homicide: The Plea of Provocation' (LRC CP27-2003) (October 2003), 
6.32. 
9 Australian Model Criminal Code Officers Committee 'Discussion Paper on Fatal Offences Against 
the Person' ( 1998), 87. Hereafter 'MCCOC.' 
10 NZ LRC 'Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants' Report 73 
(2001) Wellington, 110. 
11 Ibid. 
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If intentional killings evading a murder conviction are not reliably 
accompanied by reduced moral culpability, the integrity of murder is 
compromised. 
4.3.3. Inconsistency with other offences where provocation goes 
toward sentencing 
Some have argued that provocation should only be a matter for 
consideration at the sentencing stage.ll Under the present system this is 
not possible, but under a discretionary sentencing regime it would become 
a distinct gossibility. Provocation has been criticised as a "blunt and 
unwieldy" instrument, a crude mechanism designed to accommodate the 
indeterminate sentence; and were mandatory life to be abolished, this 
"elevated status, "13 would be far harder to defend. 
4.3.4. Overly complicated 
The New Zealand LRC, in its 2001 review of criminal defences, cited the 
argument that provocation is overly complicated: "Because of the 
difficulties judges and juries have with the defence, there is a real concern 
that it is being applied unevenly from trial to trial. There must be cases 
where the jury simply decides the matter according to the level of 
sympathy felt for the defendant. "14 This concern is shared, although there 
are no figures on how widespread this problem may be. 
4.3.5. Gender biased 
The MCCOC argued that provocation is a gender-biased plea which fails 
to represent the normal pattern of aggression in women; asserting this to 
be so deeply established that the only suitable solution is outright 
abolition. 15 
This was challenged by the Irish LRC: "although there is some evidence 
[ofthis] ... studies in Victoria and New South Walffs .. .[have) reached the 
opposite c~usion."16 However, Horder, reviewing statistics similarly 
suggestive' of provocation favouring women, conyludes that the proportion 
of these who would have suffered significant qo:rp.estic violence is such 
that in reality provocation is biased against women. 
12 Wells, "The Death penalty for Provocation?" (1978) Crim. LR 668, 671. 
13 Op. Cit., 2, 89. 
14 Op. Cit., I 0, 110. 
15 Op. Cit., 2, 87. 
16 Op. Cit., 8, 6.37. 
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The New Zealand LRC concluded its report on 'Some Criminal Defences 
with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants,' stating that 
"Provocation is gender biased: the difficulties of the defence are 
heightened for the defendant who has offended in the context of a 
battering relationship."17 
Accurate statistics are difficult to obtain due to the tendency not to 
distinguish between different types of manslaught~r conviction, but those 
available suggest that provocation disproportionately favours men. 18 
4.3.6. Artificial 
Wells argues strongly that provocation is an artificial defence, failing to 
accurately represent the circumstances of the defendant; "The result is a 
defence that constrains and constructs homicides into ·distortions of 
people 's lives, adversely affecting victims' families, defendants, and more 
generally lending legitimacy to superficial examples of violence."19 The 
absence of other partial defences (such as 'excessive force in self-
defence') has led to a favouring of a particular profile of the provoked 
defendant deserving of mitigation, failing to represent the reality of many 
defendants facing provocation. 
4.3.7. Those who lose self-control and kill may re-offend 
The mandatory life sentence is often justified as necessary in protecting 
the public from dangerous offenders, and yet provocation can operate in 
contradiction of this aim: those who kill in a state of sudden loss of self-
control in response to provocation, are much more likely to re-offend than 
battered women responding to years of sustained abuse by killing their 
abuser (yet these often will be excluded from provocation for want of 
being in a state of 'loss of self-control'). In this, provocation may 
legitimately be accused of enabling dangerous offenders to receive 
determinate sentences, and be released without any assessment of their 
danger to the public. 
4.4. Arguments for the Retention of Provocation 
4.4.1. Provoked killings are morally less culpable than unprovoked 
ones, and this should be addressed at trial stage 
17 Op. Cit., 10, 108. 
18 See Edwards "Battered Women who Kill" (1990) 140 New LJ 1380. 
19 
"Provocation: the Case for Abolition", Ashworth and Mitchell Ed.s 'Rethinking English Homicide 
Law' (2000), 86. 
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This argument states that, according to the principle of 'fair labelling,' 
provoked killers should not be convicted of murder.20 Ashworth states 
that "there are significant moral distinctions between murder, killing upon 
provocation, and killing while suffering from diminished responsibility, 
and we should think hard before abandoning all hope of designing a law 
to capture those distinctions."21 Under an indeterminate sentencing 
regime; this is a potent argument; but under a discretionary regime, the 
'significant moral distinctions' can be better reflected through specific 
sentencing. 
4.4.2. Gender-bias overstated . 
The Irish LRC stated that the "argument that the defence is irremediably 
discriminatory in its effects seems overstated."22 The absence of broad, 
in-depth research renders it difficult to accurately establish the scale of 
this problem. There is a clear favouring of male reactions in anger, but its 
extent remains unclear. 
There are significant issues concerning its application, and it is a 
legitimate criticism that provocation, in mitigating actions in anger which 
are by nature more masculine, sends out a wrong message. This is 
amplified in the absence of other partial defences more representative of 
the dilemma facing battered women. 
4.43. Problems will resurface elsewhere if provocation is simply 
abolished 
In 2003, the Irish LRC stated; "following abolition, the concept of 
intention could become the new battleground for the provoked killer 
seeking a manslaughter verdict." It argued that the problems associated 
with this would "make the current difficulties associated with the plea of 
provocation pale into insignificance."23 · The Law Commission of 
England and Wales recognised a similar risk that "a jury, whose sympathy 
for the defendant is evoked by the circumstances of the killing, would be 
reluctant to convict, despite very strong evidence that the defendant killed 
with the mens rea for murder. ,,24 
· This is an important concern, but it is contended that where the sentencing 
regime for murder permits a more accurate reflection of the culpability of 
defendants, juries would have fewer problems in convicting a defendant 
of murder. 
20 Ibid.; Ashworth 'Principles of Criminal Law' (1999), 284; CLRC 'Offences Against. the Person 
(1980) Cmnd 7844' 14th Report, 76. 
21 
"Commentary on Weller" (2003) Crim. LR 724, 726. 
22 Op. Cit. 8, 6.40. 
23 Ibid. 
24 
'Partial Defences to Murder' (2003) (LCCP173), 12.22(3) 
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4.5. Conclusion 
A majority of review bodies favour the retention of provocation where there is a 
discretionary sentencing regime. In England and Wales, both the CLRC and the 
Select Committee of the House of Lords recommended that the partial defence 
should be retained regardless of whether the sentence for murder is 
discretionary or not. 25 Likewise, the four Australian states that have introduced 
a sentencing discretion for murder have retained their partial defences, 26 and the 
Irish LRC concluded its report on provocation in favour of its retention. 27 The 
Law Commission of England and Wales, stated that it favoured "the reform 
rather than the abolition of the defence, " reasoning that "most civilised systems 
of law have gradations of homicide which allow for the existence of extenuating 
circumstances. "28 
Despite the force of these recommendations, this author strongly feels that 
provocation should be abolished, contingent upon a move to a limited 
discretionary sentencing power for murder. 
The fundamental reason is that a provoked killer remains an intentional killer: 
they have intentionally transgressed the most fundamental of rights, the right to 
life. In some circumstances the offender will have suffered extreme 
provocation, but the defence's inability to adequately reflect these cases or 
circumstances, renders it unjust. 
The Law Commission's proposed formulation covers anger and fear of serious 
violence, but fails to satisfactorily justify the exclusion of other emotions, and 
raises concerns over the effect of the breadth of the third ground. Even the 
proposed formulation of 1.3 has significant drawbacks, prioritising anger over 
other emotions, failing to address the narrowness of provocation in the absence 
of a partial defence to mitigate the harshness of self-defence. Each proposed 
formulation has significant limitations, struggling against the need to represent 
the breadth of circumstances in which defendants are provoked to kill, while 
ensuring moral reliability. 
The arguments in favour of abolition are very strong. Wells stated: 
''A substantive defence is a somewhat blunt and unwieldy instrument with which 
to deal with the inevitably wide spectrum of murder containing an element of 
provocation. Some will be clear cut, others on the borderline. If the question 
were left to be taken into account in sentencing each r;ase could be dealt with 
individually, reflecting this range more accurately."29 
25 Op. Cit., 13, CLRC, 76; House ofLords Select Committee, Session 19~8-89 (HL Paper 78-1), 142. 
26 No mandatory sentence for murder exists in Tasmania (Criminal Coqe (Tas) s 158); NSW (Crimes 
Act 1990 (NSW) Ss19A(3), 442); Victoria (Crimes Act 1958 (Vie) s3); ~11 fhe state jurisdictions have a 
provocation defence. 
27 Op. Cit., 8, 6.41. 
28 Op. Cit., 2, 344. 
29 Op. Cit., ll, 671. 
141 
The New Zealand LRC echoed this argument; "We recommend abolition of the 
partial defence of provocation. Matters of provocation can be taken into 
account in the exercise of a sentencing discretion for murder." It went on to 
state that "Provocation can be considered on sentencing in a broad, non-
technical way that avoids the difficulties posed by the technicalities of the legal 
defence. "30 
It is difficult to endorse retention of provocation in any form when there remain 
significant questions over its very basis in law. Sullivan stated, "there is clearly 
something problematic about condoning, even partially, violence used not in 
self-defence or under duress but perpetrated in anger. "31 The Law Commission 
echoed this: "many would challenge the idea that in today's society the 
provocative behaviour of a victim should ever be regarded as partial 
justification for a defendant responding by killing with the intent required for 
murder. "32 
New Zealand LRC questioned the retention of a partial defence rooted in 
archaic values; "The defence arose at a time when society supported an angry 
retaliation for slights against a man's "honour." Despite later developments, 
this historical genesis can still be seen in the modern defence."33 
Provocation is an important factor affecting the moral culpability of the 
defendant, but it is not reliably reflected through a substantive legal mechanism. 
A discretionary sentencing regime, by contrast, would enable a very specific 
approach to sentencing. 
Last words 
This author strongly feels that if the sentencing regime for murder is reformed, 
and a limited discretionary sentencing power established in a timely fashion, 
then provocation should be abolished, and the matter of provocation left as an 
element which goes to sentencing. If, however, this does not happen, the 
formulation favoured in 1.3 should be introduced. It would be unforgivable if 
the lessons and discussion of the last fifty years failed to produce a workable 
resolution to murder and provocation. 
30 Op. Cit., 10, 120. New Zealand stated that in response to its consultation paper, "The submissions 
were marginally in favour of abolition if the mandatory life sentence for rpurder is abolished." ( 11 0). 
31 Sullivan, "Anger and Excuse: Reassessing Provocation" (1995) OJLS 421,426. 
32 Op. Cit., 24, 12.13. 
33 Op. Cit., 19, 117. 
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